1 Retrospective effect of provisions extending taxation to bills formerly nót taxable.

A plea, to an action of assumpsit, that the action is for an attorney's charges, and was brought since the passing of stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73., and that no bill was delivered, is good, though it do not shew that the charges are such as were taxable before the statute, or that the business was done since. So held on special demurrer.

To a count on an account stated, it is a good plea that the account was stated solely of and concerning charges for work done as an attorney, and that no bill was delivered.

In such pleas, it is a sufficient confession to state that the action is brought to recover the amount of

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charges "by the plaintiff claimed and demanded to be due to him from the defendant for work done" &c., " and that the work was done by plaintiff for defendant as his attorney and not otherwise." So held on special demurrer. Scadding v. Eyles, 858.

2. Where bill formerly not taxable, when to be delivered.

The clause (sect. 37) of stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 75.. making attorneys' bills taxable though the business was all transacted out of Court, is retrospective; but delivery of a bill for such business, done before the act passed, is not valid unless the bill was delivered since the passing of the act, as well as one month before commencing an action.

Quare, whether an action may be commenced since the statute without delivery of a new bill, where a bill has been delivered, and the charges were taxable, before the statute.

In an action for an attorney's charges, if the plaintiff fails on the count for work and labour because no bill has been delivered, he cannot recover under a count upon an account stated, though he prove that the charges were assented to by the client. Brooks v. Bockett, 847.

5. Delivery of new bill, when required, 847. Åntè, 2.

4. Effect of not having delivered, 847. Antè, 2.

5. Not dispensed with by admission of items, 847. Antè, 2.

6. Pleading taxability need not be
alleged in plea, 858. Antè, 1.

7. Nondelivery a good plea to count
on account stated, 858. Antè, 1.
8. What confession sufficient in plea
of nondelivery, 858. Antè, 1.

VII. Taxation of bill: jurisdiction.

1. On whose application without consent, 744. Post, IX.

2. Nature of the business, 847. Antè, VI. 2.

VIII. Taxation of bill: effect.

1. Consequence of attending on order

made without jurisdiction or consent, 744. Post, IX.

2. Sum ordered to be deducted on taxation after payment, when it may be set off, 744. Post, IX.

His bill: Statute of Limitations. What is not a continuous employment. Defendant employed plaintiff, an attorney, in several transactions, and, among others, in procuring him money to pay off a mortgage. In an action against defendant on plaintiff's bill of costs, it appeared by items in the bill, that he had made applications in several quarters for this purpose, but withont success, after which he wrote to plaintiff, informing him what had been done, and requesting to know his wishes. This item bore date more than six years before action brought. The next, dated within six years, was; "Paid the postage of your answer." By subsequent items it appeared that further endeavours were made by plaintiff to raise the money. Ultimately it was obtained. Held that the transaction was not one in which the attorney's employment was continuous, and that the latter items did not draw after them the previous ones, so as to take these out of the Statute of Limitations.

One B., to whom the mortgage had been transferred, commenced actions of ejectment and other proceedings to enforce payment. Plaintiff acted as his attorney; and proceedings were stayed on condition, among others, that defendant (who was not a party on the record in the ejectments) should pay the now plaintiff his bill of costs delivered to B. Defendant paid plaintiff the bill, but afterwards (and before stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 75.), obtained a Judge's order for taxation of this latter bill, with a direction that any sum overpaid should be refunded. Plaintiff gave no consent to the order; but he attended the taxation, and made a new claim, which was allowed; and he was ordered by the allocatur to refund 10%. as overpaid.

Held that, in the action by Plaintiff against defendant on his bill of costs, the 10%. could not be set off as money had and received to defendant's use;

BANK OF ENGLAND. Payment of dividends by.

1. By warrant.

Declaration alleged that plaintiff was proprietor of a share in the 3 reduced annuities, in the management of defendants (Governor &c. of The Bank of England) for certain reward &c., and was entitled to receive certain dividends, his share standing in the books for the purpose of their paying him, on request, the accruing dividends, when sufficient money had been received by them: whereupon defendants became liable, and it was their duty, to pay plaintiff on request, when sufficient money had been received by them, all dividends due to him: that while plaintiff was possessed of the share, a dividend became due to him, and sufficient money had been received by defendants &c., and they were requested by plaintiff to pay him his dividend, and a reasonable time had elapsed: but they had not paid.

Plea: that by usage and custom of bankers and merchants in London, for divers, to wit sixty, years past, the drafts of defendants upon their cashiers, called dividend warrants, are transferable and assignable by delivery only, and a bona fide holder thereof is entitled to payment by defendants on demand: that W. had received from defendants such warrant for payment of the dividend in question, under a power of attorney from plaintiff, authorizing W. to receive and give receipts for dividend, and had delivered the warrant to L. for good consideration then moving from L. to W., and that L.

while lawful holder of the warrant, had demanded payment from defendants and required them to hold the money for his use.

