Volume IX. 1846. The QUEEN V. GREAT NORTH of ENGLAND Railway Company. 4th count, like the third, but omitting the termini of the highway. There were five other counts, charging offences against the provisions of stats. 6 & 7 W. 4. c. cv. and 7 W. 4. & 1 Vict. c. cii. Plea, Not guilty. Issue thereon. On the trial, before Wightman J., at the Durham Spring assizes, 1845, evidence was given, on the part of the prosecution, to shew that the Company had cut through a carriage road with the railway, and had carried the road over the railway by a bridge not satisfying the statutory provisions. For the defendants, it was objected that no indictment for a misfeasance could be maintained against a corporation; and, as to the first four counts, that the defendants were authorised to cut through the road and erect the bridge, and that, if, in doing so, they had not complied with the statutory provisions, they ought to have been indicted for breach of those provisions (a). Other objections were taken to the last five counts, which it is unnecessary to state. A verdict was found for the Crown on all the counts, leave being reserved to move to enter a verdict for the defendants, or to arrest the judgment. In Easter term, 1845, Wortley obtained a rule accordingly. In this term (b), The pro Granger, Otter and Bovill shewed cause. secutors do not insist on the last five counts: the first four sufficiently raise the question, whether a corporation (a) The argument, as to this point, in banc, is omitted in the report, the Court having pronounced no express decision upon it: Regina v. Scott, 3 Q. B. 543., was referred to. (b) Tuesday, May 26th, and Monday June 8th. Before Lord Denman C. J., Patteson and Wightman Js. The Queen's Bench. 1846. aggregate can be indicted for a misfeasance. (a) 12 Mod. 559. Case 935. (c) 2 B. & Ald. 646. (e) Vol. ii. p. 58. 7th ed. VOL. IX. N. S. Y (b) 3 Q. B. 223. The QUEEN GREAT NORTH of ENGLAND Railway Com pany. Volume IX. 1846. The QUEEN of ENGLAND pany. a corporation in Maund v. The Monmouthshire Canal Company (a); debt on statute, in Tilson v. The Warwick Gas Light Company (b); trover, in Yarborough v. The Bank of GREAT NORTH England (c) and Smith v. The Birmingham Gas ComRailway Company (d); case for neglect to perform repairs, according to the terms of a charter, in Henly v. The Mayor of Lyme (e); case for neglect in performing works, in Matthews v. West London Water Works Company (g); case for not keeping clear the navigation of a canal in which the corporation had power to take tolls, in The Lancaster Canal Company v. Parnaby (h). And, in Beverley v. The Lincoln Gas Light and Coke Company (i) and Church v. The Imperial Gas Light and Coke Company (k), it was held that assumpsit, on a contract not under seal, might be maintained against and by a corporation. In the former of these two cases, the Court expressed a readiness to sanction any decisions which they found introducing a relaxation of "a rule established in a state of society very different from the present, at a time when corporations were comparatively few in number, and upon which it was very early found necessary to engraft many exceptions." In Church v. The Imperial Gas Light and Coke Company (k) the Court said: "wherever to hold the rule applicable would occasion very great inconvenience, or tend to defeat the very object for which the corporation was created, the exception has prevailed." [Patteson J. Has not the movement recently been rather (a) 4 M. & G. 452. (c) 16 East, 6. (b) 4 B. & C. 962. (e) 5 Bing. 91. Affirmed on error, in Q. B. Mayor &c. of Lyme Regis v. Henley, 3 B. & Ad. 77. In the House of Lords, Same v. Same, 1 New Ca. 222. (g) 3 Campb. 403. (h) 11 A. & E. 230, in Er. Ch. ; affirming the judgment of Q. B. in Parnaby v. The Lancaster Canal Company, 11 d. & E. 223. (i) 6 A. & E. 829. (k) 6 A. & E. 846. 1846. The QUEEN V. GREAT NORTH of ENGLAND Railway Com pany. in the opposite direction (a)?] In Hall v. The Mayor Queen's Bench. &c. of Swansea (b) a corporation was held to be liable in assumpsit for money had and received. In Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton (c) the Court of Exchequer said: "In modern times a new class of exceptions has arisen. Corporations have of late been established, sometimes by royal charter, more frequently by act of parliament, for the purpose of carrying on trading speculations; and where the nature of their constitution has been such as to render the drawing of bills, or the constant making of any particular sort of contracts necessary for the purposes of the corporation, there the Courts have held that they would imply in those who are, according to the provisions of the charter or act of parliament, carrying on the corporation concerns, an authority to do those acts, without which the corporation could not subsist." That is the doctrine of Murray v. The East India Company (d). Here the corporation is a railway company, with the ordinary powers (e) of interfering with roads on certain conditions; and the offence charged is peculiarly one likely to be committed in the performance of acts which the corporation may have occasion to do. No difficulty exists as to connecting them with such acts: Rex v. Medley (g) shews that members of a company, who authorise their servants to commit an act amounting to a nuisance, are liable to be indicted with such servants it follows that the corporate body, which has the power of authorising an act under seal, is indictable (a) See cases collected in Paine v. Strand Union, 8 Q. B. 326. (d) 5 B. & Ald. 204. 210. (e) It is not thought necessary to set these out. (g) 6 C. & P. 292, Volume IX. 1846. for such act, if it be a breach of the law. So a corporation may distrain wrongfully by their servant, Smith The QUEEN v. The Birmingham Gas Company (a). In Rex v. ShelderGREAT NORTH ton (b) the inhabitants of a place were indicted for digging Railway Com in a highway; but the point was not discussed. The com V. of ENGLAND pany. mon law punishment for a nuisance is fine, or imprisonment, or both. The first of these can be inflicted on a corporation. And the reasoning which the Court used in Rex v. Trafford (c) seems applicable. It was there said that an action on the case would have lain, and that it followed that an indictment lay. Here trespass would lie. [Patteson J. Judgment in that case was reversed on error in the Exchequer Chamber (d): it then was taken up to the House of Lords, but never determined.] The reversal was on the ground that the statements in the special verdict were insufficient: no objection was made to the test propounded in this Court. That which, if committed against an individual, would be ground for an action is ground for an indictment, if committed against the public. Reference may perhaps be made to The Case of Sutton's Hospital (e), where it is said that a corporation aggregate "cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no souls." But that is met by the distinction already pointed out: no actual breach of the peace, perhaps, can be the subject of indictment against a corporation; nor can the judgment proper to treason or felony be executed upon them. But they can, by their servant, obstruct a highway, and may be fined for doing so, or may be compelled to (d) Trafford v. The King, 8 Bing. 204. ; S. C. 2 Cro. & J. 265. |