vigorously resisted, especially by the United States. In 1858, the Senate unanimously resolved

that American vessels on the high seas, in time of peace, bearing the American flag, remain under the jurisdiction of the country to which they belong, and therefore any visitation, molestation, or detention of such vessels by force, or by the exhibition of force, on the part of a foreign Power, is in derogation of the sovereignty of the United States.

'After the passage of this resolution," said Mr. Fish, as Secretary of State," Great Britain formally recognised the principle thus announced, and other maritime Powers and writers on international law all assert it."

It was

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance, both theoretically and practically, of the establishment in the past century of the freedom of vessels on the high seas from visitation and search in time of peace. the acknowledgment of this principle that made the seas really free and gave freedom to commerce. Nor does the freedom of the seas become less important with lapse of time. As a principle it grows rather than diminishes in the estimation of mankind; for, in the light of history, its evolution is seen to mark the progress of commerce from a semi-barbarous condition, in which it was exposed to constant violence, to its present state of prosperous security.

Closely related to the principle of the freedom of the seas is the question of the navigation of the narrow channels by which they may be connected. This question has been discussed in respect of natural channels in several cases, the most notable of which was that of the dues charged on vessels and their cargoes passing through the Danish Sound and Belts. By treaties made with the interested Powers in 1857, Denmark relinquished the dues, the Powers paying her once for all a lump sum, in consideration not only of her renunciation of tolls, but also of her agreement to maintain such lights, buoys, and

pilot establishments as the trade of the Baltic might require. An artificial channel necessarily involves special considerations. Its construction requires the expenditure of money and gives rise to proprietary rights; and it is not denied that those rights may be asserted by the exaction of tolls. In this respect the navigation of the artificial channel obviously cannot be free. But, although it cannot be said that the subject has been authoritatively settled as a part of international law, a tendency has been shown in the case of great international highways to act upon analogies and to make the artificial channel free in the sense that it shall be open to the ships and merchandise of all nations on equal terms.

While the right freely to navigate the seas has been established, a great advance has been made towards assuring the free navigation of waters flowing into the sea, in cases in which they wash in their navigable course the territory of two or more states. By the Treaty of Vienna of June 9, 1815, it was agreed that rivers which separated or traversed two or more states should, along their whole navigable course, be, in respect of commerce, entirely free to everyone, subject only to regulations of police. This principle was applied primarily to the Rhine, but was also expressly extended to the Neckar, the Mayne, the Moselle, the Meuse, and the Scheldt. With a limitation of the right of free navigation in some instances to the citizens or subjects of the riparian Powers, similar stipulations may be found in treaties relating to the rivers and canals of the ancient kingdom of Poland; to the Elbe, Po, Pruth, Douro, Danube, and other rivers in Europe; and to the rivers Plate, Paraguay, Uruguay, St. Lawrence, Yukon, Porcupine, and Stikine, in America. By an imperial decree of December 7, 1866, the Government of Brazil opened "to vessels of all nations," after a certain day, the Amazon as far as the frontiers of Brazil; the Tocantins, as far as Cametá; the

Tapajos, as far as Santarem; the Madeira, as far as Borda; the Negro, as far as Manáos; and the San Francisco, as far as the city of Penedo.

The principle of freedom, which has been so widely extended in commerce and in navigation, has also been acknowledged in matters of government. Such an acknowledgment may be seen in the established rule that new states and new governments are entitled to recognition on the ground of their de facto existence. The old theory of legitimacy and divine right found its last practical assertion in the acts of the Powers composing the Holy Alliance, who, in their various circulars, associated revolt and crime," denounced " as equally null, and disallowed by the public law of Europe, any pretended reform effected by revolt and open force," and announced their determination" to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place and under whatever form it might show itself." Their acts corresponded with their words; but they were soon forced by the progress of events to abandon their ground, and to admit in practice the principle which they had condemned.

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In the last hundred years there has been witnessed a change in the law relating to the acquisition of territory by occupation. In former times, when so large a part of the world was unsettled, great weight was given to the mere fact of discovery. Under the Papal Bull of 1493, and the Treaty of Tordesillas of the following year, Spain and Portugal sought to divide between themselves on that ground the whole unknown world. Even the early English charters asserted the British title to extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In the nineteenth century, and particularly in the latter half of it, the Powers have, especially in respect of territorial claims in Africa, recognised more clearly than was ever done before the necessity of actual and effective occupation as the basis of permanent national title.

In the system of extradition, which is chiefly the development of the nineteenth century, we find one of the many evidences of the growth among nations of a clearer perception of the duty of promoting common social ends. In former times there existed a strong repugnance to the surrender of fugitives from justice. This was due partly to the ancient idea of asylum, partly to perverse notions of national dignity, but perhaps in largest measure to ignorant and groundless prejudices. It was not, indeed, until the middle of the century that the great expansion of the system may be said to have begun. Since that time, however, its growth has been rapid and far-reaching. An increasing tendency to acknowledge the force and supremacy of law may be seen in the growing frequency of arbitrations for the settlement of disputes between nations, not only as to the rights of individuals, but also as to their own rights, as well as in the recent efforts to establish a permanent system of arbitration, as proposed in the plan of the International American Conference, in the unratified treaty between Great Britain and the United States, and in the convention lately adopted at The Hague. During the nineteenth century there were, exclusive of cases still pending and incomplete, at least 136 international arbitrations. Probably there were more, though certain lists lately circulated, by which the number appears to have been vastly greater, are quite inaccurate, since they include not only numerous cases of mediation, but also ordinary boundary surveys, domestic commissions, and even pure diplomatic negotiations. Both in the number of arbitrations and in the importance of the questions involved in them, the United States and Great Britain easily lead the way.

There are two modes in which international law may be developed. The first is the general and gradual transformation of international opinion and practice; the second is the specific adoption of a rule of action by an act in its

nature legislative. The operation of the former mode it is often difficult to follow in its details, but its effects are potent and undeniable. Perhaps its clearest and most definite exposition may be found in the recent opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Spanish fishing-smacks, the Paquete Habana and the Lola (the Paquete Habana, 175 U. S., 677). The particular point decided was that coast fishing-vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing the peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the question whether the exemption was merely a matter of "comity," or whether it was a matter of legal right to which the court was bound to give effect. In behalf of those who sought the condemnation of the vessels there was cited an opinion of Lord Stowell, in which it was said to be" a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision." With reference to this statement, Mr. Justice Gray, who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, said:

The word "comity" was apparently used by Lord Stowell as synonymous with courtesy or good will. But the period of a hundred years which has since elapsed is amply sufficient to have enabled what originally may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession, to grow, by the general assent of civilised nations, into a settled rule of international law. As well said by Sir James Mackintosh: "In the present century a slow and silent, but very substantial mitigation has taken place in the practice of war; and in proportion as that mitigated practice has received the sanction of time, it is raised from the rank of mere usage and becomes part of the law of nations."

The importance of this judicial declaration, in its bearing on the development of international law, it is difficult