and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, infinite, and incomprehenfible: We must be far removed from the fmalleft tendency to fcepticism not to be apprehensive, that we have here got beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our fpeculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common fenfe and experience, which ftrengthen our philofophical conclufions, and remove (at least in part) the fufpicion which we fo juftly entertain with regard to every reafoning that is very fubtile and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have not this advantage; while at the fame time we are employed upon objects, which, we must be fenfible, are too large for our grafp, and, of all others, require moft to be familiarifed to our apprehenfion. We are like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing muft feem fufpicious, and who are in danger every moment of tranfgreffing against the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converfe. We know not how far we ought to truft our vulgar methods of reasoning in such a subject; fince, even in common life, and in that province which is peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are entirely guided by a kind of inftinct or neceffity in employing them.

All sceptics pretend, that, if reafon be confidered in an abstract view, it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never retain any conviction or affurance, on any subject, were not the fceptical reasonings fo refined and fubtile, that they are not able to counterpoife the more folid and more natural arguments derived from the fenfes and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose this advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined feepticifm comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppofe and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The mind must remain in fufpense be

tween them; and it is that very fufpenfe or balance which is the triumph of fcepticism.

But I obferve, fays CLEANTHES, with regard to you, PHILO, and all fpeculative fceptics, that your doctrine and practice are as much at variance in the moft abftrufe points of theory as in the conduct of common life. Wherever evidence difcovers itself, you adhere to it, notwithstanding your pretended fcepticifm; and I can obferve, too, fome of your fect to be as decifive as thofe who make greater profeflions of certainty and affurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who pretended to reject NEWTON's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays of light; a fubject, forfooth, too refined for human comprehenfion? And what would you fay to one, who having nothing particular to object to the arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth, fhould with-hold his affent, on that general principle, That thefe fubjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow and fallacious reason of mankind?

There is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant fcepticism, as you well obferved, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do not eafily understand, and makes them reject every principle which requires elaborate reafoning to prove and establish it. This fpecies of fcepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; fince we find, that. those who make greateft profeffion of it, give often their affent, not only to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the most abfurd tenets which a traditional fuperftition has recommended to them. They firmly believe in witches; though they will not believe nor attend to the most fimple propofition of EUCLID. But the refined and philofophical fcepties fall into an inconfiftence of an oppofite nature. They push their refearches into

the

the most abftrufe corners of science; and their affent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence which they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the moft abftrufe and remote objects are those which are beft explained by philɔfophy. Light is in reality anatomized: The true fyftem of the heavenly bodies is difcovered and af certained. But the nourishment of bodies by food is ftill an inexplicable myftery: The cohesion of the parts of matter is ftill incomprehenfible. Thefe fceptics, therefore, are obliged, in every question, to confider each particular evidence apart, and proportion their affent to the precife degree of evidence which occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and political science. why not the fame, I ask, in the theological and religious? Why muft conclufions of this nature be alone rejected on the general prefumption of the infufficiency of human reafon, without any particular difcuffion of the evidence? Is not fuch an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and paffion?

And

Our fenfes, you fay, are fallacious; our underftanding erroneous; our ideas even of the most familiar objects, extenfion, duration, motion, full of abfurdities and contradictions. You defy me to folve the difficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies, which you discover in them. I have not capacity for fo great an undertaking: I have not leifure for it: I perceive it to be fuperfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumftance, refutes your principles; and fhows the firmeft reliance on all the received maxims of fcience, morals, prudence, and behavi

our.

I fhall never affent to fo harfh an opinion as that of a celebrated writer*, who fays, that the fceptics are not a fect of philofophers: They are only a fect of liars. I may, however, affirm, (I hope, without offence), that they are a fect of jefters or railers. Ee 3

* L'art de penfer,

But

But for my part, whenever I find myself difpofed to mirth and amusement, I fhall certainly choose my entertainment of a lefs perplexing and abftrufe nature. A comedy, a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural recreation than fuch metaphyfical fubtilties and abftractions.

In vain would the fceptic make a diftinction between science and common life, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a fimilar nature, and contain the fame force and evidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the advantage lies entirely on the fide of theology and natural religion. Many principles of mechanics are founded on very abftrufe reafoning; yet no man who has any pretenfions to fcience, even no fpeculative fceptic, 'pretends to entertain the leaft doubt with regard to them. The COPERNICAN fyftem contains the moft furprising paradox, and the most contrary to our natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very fenfes: yet even monks and inquifitors are now constrained to withdraw their oppofition to it. And fhall PHILO, a man of fo liberal a genius, and extenfive knowledge, entertain any general undistinguished scruples with regard to the religious hypothefis, which is founded on the fimpleft and moft obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has such eafy access and admiffion into the mind of man?

And here we may obferve, continued he, turning himself towards DEMEA, a pretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the union of philofophy with the popular religion, upon the firft eftablishment of Christianity, nothing was more ufual, among all religious teachers, than declamations against reafon, again the fenfes, against every principle derived merely from human refearch and inquiry. All the topics of the ancient Academics were adopted by the Fathers; and thence propagated for feveral ages in every fchool and pulpit through

out

out Chriftendom. The Reformers embraced the fame principles of reafoning, or rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excellency of faith were fure to be interlarded with fome fevere ftrokes of fatire against natural reafon. A celebrated prelate too*, of the Romish communion, a man of the most extenfive learning, who wrote a demonftration of Christianity, has also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils of the boldest and most determined PYRRHONISM. LOCKE feems to have been the first Chriftian, who ventured openly to affert, that faith was nothing but a species of reafon; that religion was only a branch of philofophy; and that a chain of arguments, fimilar to that which established any truth in morals, politics, or phyfics, was always employed in difcovering all the principles of theology, natural and revealed. The ill ufe which BAYLE and other libertines made of the philofophical fcepticism of the fathers and first reformers, still farther propagated the judicious fentiment of Mr LOCKE: And it is now, in a manner, avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning and philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almoft fynonymous. And as it is certain, that no man is in earnest when he profeffes the latter principle; I would fain hope, that there are as few who seriously maintain the former.

Don't you remember, faid PHILO, the excellent faying of Lord BACON on this head? That a little philofophy, replied CLEANTHES, makes a man an Atheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious remark too, faid PHILO. But what I have in my eye is another paffage, where, having mentioned DAVID'S fool, who faid in his heart there is no God, this great, philofopher observes, that the Atheists now-a-days have a double fhare of folly for they are not contented to say in their hearts there is no God, but they alfo utter that impiety with their lips; and are thereby guilty of

Ee 4

• Monf. HUET.

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