are the confequences. The preceding delineation or definition of PERSONAL MERIT muft ftill retain its evidence and authority: It muft ftill be allowed, that every quality of the mind, which is ufeful or agreeable to the perfon himself or to others, communicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages his esteem, and is admitted under the honourable denomination of virtue or merit. Are not justice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chastity, efteemed folely on account of their tendency to promote the good of fociety? Is not that tendency infeparable from humanity, benevolence, lenity, generofity, gratitude, moderation, tenderness, friendfhip, and all the other focial virtues? Can it poffibly be doubted, that industry, difcretion, frugality, fecrecy, order, perfeverance, forethought, judgment, and this whole clafs of virtues and accomplishments, of which many pages would not contain the catalogue; can it be doubted, I say, that the tendency of these qualities to promote the intereft and happi, nefs of their poffeffor, is the fole foundation of their merit? Who can dispute that a mind, which fupports a perpetual ferenity and cheerfulnefs, a noble dignity and undaunted fpirit, a tender affection and good-will to all around; as it has more enjoyment within itself, is alfo a more animating and rejoicing fpectacle, than if dejected with melancholy, tormented with anxiety, irritated with rage, or funk into the most abject bafenefs and degeneracy? And as to the qualities immediately agreeable to others, they speak fufficiently for themselves; and he muft be unhappy indeed, either in his own temper, or in his fituation and company, who has never perceived the charms of a facetious wit or flowing affability, of a delicate modesty or decent genteelness of addrefs and manner.

I am fenfible, that nothing can be more unphilofophical than to be pofitive or dogmatical on any fubject; and that, even if exceffive scepticism could

be

be maintained, it would not be more deftructive to all just reasoning and enquiry. I am convinced, that where men are the most fure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there given reins to paffion, without that proper deliberation and fufpenfe, which can alone fecure them from the groffeft abfurdities. Yet I must confefs, that this enumeration puts the matter in fo ftrong a light, that I cannot at prefent be more affured of any truth, which I learn from reafoning and argument, than that perfonal merit confifts entirely in the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the perfon himself poffeffed of them, or to others who have any intercourse with him. But when I reflect, that though the bulk and figure of the earth have been measured and delineated, though the motions of the tides have been accounted for, the order and economy of the heavenly bodies fubjected to their proper laws, and INFINITE itself reduced to calculation; yet men ftill difpute concerning the foundation of their moral duties: When I reflect on this, I fay, I fall back into diffidence and fcepticism, and fufpect, that an hypothefis fo obvious, had it been a true one, would long ere now have been received by the unanimous fuffrage and confent of mankind.

PART II.

HAVING explained the moral approbation attending merit or virtue, there remains nothing, but briefly to confider our interested obligation to it, and to enquire, whether every man, who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will not beft find his account in the practice of every moral duty? If this can be clearly afcertained from the foregoing theory, we shall have the fatisfaction to reflect, that we have advanced principles, which not only, it is hoped, will ftand the teft of reafoning and enquiry, but may contribute to the amendment of mens lives,

and

and their improvement in morality and focial virtue And though the philofophical truth of any propofition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of fociety; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he must confefs, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into thofe corners of nature, which spread a nuisance all around? Why dig up the peftilence from the pit in which it is buried? The ingenuity of your refearches may be admired, but your fyftems will be detefted; and mankind will agree, if they cannot refute them, to fink them, at leaft, in eternal filence and oblivion. Truths, which are pernicious to fociety, if any fuch there be, will yield to errors, which are falutary and advantageous.

But what philofophical truths can be more advantageous to fociety, than thofe here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with eafe, familiarity, and affection? The difmal drefs falls off, with which many divines, and fome philofophers have covered her; and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay even, at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of useless aufterities and rigours, fuffering and felf-denial. She declares, that her fole purpofe is, to make her votaries and all mankind, during every inftant of their existence, if poffible, cheerful and happy; nor does the ever willingly part with any pleasure but in hopes of ample compenfation in fome other period of their lives. The fole trouble, which fhe demands, is that of juft calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness. And if any auftere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and pleasure, the either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers; or if the admit them in her train, they are ranked however, among the least favoured of her votaries.

And,

And, indeed, to drop all figurative expreffion, what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice, which we confefs full of aufterity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever ferve any ufeful purpose, unless it can fhow, by a particular detail, that all the duties, which it recommends, are alfo the true intereft of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing fyftem seems to be, that it furnishes proper mediums for that purpose.

That the virtues which are immediately useful or agreeable to the perfon poffeffed of them, are defirable in a view to felf-intereft, it would furely be fuperfluous to prove. Moralifts, indeed, may fpare themselves all the pains which they often take in recommending thefe duties. To what purpose collect arguments to evince, that temperance is advantageous, and the exceffes of pleasure hurtful? when it appears, that these exceffes are only denominated fuch, because they are hurtful; and that, if the unlimited use of strong liquors, for inftance, no more impaired health or the faculties of mind and body than the use of air or water, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable.

It seems equally fuperflous to prove, that the companionable virtues of good manners and wit, decency and genteelnefs, are more defirable than the contrary qualities. Vanity alone, without any other confideration, is a fufficient motive to make us wish for the poffeffion of thefe accomplishments. No man was ever willingly deficient in this particular. All our failures here proceed from bad education, want of capacity, or a perverfe and unpliable difpofition. Would you have your company coveted, admired, followed; rather than hated, defpifed, avoided? Can any one seriously deliberate in the case? As no enjoyment is fincere, without fome reference to company and fociety; fo no fociety can be agreeable, or even tolerable, where a man feels his prefence un

welcome,

welcome, and difcovers all around him fymptoms of difguft and averfion.

But why, in the greater fociety or confederacy of mankind, fhould not the cafe be the fame as in particular clubs and companies? Why is it more doubtful, that the enlarged virtues of humanity, generofity, beneficence, are defirable with a view to happiness and felf-intereft, than the limited endowments of ingenuity and politnefs? Are we apprehenfive left thofe focial affections interfere, in a greater and more immediate degree than any other purfuits, with private utility, and cannot be gratified, without fome important facrifice of honour and advantage? If so, we are but ill inftructed in the nature of the human paffions, and are more influenced by verbal diftinctions than by real differences.

Whatever contradiction may vulgarly be supposed between the selfish and focial fentiments or difpofitions, they are really no more oppofite than felfish and ambitious, felfifh and revengeful, felfish and vain. It is requifite, that there be an original propensity of fome kind, in order to be a bafis to felf-love, by giving a relish to the objects of its purfuit; and none more fit for this purpose than benevolence or humanity. The goods of fortune are spent in one gratification or another: The mifer, who accumulates his annual income, and lends it out at intereft, has really fpent it in the gratification of his avarice. And it would be difficult to fhow, why a man is more a loofer by a generous action, than by any other method of expence; fince the utmoft which he can attain, by the moft elaborate selfishness, is the indulgence of fome affection.

Now if life, without paffion, muft be altogether infipid and tiresome; let a man fuppofe that he has full power of modelling his own difpofition, and let him deliberate what appetite or defire he would choofe for the foundation of his happinefs and enjoyment. Every affection, he would obferve, when

gratified