and explain every affection to be felf-love, twifted and moulded, by a particular turn of imagination, into a variety of appearances. But as the fame turn of imagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the fame direction to the original paffion; this is fufficient, even according to the selfish fyftem, to make the wideft difference in human characters, and denominate one man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly interested. I efteem the man, whofe felf-love, by whatever means, is fo directed as to give him a concern for others, and render him ferviceable to fociety: As I hate or defpife him who has no regard to any thing beyond his own gratifications and enjoyments. In vain would you fuggeft, that thefe characters, though feemingly oppofite, are at bottom the fame, and that a very inconfiderable turn of thought forms the whole difference between them. Each character, notwithstanding thefe inconfiderable differences, appears to me, in practice, pretty durable and untranfmutable. And I find not in this more than in other fubjects, that the natural fentiments arising from the general appearances of things, are easily destroyed by fubtile reflections concerning the minute origin of thefe appearances. Does not the lively, cheerful colour of a countenance inspire me with complacency and pleasure; even though I learn from philofophy, that all difference of complexion arifes from the most minute differences of thickness in the most minute parts of the fkin; by means of which a fuperficies is qualified to reflect one of the original colours of light, and abforb the others? But though the question concerning the univerfal or partial felfishness of man be not fo material as is ufually imagined to morality and practice, it is certainly of confequence in the fpeculative science of human nature, and is a proper object of curiofity and enquiry. It may not, therefore, be unfuitable in this place to beftow a few reflections upon it *. See Note [00.] The The moft obvious objection to the selfish hypothefis is, that as it is contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions, there is required the highest stretch of philofophy to establish fo extraordinary a paradox. To the most careless obferver, there appear to be fuch difpofitions as benevolence and generofity; fuch affections as love, friendship, compaffion, gratitude. Thefe fentiments have their causes, effects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and obfervation, and plainly dif tinguished from those of the selfish paffions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted, till fome hypothefis be discovered, which, by penetrating deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitless, and seem to have proceeded entirely from that love of fimplicity which has been the fource of much false reasoning in philofophy. I fhall not here enter into any detail on the prefent fubject. Many able philofophers have fhown the infufficiency of these fyftems. And I fhall take for granted what, I believe, the smalleft reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer. But the nature of the subject furnishes the strongeft prefumption, that no better fyftem will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to account for the origin of the benevolent from the selfish affections, and reduce all the various emotions of the human mind to a perfect fimplicity. The cafe is not the fame in this fpecies of philofophy as in phyfics. Many an hypothefis in nature, contrary to firft appearances, has been found, on more accurate fcrutiny, folid and fatisfactory. Inftances of this kind are fo frequent, that a judicious as well as witty philofopher *, has ventured to affirm, if there be more than one way in which any phænomenon may be produced, that there is a general prefumption for its arifing from the causes VOL II. X * Monf. FONTENELLE. which which are the leaft obvious and familiar. But the prefumption always lies on the other fide, in all en quiries concerning the origin of our paffions, and of the internal operations of the human mind. The fimpleft and moft obvious caufe which can there be affigned for any phænomenon, is probably the true one. When a philofopher, in the explication of his fyftem, is obliged to have recourse to some very intricate and refined reflections, and to fuppofe them effential to the production of any paffion or emotion, we have reafon to be extremely on our guard against fo fallacious an hypothefis. The affections are not fufceptible of any impreffion from the refinements of reafon or imagination; and it is always found, that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties, neceffarily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, detroys all activity in the former. Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourselves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives, which the mind, from vanity or felf-conceit, is defirous of fuppofing more prevalent: But there is no inftance, that a concealment of this nature has ever arisen from the abftrufeness and intricacy of the motive. A man, that has lost a friend and patron, may flatter himself, that all his grief arifes from generous fentiments, without any mixture of narrow or interested confiderations: But a man that grieves for a valuable friend who needed his patronage and protection; how can we fuppofe that his paffionate tenderness arifes from fome metaphyfical regards to a self-intereft which has no foundation or reality? We may as well imagine, that minute wheels and fprings, like thofe of a watch, give motion to a loaded waggon, as account for the origin of paffion from fuch abftrufe reflections. Animals are found fufceptible of kindness, both to their own species and to ours; nor is there, in this cafe, the leaft fufpicion of disguise or artifice. Shall we account for all their fentiments too from refined deductions deductions of felf-intereft? Or if we admit a difinterefted benevolence in the inferior fpecies, by what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the fuperior? Love between the fexes begets a complacency and good-will very diftinct from the gratification of an appetite. Tenderness to their offspring, in all fenfible beings, is commonly able alone to counterbalance the ftrongest motives of self-love, and has no manner of dependance on that affection. What intereft can a fond mother have in view who lofes her health by affiduous attendance on her fick child, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief, when freed by its death from the flavery of that attendance? Is gratitude no affection of the human breaft, or is that a word merely without any meaning or reality? Have we no fatisfaction in one man's company above another's, and no defire of the welfare of our friend, even though absence or death fhould prevent us from all participation in it? Or what is it commonly that gives us any participation in it, even while alive and present, but our affection and regard to him? These and a thousand other inftances are marks of a general benevolence in human nature, where no real intereft binds us to the object. And how an imaginary intereft, known and avowed for fuch, can be the origin of any paffion or emotion, feems difficult to explain. No fatisfactory hypothefis of this kind has yet been discovered; nor is there the smallest probability, that the future induftry of men will ever be attended with more favourable fuccefs. But farther, if we confider rightly of the matter, we shall find, that the hypothefis, which allows of a difinterested benevolence diftinct from felf-love, has really more fimplicity in it, and is more conformable to the analogy of nature, than that which pretends to refolve all friendship and humanity into this latter principle. There are bodily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which neceffarily precede all fenfual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek X 2 poffeffion poffeffion of the object. Thus hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end: and from the gratification of thefe primary appetites arifes a pleasure which may become the object of another fpecies of defire or inclination that is fecondaryand interested. In the fame manner, there are mental paffions by which we are impelled immediately to feek particular objects, fuch as fame, or power, or vengeance, without any regard to intereft; and when thefe objects are attained, a pleafing enjoyment enfues as the confequence of our indulged affections. Nature muft, by the internal frame and conftitution of the mind, give an original propenfity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquifition, or purfue it from motives of felf-love, and a defire of happinefs. If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praife: If I be void of ambition, power gives me no enjoyment: If I be not angry, the punishment of an adverfary is totally indifferent to me. In all thefe cafes, there is a paffion which points immediately to the object, and conftitutes it our good or happiness; as there are other fecondary paffions which afterwards arife, and purfue it as a part of our happiness, when once it is conftituted fuch by our original affections. Were there no appetite of any kind antecedent to self-love, that propensity could fcarcely ever exert itself; because we should, in that cafe, have felt few and flender pains or pleasures, and have little mifery or happiness to avoid or to pursue. Now where is the difficulty in conceiving that this may likewise be the cafe with benevolence and friendfhip, and that, from the original frame of our temper, we may feel a defire of another's happiness or good, which, by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is afterwards purfued from the combined motives of benevolence and felf-enjoyment? Who fees not that vengeance, from the force alone of paffion, may be fo eagerly pursued as to make us knowingly neglect every confideration of ease, intereft, or fafety? and, like fome vindictive animals, infuse our ༢ very |