in the mouth of a philofopher, one may fafely fay, are too obvious to have any influence; because they must always, to every man, occur at first fight; and where they prevail not of themselves, they are furely obftructed by education, prejudice, and paffion, not by ignorance or mistake.

It may appear to a carelefs view, or rather a too abstracted reflection, that there enters a like fuperftition into all the sentiments of juftice; and that if a man expofe its object, or what we call property, to the fame scrutiny of sense and science, he will not, by the most accurate enquiry, find any foundation for the difference made by moral fentiment. I may lawfully nourish myself from this tree; but the fruit of another of the fame fpecies, ten paces off, it is criminal for me to touch. Had I worne this apparel an hour ago, I had merited the feverest punishment; but a man, by pronouncing a few magical fyllables, has now rendered it fit for my ufe and fervice. Were this house placed in the neighbouring territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell in it; but being built on this fide the river, it is fubject to a different municipal law, and, by its becoming mine, I incur no blame or cenfure. The fame species of reasoning, it may be thought, which fo fuccefsfully expofes fuperftition, is also applicable to juftice; nor is it posfible, in the one cafe, more than in the other, to point out, in the object, that precife quality or circumftance which is the foundation of the fentiment.

But there is this material difference between fuperftition and justice, that the former is frivolous, useless, and burdenfome; the latter is abfolutely requifite to the well-being of mankind and existence of fociety. When we abstract from this circumftance (for it is too apparent ever to be overlooked), it must be confeffed, that all regards to right and property seem entirely without foundation, as much as the groffeft and most vulgar fuperftition. Were the interests of fociety nowife concerned, it is as unintelligible, why

another's

another's articulating certain founds implying confent, fhould change the nature of my actions with regard to a particular object, as why the reciting of a liturgy by a priest, in a certain habit and posture, fhould dedicate a heap of brick and timber, and render it, thenceforth and for ever, facred *.

These reflections are far from weakening the obligations of justice, or diminishing any thing from the moft facred attention to property. On the contrary, fuch fentiments must acquire new force from the prefent reafoning. For what ftronger foundation can be defired or conceived for any duty, than to obferve, that human fociety, or even human nature, could not fubfift without the establishment of it; and will ftill arrive at greater degrees of happinefs and perfection, the more inviolable the regard is which is paid to that duty?

The dilemma feems obvious: As juftice evidently tends to promote public utility and to fupport civil fociety, the fentiment of juftice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, refentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, and other paffions, arifes from a fimple original inftinct in the human breaft, which nature has implanted for like falutary purposes. If the latter be the cafe, it follows, that property, which is the object of justice, is also distinguished by a fimple, original inftinct, and is not afcertained by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard of fuch an inftinct? Or is this a fubject in which new difcoveries can be made? We may

as well expect to discover in the body new fenses, which had before efcaped the obfervation of all mankind.

But farther, though it feems a very fimple propofition to fay, that nature, by an inftinctive fentiment, diftinguishes property, yet in reality we fhall find, that there are required for that purpose ten thousand P 4

See NOTE [U.]

dif

different inftincts, and thefe employed about objects of the greatest intricacy and niceft difcernment. For when a definition of property is required, that relation is found to refolve itfelf into any poffeffion acquired by occupation, by induftry, by prefcription, by inheritance, by contract, &c. Can we think that nature, by an original inftinct, inftructs us in all these methods of acquifition?

Thefe words, too, inheritance and contract, ftand for ideas infinitely complicated; and to define them exactly, a hundred volumes of laws, and a thousand volumes of commentators, have not been found fufficient. Does nature, whofe instincts in men are all fimple, embrace fuch complicated and artificial objects, and create a rational creature, without trufting any thing to the operation of his reafon?

But even though all this were admitted, it would not be fatisfactory. Pofitive laws can certainly transfer property. Is it by another original instinct, that we recognize the authority of kings and fenates, and mark all the boundaries of their jurifdiction? Judges too, even though their fentence be erroneous and illegal, must be allowed, for the fake of peace and order, to have decifive authority, and ultimately to determine property. Have we original, innate ideas of prætors, and chancellors, and juries? Who fees not, that all thefe inftitutions arife merely from the neceffities of human fociety?

All birds of the fame fpecies in every age and country, build their nefts alike: In this we fee the force of inftinct. Men in different times and places, frame their houfes differently: Here we perceive the influence of reafon and cuftom. A like inference may be drawn from comparing the inftinct of generation and the inftitution of property."

How great foever the variety of municipal laws, it muft be confeffed, that their chief outlines pretty regularly concur; because the purposes to which they tend, are every where exactly fimilar. In like man

ner,

ner, all houfes have a roof and walls, windows and chimneys; though diverfified in their fhape, figure, and materials. The purposes of the latter, directed to the conveniences of human life, discover not more plainly their origin from reafon and reflection, than do thofe of the .former, which point all to a like end.

I need not mention the variations which all the rules of property receive from the finer turns and connections of the imagination, and from the fubtilties and abftractions of law-topics and reafonings. There is no poffibility of reconciling this obfervation to the notion of original inftincts.

What alone will beget a doubt concerning the theory on which I infift, is the influence of education and acquired habits; by which we are fo accuftomed to blame injuftice, that we are not, in every inftance, confcious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious confequences of it. The views the moft familiar to us are apt, for that very reason, to efcape us; and what we have very frequently performed from certain motives, we are apt likewife to continue mechanically, without recalling, on every occafion, the reflections which firft determined us. The convenience, or rather neceflity, which leads to juftice, is fo univerfal, and every where points fo much to the fame. rules, that the habit takes place in all focieties; and it is not without some scrutiny, that we are able to afcertain its true origin. The matter, however, is not so obfcure, but that, even in common life, we have, every moment, recourse to the principle of public utility, and afk, What must become of the world, if fuch practices prevail? How could fociety fubfift under fuch diforders? Were the diftinction or feparation of poffeffions entirely ufelefs, can any one conceive, that it ever fhould have obtained in fociety?

Thus we feem, upon the whole, to have attained a knowledge of the force of that principle here in

fifted on, and can determine what degree of esteem or moral approbation may refult from reflections on public intereft and utility. The neceffity of juftice to the fupport of fociety is the SOLE foundation of that virtue; and fince no moral excellence is more highly esteemed, we may conclude, that this circumftance of ufefulnefs has, in general, the ftrongeft energy, and most entire command over our fentiments. It muft, therefore, be the fource of a confiderable part of the merit ascribed to humanity, benevolence, friendship, public fpirit, and other focial virtues of that stamp; as it is the SOLE fource of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, juftice, veracity, integrity, and those other eftimable and ufeful qualities and principles. It is entirely agreeable to the rules of philofophy, and even of common reafon, where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one inftance, to afcribe it to a like energy in all fimilar inftances. This indeed is NEWTON's chief rule of philofophizing *.

SECTION IV.

Of POLITICAL SOCIETY.

AD every man fufficient fagacity to perceive, at all times, the ftrong intereft which binds him to the obfervance of juftice and equity, and strength of mind fufficient to perfevere in a fteady adherence to a general and a diftant intereft, in oppofition to the allurements of prefent pleasure and advantage;

Principia, lib. iii.

there