again, may be refolved into one more general and univerfal: And how far these researches may poffibly be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who philofophife the most negligently: And nothing can be more requifite than to enter upon the enterprise with thorough care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily atchieved; if not, it may, however, be rejected with fome confidence and fecurity. This laft conclufion, furely, is not defirable; nor ought it to be embraced too rafhly. For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this fpecies of philofophy, upon fuch a fuppofition? Moralifts have hitherto been accustomed, when they confidered the vast multitude and diverfity of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to fearch for fome common principle, on which this variety of fentiments might depend. And though they have fometimes carried the matter too far, by their paffion for fome one general principle; it muft, however, be confeffed, that they are excufable in expecting to find some general principles, into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be refolved. The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians: Nor have their attempts been wholly unfuc cessful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application, may bring these sciences ftill nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretenfions of this kind, may juftly be deemed more rafh, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philofophy, that has ever attempted to impofe its crude dictates and principles on mankind.

What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehenfion? . This affords no prefumption of their falfehood. On

the

the contrary, it feems impoffible, that what has hitherto efcaped fo many wife, and profound philofophers, can be very obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches may coft us, we may think ourfelves fufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge, in fubjects of fuch unspeakable importance,

But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be furmounted by care and art, and the avoiding of all unneceffary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted to throw fome light upon fubjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wife, and obfcurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different fpecies of philofophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearnefs, and truth with novelty! And ftill more happy, if, reasoning in this eafy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abftrufe philofophy, which feems to have hitherto served only as a fhelter to fuperftition, and a cover to abfurdity and error!

SECTION II.

Of the ORIGIN of IDeas.

VERY one will readily allow, that there is a

E confiderable difference between the perceptions

of the mind, when a man feels the pain of exceffive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth; and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this fenfation,

or

or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the fenfes; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original fentiment. The utmoft we fay of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, that they reprefent their object in fo lively. a manner, that we could almost fay we feel or fee it: But, except the mind be difordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at fuch a pitch of vivacity, as to render thefe perceptions altogether undiftinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however fplendid, can never paint natural objects in fuch a manner as to make the defcription be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dulleft fenfation.

We may obferve a like diftinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any perfon is in love, I eafily underftand your meaning, and form a juft conception of his fituation; but never can mistake that conception for the real diforders and agitations of the paffion. When we reflect on our paft fentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were cloathed. It requires no nice difcernment or metaphyfical head to mark the diftinction between them."

. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two claffes or fpecies, which are diftinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The lefs forcible and lively are commonly denominated THOUGHTS OF IDEAS. The other fpecies want a name in our language, and in moft others; I fuppofe, because it was not requifite for any, but philofophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore,

ufe

+

ufe a little freedom, and call them IMPRESSIONS; employing that word in a sense fomewhat different from the ufual. By the term impreffion, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or fee, or feel, or love, or hate, or defire, or will. And impreffions are diftinguished from ideas, which are the lefs lively perceptions, of which we are confcious, when we reflect on any of those fenfations or movements above mentioned.

Nothing, at firft view, may feem more unbounded than the thought of man; which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous fhapes and appearances, cofts the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant tranfport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is fuppofed to lie in total confufion. What never was feen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what implies an abfolute contradiction.

But though our thought feems to poffefs this unbounded liberty, we fhall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, tranfpofing, augmenting, or diminishing, the materials afforded us by the fenfes and experi ence. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two confiftant ideas, gold and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horfe we can conceive; becaufe, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and fhape of a horfe, which is an animal familiar to us. In fhort all the materials of

thinking are derived either from our outward or inward fentiment: The mixture and compofition of these belongs alone to the mind and will: Or, to exprefs myself in philofophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impreffions or more lively ones.

To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be fufficient. First, when we analyfe our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or fublime, we always find, that they refolve themfelves into fuch fimple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or fentiment. Even thofe ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer fcrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wife, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting without limit, thofe qualities of goodnefs and wifdom. We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a fimilar impreffion. Those who would affert, that this pofition is not univerfally true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy, method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this fource. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impreffion or lively percep on which correfponds to it.

Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not fufceptible of any fpecies of fenfation, we always find, that he is as little fufceptible of the correfpondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of founds. Restore either of them that fenfe, in which he is deficient ; by opening this new inlet for his fenfations, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving thefe objects. The cafe is the fame, if the object, proper for exciting any fenfation, has