They cannot even país each other on the road with out rules. Waggoners, coachmen, and poftilions have principles, by which they give the way; and these are chiefly founded on mutual cafe and convenience. Sometimes alfo they are arbitrary, at least dependent on a kind of capricious analogy, like many of the reafonings of lawyers*.

To carry the matter farther, we may observe, that it is impoffible for men fo much as to murder each other without ftatutes, and maxims, and an idea of justice and honour. War has its laws as well as peace; and even that sportive kind of war, carried on among wrestlers, boxers, cudgel-players, gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles. Common intereft and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and wrong among the parties concerned.

SECTION V.

WHY UTILITY PLEASES,

PART I.

T feems fo natural a thought to afcribe to their utility the praise which we bestow on the focial virtues, that one would expect to meet with this principle every where in moral writers, as the chief foundation of their reafoning and enquiry. In common life, we may obferve, that the circumftance of utility is always appealed to; nor is it fuppofed, that a greater eulogy can be given to any man, than to display

• See NOTE [Y].

difplay his usefulness to the public, and enumerate the fervices which he has performed to mankind and fociety. What praife, even of an inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance of its parts deftroy not its fitnefs for any ufeful purpofe! And how fatisfactory an apology for any difproportion or feem ing deformity, if we can fhow the neceflity of that particular conftruction for the use intended! A fhip appears mor beautiful to an artist, or one moderately skilled in navigation, where its prow is wide and fwelling beyond its poop, than if it were framed with a precife geometrical regularity, in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics. A building, whofe doors and windows were exact fquares, would hurt the eye by that very proportion; as ill adapted to the figure of a hunian creature, for whofe fervice the fabric was intended. What wonder then that a man, whofe habits and conduct are hurtiful to fociety, and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an intercourfe with him, fhould, on that account, be an object of difapprobation, and communicate to every fpectator the ftrongeft fentiment of difguft and hatred *.

But perhaps the difficulty of accounting for these effects of usefulness, or its contrary, has kept philofophers from admitting them into their fyftems of ethics, and has induced them rather to employ any other principle in explaining the origin of moral good and evil. But it is no juft reafon for rejecting any principle, confirmed by experience, that we cannot give a fatisfactory account of its origin, nor are able to refolve it into other more general principles. And if we would employ a little thought on the present fubject, we need be at no lofs to account for the influence of utility, and to deduce it from principles, the most known and avowed in human nature.

From the apparent usefulness of the focial virtues, VOL. II.

е

See NOTE [Z].

it

it has readily been inferred by fceptics, both an cient and modern, that all moral diftinctions arise from education, and were, at first, invented, and afterwards encouraged, by the art of politicians, in order to render men tractable, and subdue their natural ferocity and selfishness which incapacitated them for fociety. This principle, indeed, of precept and education, muft fo far be owned to have a powerful influence, that it may frequently encrease or diminfh, beyond their natural standard, the sentiments of approbation or dislike; and may even, in particular inftances, create, without any natural principle, a new fentiment of this kind; as is evident in all fuperftitious practices and obfervances: that all moral affection or diflike arifes from this origin, will never furely be allowed by any judicious enquirer. Had nature made no fuch diftinction, founded on the original constitution of the mind, the words, honourable and shameful, lovely and odious, noble and despicable, had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience. So that nothing can be more fuperficial than this paradox of the fceptics; and it were well if, in the abftrufer ftudies of logic and metaphyfics, we could as eafily obviate the cavils of that fect, as in the practical and more intelligible fciences of politics and morals.

The focial virtues muft, therefore, be allowed to have a natural beauty and amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all precept or education, recommends them to the esteem of uninftructed mankind, and engages their affections. And as the public utility of thefe virtues is the chief circumftance whence they derive their merit, it follows, that the end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be fome way agreeable to us, and take hold of fome natural affection. It must please, either from confiderations of selfintereft, or from more generous motives and regards.

It has often been afferted, that, as every man has

a

a ftrong connection with fociety, and percieves the impoffibililty of his folitary fubfiftence, he becomes, on that account, favourable to all thofe habits or principles which promote order in fociety, and insure to him the quiet poffeffion of fo ineftimable a bleffing. As much as we value our own happiness and welfare, as much must we applaud the practice of juftice and humanity, by which alone the social confederacy can be maintained, and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and affiftance.

This deduction of morals from felf-love, or a regard to private intereft, is an obvious thought, and has not arisen wholly from the wanton fallies and fportive affaults of the fceptics. To mention no others, POLYBIUS, one of the gravest and most judicious, as well as most moral writers of antiquity, has affigned this selfish origin to all our fentiments of virtue *. But though the folid, practical sense of that author, and his averfion to all vain subtilities, render his authority on the present subject very confiderable; yet is not this an affair to be decided by authority; and the voice of nature and experience feems plainly to oppose the selfish theory.

We frequently beftow praife on virtuous actions, performed in very diftant ages and remote countries; where the utmost fubtility of imagination would not discover any appearance of felf-intereft, or find any connection of our present happiness and fecurity with events fo widely feparated from us.

A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adversary, commands our approbation; while in its confequences it may be acknowledged prejudicial to our particular interest.

Where private advantage concurs, with general affection for virtue, we readily perceive and avow the mixture of these diftinct fentiments, which have a very different feeling and influence on the mind. We praise, perhaps, with more alacrity, where the Q 2 generous,

See NOTE [AA].

generous, humane action contributes to our particu lar intereft: But the topics of praife, which we infift on, are very wide of this circumftance. And we

may attempt to bring over others to our fentiments, without endeavouring to convince them, that they reap any advantage from the actions which we recommend to their approbation and applause.

Frame the model of a praife-worthy character, confifting of all the most amiable moral virtues; give inftances, in which these display themselves after an eminent and extraordinary manner: You readily engage the esteem and approbation of all your audience, who never fo much as enquire in what age and country the perfon lived who poffeffed thefe noble qualities: A circumftance, however, of all others, the moft material to felf-love, or a concern for our own individual happiness.

Once on a time, a statesman, in the fhock and contest of parties, prevailed fo far as to procure, by his eloquence, the banishment of an able adverfary; whom he fecretly followed, offering him money for his fupport during his exile, and foothing him with topics of confolation in his misfortunes. Alas! cries the banished ftatfeman, with what regret must I leave my friends in this city, where even enemies are fo generous! Virtue, though in an enemy, here pleased him: And we alfo give it the juft tribute of praise and approbation; nor do we retract these fentiments, when we hear, that the action paffed at ATHENS, about two thousand years ago, and that the perfons names were ESCHINES and DEMOSTHENES.

What is that to me? There are few occafions when this question is not pertinent: And had it that univerfal, infallible influence fuppofed, it would turn into ridicule every compofition, and almost every converfation which contain any praise or cenfure of men and manners.

It is but a weak fubterfuge, when preffedby these facts and arguments, to fay, that we tranfport our