Held, by the Court of Q. B,, on a replication traversing the above allegations, except the execution of the power and delivery to W.;

1. That the allegation of usage was satisfied by proof that dividend warrants, with the receipt subscribed, are passed from hand to hand like bank notes, and are paid by the Bank cashiers to any one who presents them after a certain day :

2. That the alleged consideration was proved by shewing that, before the dividend was due, L., a banker, had discounted a promissory note of and for W., his customer, payable on a day subsequent to the delivery of the warrant by W. to L., and that the warrant was delivered to secure payment to L. of the note when due; although at the time of delivery the cash balance at L.'s bank was in favour of W., and the note was not due till after the day for pay

ment on the warrant.

But, Held, by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment on the record: because,

1. The power, as pleaded, did not authorize receiving payment by a warrant and it did not appear, by plea or by any statute, that it was a usual mode of paying dividends to give a

warrant.

2. It did not appear that defendants had become liable to pay L,, the warrant not being negotiable by the general law, and the supposed custom not appearing to be an immemorial custom in the particular place, nor an usage of trade of which plaintiff was cognisant.

3. L. was not averred to be a bonâ fide holder, but only to have taken for value; and the averment, as above, of his being lawful holder, did not supply the defect. Partridge v. Bank of England, 596.

2. Negotiability of dividend warrants, 396. Antè, 1.

II. Usage of.

As to payment of dividends, 596, Antè, I. 1.

III. Act of bankruptcy: procuring own goods to be taken in execution. 1. When committed.

An act of bankruptcy under stat. 6 G. 4. c. 16. s. 3., by procuring the party's own goods to be taken in execution is not committed till the actual seizure.

And, upon such seizure, the commission of the act of bankruptcy is not carried back by relation to any earlier period. Belcher v. Gummow, 875.

2. Relation to, 875. Antè, 1.

IV. Act of bankruptcy: refusal to admit demand on summons.

What omission not a refusal.

Under stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122., if a trader, summoned by his creditor under sect. 11, and being indebted to him in 1491. 4s., signs an admission that he is indebted to such creditor in 1497., and there is nothing to shew that the 4s. was intentionally omitted, such trader does not commit an act of bankruptcy if he omits to perform any thing required by sect. 15 or sect. 15 from parties refusing to admit debts on summons, or admitting them in part.

If the trader, having, on summons, given an admission according to stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122., agrees with the creditor to deposit bills with him as a security, and submit to a Judge's order for payment of the debt by instalments, with which terms the creditor is satisfied, no act of bankruptcy is committed though more than fourteen days elapse between the filing of the admission and the day appointed for fulfilling the stipulated terms, provided the agreement itself be made within the fourteen days; for in such case the trader has compounded for the demand in due

Agreement for composition within fourteen days, 114. Antè, IV. VI. Order and disposition: policies. What notice to insurer of assignment of policy sufficient, 730. Agent, III. VII. Relation.

To what period, 873. Antè, III. 1. VIII. Certificate.

How shewn to be void for losses by gambling, 1024. Post, IX. 1.

IX. Discharge on certificate.

1. Jurisdiction of single Judge.

Under stat 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. s. 42. this Court in banc has no jurisdiction to discharge a prisoner who has become bankrupt and is in execution under a judgment obtained before the confirmation of his certificate, the jurisdiction being given to a single Judge. But if a Judge has, on hearing, refused to discharge, this Court may be moved to rescind his order.

On such application to a Judge, he may receive, and decide upon affidavit, the objection that the certificate is void, under sect. 58, on account of losses by gambling, and, if he considers the gambling to be proved, should refuse the application. And he may receive evidence of several distinct cases of loss by gambling within sect. 58. Wearing V. Smith, 1024.

2. Jurisdiction of full Court, 1024. Antè, 1.

ment against them, for costs, in an action brought by them jointly, a ca. sa. for the costs against both is regular. And no action lies for suing out the writ and arresting the wife upon such ca. sa., though it appear upon the record that the party suing out and arresting knew of the coverture. So held, where the first action was for a libel on the wife. Newton v. Boodle, 948.

2. Meaning of the wife being the meritorious cause of action, 948. Antè, 1.

II. Settlement, parochial.

Maiden settlement, 626. Poor, XXV.

BENEFICE.

1024. Antè, 1.

BARON AND FEME.

I. Actions by.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.

costs.

Where husband and wife have judg

1. In the name of a firm, 361. Post,

XIII. 1.