1846. JAMES V. BROOK. sarily import that the plaintiff had been guilty of Queen's Bench. adultery in the course of exercising his profession; and that the declaration ought to have connected the imputation with the profession. Here it might possibly be said that the word "guilty" indicates some evil practice: but, when we look at what follows, we see that the discourse might refer only to some inquiries which the plaintiff was led to pursue, in the course of his office, and which it could not be fit to publish. PATTESON J. I cannot see how we are to distinguish this case from Ayre v. Craven (a). The language at the end of the judgment there is closely applicable here, and establishes the doctrine that, where a charge is not necessarily connected with a profession, the declaration must shew how the speaker did connect it. But here the words only declare that the speaker had seen a letter imputing that an officer of the Leeds police force "had been guilty of conduct unfit for publication." Lumby v. Allday (b), though in some respects distinguishable, rests on the same doctrine. The only difference between the present case and Ayre v. Craven (a) is, that in Ayre v. Craven (a) the declaration did not charge that the discourse was held concerning the plaintiff in his profession, or concerning the profession, but only "of and concerning the said plaintiff, so carrying on the said profession :" but then the declaration went on to say that the words were spoken "of and concerning him in his said profession;" so that really that case is on all fours with the present. (a) 2 A. & E. 2. (b) 1 C. & J. 301; S. C. 1 Tyrwh, 217. Volume IX. 1846. JAMES V. BROOK. WILLIAMS J. I cannot distinguish this case from Ayre v. Craven (a). The word "guilty," here, might, as my Lord remarks, seem to give a character to the conduct stated to be unfit for publication: but, after all, that shews rather the view taken of the conduct by the speaker than the conduct itself. But, even if the words have a natural tendency to produce injury in the profession, the declaration is wholly wanting in any explanation of the way in which the speaker connected the conduct with the profession. That was the objection on which this Court acted in Ayre v. Craven (a). Rule absolute (b). (a) 2 A. & E. 2. (b) See Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624. Also Le Fanu v. Malcomson, in Dom. Proc., 27th June 1848, 1 Ho. of Lords Cases. Friday, Before stat. 8 Ann. c. 14. s. 6., rent, accruing before the expiration of a tenancy, could not be distrained for after the te nancy expired, though the tenant con tinued in occupation. Therefore, where an WILLIAMS against STIVEN. REPLEVIN for taking plaintiff's cattle and chattels in two closes. The defendant, besides two other pleas, avowed, for that plaintiff, for a long time, to wit two years next before and ending on a certain day, to wit 2nd February 1844, and from thence until and at the said time when &c., held and enjoyed the said closes in which &c., as tenant thereof to defendant, by virtue of a demise thereof to plaintiff theretofore made, at a yearly rent, to wit arrere is framed the yearly rent of 201., payable half yearly on the 2nd August and 2nd February in every year: and, because avowry for rent at common law, it must be al leged and proved that the tenancy continued up to the time of the distress. 1846. WILLIAMS the sum of 40% of the rent aforesaid, for the space of Queen's Bench. two years ending as aforesaid, on &c. (2nd February), and from thence until and at the said time when &c., was due and in arrear from plaintiff to defendant, defendant. well avows the taking &c., and justly &c., as for and in the name of a distress for the said rent so due &c. Plea in bar. That plaintiff did not hold or enjoy the close in which &c., as tenant thereof to defendant, in manner &c.: conclusion to the country. Issue thereon. There were other issues, which it is not necessary to state. On the trial, before Platt B., at the Monmouthshire Spring assizes, 1845, it appeared that the distress was made, in July 1844, for rent due for the time stated in the avowry; and evidence was given, on the part of the defendant, to shew that the plaintiff held the land as tenant to the defendant from year to year, at a yearly rent of 204, payable on the 2nd of August and 2nd of February, on which latter day the current year ended: but the plaintiff proved that he had been served, on 26th June 1843, by the defendant, with a notice to quit, of that date. It was hereupon contended, for the plaintiff, that his tenancy had ceased before the distress was made, and he was therefore a mere trespasser at the time of the distress, and was entitled to a verdict on the issue above mentioned. The learned Baron reserved leave to move to enter a verdict for the plaintiff on this issue, and directed a verdict for the defendant. On the other issues the plaintiff had a verdict. In Easter term, 1845, Alexander obtained a rule to enter the verdict on this issue for the plaintiff, or for a new trial. He cited Jenner v. Clegg (a). (a) 1 Moo. & Rob. 213. STIVEN. Volume IX. 1846. WILLIAMS V. STIVEN. Whateley and F. V. Lee now shewed cause (a). In Jenner v. Clegg (b) the marginal note states that "a tenant holding over after notice to quit given by the landlord, is not liable to a distress, without some evidence of a renewal of the tenancy." But, in that case, the rent distrained for did not become due before the tenancy expired, so that there was no right to distrain : here the tenancy did not expire till after the day on which the rent was due. The same distinction applies to Alford v. Vickery (c). Jenner v. Clegg (b) Alexander and Smythies, contrà. shews that, after a notice to quit has expired, the landlord cannot affirm the tenancy by distraining, and that the tenant does not do so by continuing his occupation. Then the only question is whether a party continuing in possession after his tenancy expires is liable to have his goods distrained for rent which accrued during the tenancy. The avowry here is not framed under stat. 8 Ann. c. 14. ss. 6, 7.: and, before that statute, no right to distrain continued after the determination of the tenancy; 1 Bro. Abr. Distresse, pl. 19; 1 Rol. Abr. 672, Distress, (O) 8. 10. Therefore it is a material allegation, in this avowry, that the plaintiff continued tenant up to the time of the distress; which is negatived by the evidence. Without that allegation, the avowry would have been bad; Banks v. Angell (d), Innes v. Colquhon (e). 1846. Lord DENMAN C. J., in this term (May 26th), de- Queen's Bench. livered the judgment of the Court. Numerous points were made in this case (a), in which the plaintiff obtained a verdict on two issues, the defendant on the third, subject to a motion for entering a verdict for the plaintiff on that also, if the Court should think him entitled to it. The learned Baron reports that he reserved questions on evidence of the identity of the premises distrained upon, and on the defendant's right to distrain after he had given notice to quit. On this latter point, Jenner v. Clegg (b) was cited; which is not applicable, because the rent there distrained for became due after the determination of the tenancy by notice to quit from the landlord. But it was argued that, as the avowry here was at common law and not under the statute of 8 Ann. c. 14. S. 6., it was not good after determination of the lease by landlord's notice. And it is clear from Co. Lit. 47 b. and 1 Ro. Ab. 672, Distress (O) pl. 10, Com. Dig. Distress (A 2.), that this is so. The plaintiff therefore is entitled to have the rule absolute. Rule absolute to enter a verdict for (a) The report is confined to the point upon which the Court decided. (6) 1 Moo. & Rob. 213. WILLIAMS V. STIVEN. |