proach to it, its image would expand on the eye, and that the difference confifts not in the object itfelf, but in our position with regard to it. And indeed, without fuch a correction of appearances, both in internal and external fentiment, men could never think or talk fteadily on any fubject; while their fluctuating fituations produce a continual variation on objects, and throw them into fuch different and contrary lights and pofitions *.

The more we converfe with mankind, and the greater focial intercourse we maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences and diftinctions, without which our converfation and discourse could scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other. Every man's intereft is peculiar to himself, and the averfions and defires, which refult from it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree. General language, therefore, being formed for general ufe, must be moulded on fome more general views, and must affix the epithets of praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments which arife from the general interests of the community: And if these fentiments, in most men, be not so strong as those which have a reference to private good; yet still they must make fome diftinction, even in perfons the most depraved and selfish; and must attach the notion of good to a beneficent conduct, and of evil to the contrary. Sympathy, we shall allow, is much fainter than our concern for ourselves, and fympathy with perfons remote from us, much fainter than that with perfons near and contiguous; but for this very reafon, it is neceffary for us, in our calm judgments and discourse concerning the characters of men, to neglect all these differences, and render our fentiments more public and focial. Befides, that we ourselves often change our fituation in this particular, we every day meet with perfons who are in a fituation different from us, and who could never converfe with us, were we to remain conftantly in that pofition and point

See Note [DD.]

point of view, which is peculiar to ourfelves. The intercourfe of fentiments, therefore, in fociety and converfation, makes us form fome general unalterable ftandard by which we may approve or difapprove of characters and manners. And though the heart takes not part entirely with thofe general notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred, by the univerfal, abftract differences of vice and virtue, without regard to felf, or the perfons with whom we are more intimately connected; yet have thefe moral differences a confiderable influence, and being fufficient, at least, for difcourfe, ferve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the fchools *.

Thus, in whatever light we take this fubject, the merit afcribed to the focial virtues appears ftill uniform, and arifes chiefly from that regard, which the natural fentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of mankind and fociety. If we confider the principles of the human make, fuch as they appear to daily experience and obfervation, we must, à priori, conclude it impoffible for fuch a creature as man to be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular bias, that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends to their mifery is evil, without any farther regard or confideration. Here then are the faint rudiments, at leaft, or out-lines, of a general diftinction between actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the perfon is fuppofed to encrease, his connection with those who are injured or benefited, and his lively conception of their mifery or happiness; his confequent cenfure or approbation acquires proportionable vigour. There is no neceffity that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old hiftory or remote gazette, fhould communicate any ftrong feelings of applause and admiration. Virtue, placed at fuch a distance, is like a fixed ftar, which, though to the eye of reafon,

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* See NOTE [EE].

fen, it may appear as luminous as the fun in his me ridian, is fo infinitely removed as to affect the fenfes neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connection with the perfons, or even by an elegant recital of the cafe; our hearts are immediately caught, our fympathy enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmeft fentiments of friendship and regard. These feem neceffary and infallible confequences of the general prin- . ciples of human nature, as difcovered in common life and practice.

Again; reverfe thefe views and reafonings: Confider the matter à pofteriori; and weighing the confequences, enquire if the merit of focial virtue be not in a great measure derived from the feelings of humanity, with which it affects the fpectators It ap pears to be a matter of fact, that the circumstance of utility, in all fubjects, is a fource of praise and approbation: That it is conftantly appealed to in all moral decifions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is the fole fource of that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chatity: That it is infeparable from all the other focial virtues, humanity, generofity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is a foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures.

It appears alfo, that, in our general approbation of characters and manners, the useful tendency of the focial virtues moves us not by any regards to selfintereft, but has an influence much more univerfal and extenfive. It appears, that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and order in fociety, does always, by affecting the bene volent principles of our frame, engage us on the fide. of the focial virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that these principles of humanity and fympathy enter fo deeply into all our fentiments, and have fo powerful an influence, as may enable them to VOL. II.

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excite

excite the strongest cenfure and applaufe. The prefent theory is the fimple result of all these inferences each of which feems founded on uniform experience and obfervation.

Were it doubtful, whether there were any fuch principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for others, yet when we fee, in numberless inftances, that whatever has a tendency to promote the interests of fociety, is fo highly approved of, we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle; fince it is impoffible for any thing to please as means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubtful whether there were implanted in our nature any general principle of moral blame and approbation; yet when we fee, in numberlefs inftances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that it is impoffible but that every thing which promotes the intereft of fociety, must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious give uneafinefs: But when thefe different reflections and obfervations concur in establishing the fame conclufion, must they not bestow an undisputed evidence upon it?

It is however hoped, that the progrefs of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the prefent theory, by showing the rise of other sentiments of esteem and regard from the fame or like principles.

SEC

SECTION VI.

OF QUALITIES USEFUL to OURSELVES.

PART I.

T feems evident, that where a quality or habit is fubjected to our examination, if it appear in any refpect prejudicial to the perfon poffeffed of it, or fuch as incapacitates him for business and action, it is instantly blamed, and ranked among his faults and imperfections. Indolence, negligence, want of order and method, obftinacy, fickleness, rafhness, credulity; thefe qualities were never efteemed by any one indifferent to a character; much lefs extolled as accomplishments or virtues. The prejudice, refulting from them, immediately ftrikes our eye, and gives us the fentiment of pain and disapprobation.

No quality, it is allowed, is absolutely either blameable or praife-worthy. It is all according to its degree. A due medium, fay the PERIPATETICS, is the characteristic of virtue. But this medium is chiefly determined by utility. A proper celerity, for inftance, and dispatch in bufinefs, is commendable. When defective, no progrefs is ever made in the execution of any purpose: When exceffive, it engages us in precipitate and ill-concerted measures and enterprises: By fuch reafonings, we fix the proper and commendable mediocrity in all moral and prudential difquifitions; and never lofe view of the advantages which refult from any character or habit.

Now as these advantages are enjoyed by the perfon poffeffed

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