(87)

1

SECTION VIII.

Of LIBERTY and NECESSITY.

PART I.

T might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvaffed and difputed with great eagernefs, fince the first origin of fcience and philofophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, fhould have been agreed upon among the difputants; and our enquiries, in the courfe of two thousand years, been able to pafs from words to the true and real fubject of the controverfy.. For how eafy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reafoning, and make thefe definitions, not the mere found of words, the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we confider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite oppofite conclufion. From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains ftill undecided, we may prefume, that there is fome ambiguity in the expreffion, and that the difputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controverfy. For as the faculties of the mind are fuppofed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwife nothing could be more fruitless than to reafon or difpute together; it were impoffible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terms, that they could fo long form different opinions of the fame fubject; efpecially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all fides in fearch of arguments which may give them

the victory over their antagonists. It is true, if men attempt the difcuffion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, fuch as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual fyftem or region of fpirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitlefs contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclufion: But if the question regard any fubject of common life and experience; nothing, one would think, could preferve the difpute fo long undecided, but fome ambiguous expreffions which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.

This has been the cafe in the long difputed queftion concerning liberty and neceflity; and to fo remarkable a degree, that, if I be not much mistaken, we fhall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of the fame opinion with regard to this fubject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy. I own, that this dispute has been fo much canvaffed on all hands, and has led philofo phers into fuch a labyrinth of obfcure fophiftry, that it is no wonder, if a fenfible reader indulge his ease fo far as to turn a deaf ear to the propofal of fuck a queftion, from which he can expect neither inftruction nor entertainment. But the state of the argument here propofed may, perhaps, ferve to renew his attention, as it has more novelty, promises at least fome decifion of the controverfy, and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obfcure reafoning.

I hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of neceflity and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense which can be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We fhall begin with examining the doctrine of neceflity.

It is univerfally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceffary force, and that every natural effect is fo precifely determined by the

energy

energy of its cause, that no other effect, in fuch par ticular circumstances, could poffibly have refulted from it. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed with fuch exactnefs, that a living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies, as motion, in any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a juft and precife idea of neceffity, we must confider whence that idea arifes, when we apply it to the operation of bodies.

It seems evident, that, if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in fuch a manner, that no two events bore any refemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any fimilitude to whatever had been feen before, we should never, in that cafe, have attained the least idea of neceffity, or of a connection among these objects. We might say, upon fuch a fuppofition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of caufe and effect muft be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reafoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and fenfes remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could poffibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of neceflity and caufation, arises entirely from the uniformity obfervable in the operations of nature; where fimilar objects are conftantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by cuftom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. Thefe two circumftances form the whole of that neceffity which we afcribe to matter. Beyond the conftant conjunction of fimilar objects, and the confequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any neceffity or connection.

If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions

of

of men, and in the operations of mind; it must follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of neceffity, and that they have hitherto difputed, merely for not understanding each other.

As to the first circumftance, the conftant and regular conjunction of fimilar events; we may poffibly fatisfy ourselves by the following confiderations. It is univerfally acknowledged, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains ftill the fame, in its principles and operations. The fame

motives always produce the fame actions: The fame events follow from the fame caufes. Ambition, avarice, felf-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public fpirit; these paffions, mixed in various degrees, and diftributed through fociety, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the fource of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been obferved among mankind. Would you know the fentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the GREEKS and ROMANS? ftudy well the temper and actions of the FRENCH and ENGLISH: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the fame, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief ufe is only to discover the conftant and univerfal principles of human nature, by fhowing men in all varieties of circumstances and fituations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our obfervations, and become acquainted with the regular fprings of human action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are fo many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philofopher fixes the principles of his fcience; in the fame manner as the phyfician or natural philofopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects,

by

by the experiments which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by ARISTOTLE and HIPPOCRATES, more like to those which at prefent lie under our obfervation, than to the men described by POLYBIUS and TACITUS, are to thofe who now govern the world.

Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generofity, and public fpirit; we fhould immediately, from these circumftances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the fame certainty as if he had ftuffed his narration with ftories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we would explode any forgery in hiftory, we cannot make use of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions, afcribed to any perfon, are directly contrary to the course of nature, and that no human motives, in fuch circumftances, could ever induce him to fuch a conduct. The veracity of QUINTUS CURTIUS is as much to be fufpected, when he defcribes the fupernatural courage of ALEXANDER, by which he was hurried on fingly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his fupernatural force and activity, by which he was able to refift them. So readily and univerfally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body.

Hence likewife the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of bufinefs and company, in order to inftruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as fpeculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of mens inclinations and motives, from their actions, expreffions, and even geftures; and again defcend to the interpretation of their actions, from our knowledge of their

motives