evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question. In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the fimilarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects fimilar to those which we have found to follow from fuch objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to difpute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life; it may furely be allowed a philofopher to have fo much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that fimilarity which nature has placed among different objects. From caufes which appear fimilar, we expect fimilar effects. This is the fum of all our experimental conclufions. Now it seems evident, that if this conclufion were formed by reafon, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one inftance, as after ever fo long a course of experience: but the cafe is far otherwife. Nothing fo like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this appearing fimilarity, expects the fame taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and fecurity with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reasoning, which, from one inftance, draws a conclufion fo different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowife different from that fingle one? This question I propose as much for the fake of information, as with an intention of raifing difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine, any fuch reasoning. But I keep my mind ftill open to inftruction, if any one will vouchfafe to beftow it on me. Should it be faid, that, from a number of uniform experiments, we infer a connection between the fenfible qualities and the fecret powers; this, I must confess, seems the fame difficulty, couched in different terms. The queftion ftill recurs, on what process of argument argument this inference is founded? Where is the medium, the interpofing ideas, which join propofitions fo very wide of each other? It is confeffed, that the colour, confiftence, and other fenfible qualities of bread, appear not of themselves to have any connection with the fecret powers of nourishment and fupport. For otherwife we could infer thefe fecret powers from the first appearance of these fenfible qualities, without the aid of experience, contrary to the fentiment of all philofophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here then is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience? It only fhows us a number of uniform effects refulting from certain objects, and teaches us, that thofe particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with fuch powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with fimilar fenfible qualities, is produced, we expect fimilar powers and forces, and look for a like effect. From a body of like colour and confiftence with bread, we expect like nourishment and fupport. But this furely is a ftep or progrefs of the mind which wants to be explained. When a man fays, I have found, in all paft inftances, fuch fenfible qualities conjoined with fuch fecret powers; and when he says, fimilar fenfible qualities will always be conjoined with fimilar fecret powers; he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propofitions in any respect the fame. You fay that the one propofition is an inference from the other: But you must confefs that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonftrative. Of what nature is it then? To fay it is experimental is begging the queftion. For all inferences from experience fuppofe, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the paft, and that fimilar powers will be conjoined with fimilar fenfible qualities. If there be any fufpicion that the courfe of nature may change, and that the paft may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes ufelefs, and can give rife to no infe rence rence or conclufion. It is impoffible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this refemblance of the paft to the future; fince all these arguments are founded on the fuppofition of that refemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever fo regular; that alone, without fome new argument or inference, proves not, that for the future it will continue fo. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your paft experience. Their fecret nature, and confequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their fenfible qualities. This happens fometimes, and with regard to fome objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what procefs of argument, fecures you against this fuppofition? My practice, you fay, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my queftion. As an agent, I am quite fatisfied in the point; but as a philofopher, who has fome fhare of curiofity, I will not fay scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry, has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me fatisfaction in a matter of fuch importance. Can I do better than propofe the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have fmall hopes of obtaining a folution? We fhall at least, by this means, be fenfible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge. I must confefs, that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance, who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confefs, that though all the learned, for several ages, fhould have employed themselves in fruitlefs fearch upon any fubject, it may ftill, perhaps, be rash to conclude pofitively, that the fubject must therefore pass all human comprehenfion. Even though we examine all the fources of our knowledge, and conclude them unfit for fuch a fubject, there may still remain a fufpicion, that the enumeraVOL. II. D tion tion is not complete, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the prefent fubject, there are fome confiderations which feem to remove all this accufation of arrogance or fufpicion of mistake. It is certain, that the most ignorant and ftupid peasants, nay infants, nay even brute beafts, improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by obferving the effects which refult from them. When a child has felt the fenfation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a fimilar effect from a caufe, which is fimilar in its fenfible qualities and appearance. If you affert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclufion by any procefs of argument or ratiocination, I may juftly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refufe fo equitable a demand. You cannot fay, that the argument is abftrufe, and may poffibly efcape your enquiry; fince you confefs, that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hefitate therefore a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the queftion, and confefs, that it is not reasoning which engages us to fuppofe the past resembling the future, and to expect fimilar effects from caufes, which are, to appearance, fimilar. This is the propofition which I intended to enforce in the prefent fection. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myfelf to be indeed a very backward fcholar; fince I cannot now discover an argument, which, it seems, was perfectly fimilar to me long before I was out of my cradle. SECTION TH PART I. THE paffion for philofophy, like that for religion, feems liable to this inconvenience, at though it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only ferve, by imprudent management, to fofter a predominant inclination, and push the mind with more determined refolution, towards that fide which already draws too much, by the biafs and propenfity of the natural temper. It is certain, that, while we afpire to the magnanimous firmness of the philofophic fage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may, at laft, render our philofophy like that of EPICTETUS, and other Stoics, only a more refined fyftem of selfishness, and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as focial enjoyment. While we ftudy with attention the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and tranfitory nature of riches and honours, we are, perhaps all the while, flattering our natural indolence, which, hating the buftle of the world and drudgery of bufinefs, feeks a pretence of reafon to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence. There is, however, one fpecies of philofophy which feems little liable to this inconvenience, and that because it strikes in with no diforderly paffion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself witli D 2 any |