Volume IX. 1846. The QUEEN V. The Inhabitants of Holbeck (a) the exception relied upon related to the time of work. Sir F. Kelly, Solicitor General, Pickering and Hardy, NORTHOWRAM. Contrà. It appears that the workmen are presumed to be incompetent. [Patteson J. Bagot's wages are exactly the same that the Browns are to receive for over work, after the first three months.] That must be on the assumption that they will have become more competent workmen in the three months, and shews that their improvement was contemplated in the contract. [Patteson J. I do not see how either of the Browns could enforce any contract for teaching.] In Rex v. Combe (b) and Rex v. Crediton (c) there was no direct contract to teach; but there, as here, such a contract might arise by implication. The decision of the sessions can have no weight in the interpretation of a written agreement. In Rex v. Billinghay (d) this Court treated a written contract as a contract of hiring and service, quashing the order of Sessions, which assumed that it was an imperfect contract of apprenticeship: and Lord Denman C. J. rested his decision on the ground that there was no provision for learning or teaching: here such a provision appears. Rex v. Burbach (e) is clearly overruled by Rex v. Crediton (c): that is the view taken by Patteson J. in Rex v. Newtown (g). In the case last mentioned, a contract was held to be an imperfect contract of apprenticeship: Littledale J. suggested, as a test, that the master might not have been entitled to insist on employing the pauper in any other busi (a) 4 Q. B. 590. (b) 8 B & C. 82. (g) 1 A. & E. 238. 243. Queen's Bench, 1846. The QUEEN V. The Inhabit ants of ness; and that is so here. [Patteson J. So it would have been if a fully competent person had been hired to work flannel.] In Rex v. St. Margaret's, King's Lynn (a), the bargain, which was not in writing, appeared to be merely the acceptance of a proposal, by NORTHOWRAM, a shoemaker, to take the pauper to learn his business; and this was held to be a defective contract of apprenticeship. Rer v. Nether Knutsford (b) is not distinguishable from the present case. Nothing can turn upon the fact that Bagot, who is to teach, may be a mere superintendant. The contract, as between the Browns and the employer, was in this respect no other than it would have been if Bagot had been the employers' partner. As to the question of exceptive hiring, the test is whether J. Brown, after performing a certain quantity of work, was at liberty to work or not, as he pleased. The case resembles Rex v. Edgmond (c) and Rex v. Gateshead (d). [Lord Denman C. J. I must say that, when previous cases run close upon each other, the best way is to apply the mind honestly to the one case which is before the Court. I have no doubt that this is a contract not exceptive. I regret much to see such cases reserved.] It cannot be said that any rule has been laid down which will prevent a contract, absolute in the first instance, from becoming exceptive by a subsequent qualification: Rex v. Gateshead (d) proves the contrary. Lord DENMAN C. J. I need not repeat that I do not consider this an exceptive contract. As to the question, Volume IX. 1846. The QUEEN V. whether it is merely an imperfect contract of apprenticeship, the Court has, in former times, seemed to treat contracts as if a hiring, which included a teaching, The Inhabit ceased to be a hiring under which a settlement could be NORTHOWRAM gained by hiring and service. But I do not see why there should not be both a hiring and a contract to ants of learn and teach: the one may exclude the other, but PATTESON J. The question as to the exception being disposed of, the remaining point is, whether this is an imperfect contract of apprenticeship. The controversy having been always upon terms in particular contracts, there may naturally appear to have been conflicting decisions. Here the parties at first agree to hire and be hired, for three years, to dress silk. Stopping there, no apprenticeship appears; nothing is said about learning or teaching. Then comes a clause by which Bagot is to receive so much for superintending and teaching, and to be answerable for the work. Can we from that infer that the main object of the contract was teaching? I think no such consequence follows. I do not see how James Brown could bring any action for not being taught. Wherever teaching and learning are the objects of a contract, though there be no perfect apprenticeship, there would be some remedy; and I can find nothing like that here. Therefore the contract must be interpreted from the earliest words; and it will be one of hiring. WILLIAMS J. I think this case is like Rex v. Billinghay (a): though I agree with my Lord that the sound rule is to interpret each particular case by itself. Had that been always the mode of deciding, much fewer cases would have been sent to us. The attempt to lay down a general rule for such cases, leads only to attempts to evade it. As to the question of exceptive hiring, I will only say that, after an express contract of hiring for three years, the subsequent words must be very distinct to introduce an exception. Rex v. Woodhurst (b) may however be a right decision: the mention of the whole quantity of bricks to be made might perhaps be sufficient to overpower what, as a general rule, is, I think, the proper inference from a contract naming a particular time of service. As to the other point, I will merely say that, if the doctrine had been held, and acted on, that, wherever teaching was introduced into the contract, this put an end to the supposition of a contract for hiring and service, it might possibly (I say no more) have prevented all questions. In Rex v. Billinghay (a) it might have been contended that teaching was contemplated by the agreement: but this Court, contrary to the decision of the sessions, held the contract to be one of hiring and service. (a) 5 A. & E. 676. Order of sessions confirmed. (b) 1 B. & Ald. 325. Volume IX. 1846. Wednesday, An order of removal, having "borough of D." in the margin, reciting a complaint of the overseers of a parish in the borough of D., to R. and K., "being two of her Majesty's justices of the peace having jurisdiction The QUEEN against The Inhabitants of the A CERTIORARI had been obtained, upon a Judge's fiat at chambers, absolute in the first instance, to bring up, for the purpose of quashing them, an order, under the hands and seals of Robert Rundle and Samuel Kerswill, Esquires, two justices of the peace for the borough of Devonport in Devonshire, dated 22nd February 1845, for the removal of Abraham West, his wife and four children, from the parish of Stoke Damerel in the said borough, to the parish of Newton Ferrers in the within and for said county, and an order of the Devonshire Quarter Sessions, made 8th April 1845, confirming the order of removal. the said bo rough," and not otherwise shewing that the order was made within the jurisdiction, is bad. And the the order, and an order of sessions affirming brought up by a certiorari, granted, in the The orders having been brought up, it appeared that the original order of removal had the words " Borough Court quashed of Devonport" in the margin, and was addressed "To the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the it, the two being parish of Stoke Damerel in the borough of Devonport in the county of Devon, and to the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of Newton Ferrers in the said county of Devon, and to each and every of them ;" and it purported to be made "upon the complaint of the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of Stoke Damerel aforesaid, in the county of Devon, unto us, Robert Rundle, Esquire, Mayor, and Samuel Kerswill, Esquire, whose names are hereunto set and seals affixed, being two of Her Majesty's Justices of the peace having jurisdiction within and for the said first instance and without a rule to shew cause, by fiat of a Judge at Chambers, |