gratified by fuccefs, gives a fatisfaction proportioned to its force and violence: but befides this advantage, common to all, the immediate feeling of benevolence and friendship, humanity and kindnefs, is fweet, fmooth, tender, and agreeable, independent of all fortune and accidents. Thefe virtues are befides

attended with a pleafing consciousness or remembrance, and keep us in humour with ourselves as well as others; while we retain the agreeable reflection of having done our part towards mankind and fociety. And though all men fhow a jealousy of our fuccefs in the pursuits of avarice and ambition; yet are we almoft fure of their good-will and good-wishes, fo long as we perfevere in the paths of virtue, and employ ourfelves in the execution of generous plans and purpofes. What other paffion is there where we shall find so many advantages united; an agreeable sentiment, a pleafing confcioufnefs, a good reputation? But of these truths, we may obferve, men are, of themselves, pretty much convinced; nor are they deficient in their duty to fociety, because they would not wish to be generous, friendly, and humane; but because they do not feel themselves such.

Treating vice with the greateft candour, and making it all poffible conceffions, we muft acknowledge, that there is not, in any inftance, the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view to felf-intereft; except, perhaps, in the cafe of juftice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often feem to be a lofer by his integrity. And though it is allowed, that, without a regard to property, no fociety could fubfift; yet, according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a fenfible knave, in particular incidents, may think, that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a confiderable addition to his fortune, without caufing any confiderable breach in the focial union and confederacy. That bonefly is the beft policy, may be a good general rule; but is liable VOL. II.

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to many exceptions: And he, it may, perhaps, be thought, conducts himself with moft wifdom, who obferves the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.

I must confefs, that if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer, it will be a little difficult to find any, which will to him appear fatisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebel not against fuch pernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villany or baseness, he has indeed loft a confiderable motive to virtue; and we may expect, that his practice will be answerable to his fpeculation. But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too ftrong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, confcioufnefs of integrity, a fatisfactory review of our own conduct; these are circumftances very requifite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every honeft man who feels the importance of them.

Such a one has, befides, the frequent fatisfaction of feeing knaves, with all their pretended cunning and abilities, betrayed by their own maxims; and while they purpose to cheat with moderation and fecrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into the fnare; whence they can never extricate themselves, without a total lofs of reputation, and the forfeiture of all future truft and confidence with mankind.

But were they ever fo fecret and successful, the honeft man, if he has any tincture of philofophy, or even common observation and reflection, will difcover that they themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes, and have facrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themselves at leaft, for the acquifition of worthlefs toys and gewgaws. How little is requifite to fupply the neceffities of nature? And in a view to pleasure, what comparison between the unbought fatisfaction of converfation, fociety, ftudy,

even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one's own conduct? What comparison, I fay, between these, and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expence? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and above it in their en

joyment.

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APPENDIX

I

APPENDIX

I.

CONCERNING MORAL SENTIMENT.

F the foregoing hypothefis be received, it will now be eafy for us to determine the queftion first started*, concerning the general principles of morals: and though we poftponed the decifion of that queftion, left it should then involve us in intricate fpeculations, which are unfit for moral difcourfes, we may refume it at prefent, and examine how far either reafon or fentiment enters into all decifions of praise or cenfure.

One principal foundation of moral praise being fuppofed to lie in the usefulness of any quality or action, it is evident, that reafon muft enter for a confiderable share in all decifions of this kind; fince nothing but that faculty can inftruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial confequences to fociety and to their poffeffor. In many cafes, this is an affair liable to great controverfy Doubts may arife; oppofite interests may occur; and a preference must be given to one fide, from very nice views, and a fmail overbalance of utility. This is particularly remarkable in questions with regard to juftice; as is, indeed, natural to fuppofe, from that fpecies of utility which attends this virtue+. Were every fingle inftance of juftice, like that of benevolence, useful to fociety, this would be a more fimple ftate of the cafe, and feldom liable to great controverfy. But as fingle inftances of justice are often pernicious in their first and immediate tendency, and as the advantage to fociety refults only from

* Se&. I.

+ See Appendix III.

from the obfervance of the general rule, and from the concurrence and combination of feveral perfons in the fame equitable conduct, the cafe here becomes more intricate and involved. The various circumftances of fociety; the various confequences of any practice; the various interefts which may be proposed : Thefe, on many occafions, are doubtful, and fubject to great difcuffion and enquiry. The object of municipal laws is to fix all the queftions with regard to juftice: The debates of civilians; the reflections of politicians; the precedents of hiftory and public records, are all directed to the fame purpofe. And a very accurate reafon or judgment is often requifite, to give the true determination, amidst fuch intricate doubts arising from obfcure or oppofite utilities.

But though reafon, when fully affifted and improved, be fufficient to inftruct us in the pernicious or ufeful tendency of qualities and actions; it is not alone fufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we fhould feel the fame indifference towards the means. It is requifite a fentiment fhould here difplay itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. This fentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a refentment of their mifery; fince these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here, therefore, reafon inftructs us in the feveral tendencies of actions, and f humanity makes a diftinction in favour of thofe which are useful and beneficial.

This partition between the faculties of underftanding and fentiment, in all moral decifions, feems clear from the preceding hypothefis. But I fhall fuppofe that hypothefis falfe: It will then be requifite to look out for fome other theory that may be fatisfactory; and I dare venture to affirm, that none fuch will ever be found, fo long as we fuppofe reafon to be the fole fource

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