1

needlefs for us, at prefent, to employ farther care in our researches concerning it. For if we can be fo happy, in the courfe of this enquiry, as to discover the true origin of morals, it will then easily appear how far either fentiment or reafon enters into all determinations of this nature. In order to attain this purpose, we shall endeavour to follow a very fimple method: We fhall analyze that complication of mental qualities, which form what, in common life, we call PERSONAL MERIT: We fhall confider every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or fentiment or faculty, which, if afcribed to any perfon, implies either praise or blame, and may enter into any panygyric or fatire of his character and manners. The quick fenfibility, which, on this head, is fo universal among mankind, gives a philofopher fufficient affurance, that he can never be confiderably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incur any danger of misplacing the objects of his contemplation: He needs only enter into his breaft for a moment, and confider whether or not he fhould defire to have this or that quality afcribed to him, and whether fuch or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of this nature; and as every tongue poffeffes one set of words which are taken in a good fense, and another in the oppofite, the least acquaintance with the idiom fuffices, without any reasoning, to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of men. The only object of reafoning is to difcover the circumftances on both fides, which are common to thefe qualities; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand, and the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation of ethics, and find thofe univerfal principles, from which all cenfure

See Appendix L

As

cenfure or approbation is ultimately derived. this is a queftion of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect fuccefs, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular inftances. The other scientifical method, where a general abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclufions, may be more perfect in itself, but fuits lefs the imperfection of human nature, and is a common fource of illufion and mistake in this as well as in other fubjects. Men are now cured of their paffion for hypothesis and systems in natural philofophy, and will hearken to no arguments but thofe which are derived from experience. It is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral difquifitions; and reject every system of ethics, however fubtile or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and obfervation.

We shall begin our enquiry on this head by the confideration of the focial virtues, benevolence and juftice. The explication of them will probably give us an opening by which the others may be accounted for.

SEC

SECTION II.

Of BENEVOLENCE.

PART Í.

T may be efteemed, perhaps, a fuperfluous task

IT

to prove, that the benevolent or fofter affections are ESTIMABLE; and wherever they appear, engage the approbation and good-will of mankind. The epithets fociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and univerfally exprefs the highest merit which human nature is capable of attaining. Where these amiable qualities are attended with birth and power and eminent abilities, and display themselves in the good government or useful inftruction of mankind, they seem even to raise the poffeffors of them above the rank of human nature, and make them approach in fome meafure to the divine. Exalted capacity, undaunted courage, profperous fuccefs; thefe may only expofe a hero or politician to the envy and ill-will of the public: But as foon as the praifes are added of humane and beneficent; when inftances are displayed of lenity, tendernefs, or friendship; envy itself is filent, or joins the general voice of approbation and applause.

When PERICLES, the great ATHENIAN ftatesman and general, was on his death-bed, his furrounding VOL. II. friends,

friends, deeming him now infenfible, began to in dulge their forrow for their expiring patron, by enumerating his great qualities and fucceffes, his conquefts and victories, the unufual length of his administration, and his nine trophies erected over the enemies of the republic. You forget, cries the dying hero, who had heard all, you forget the most eminent of my praifes, while you dwell fo much on those vulgar advantages, in which fortune had a principal share. You have not observed, that no citizen has ever yet worne mourning on my account *.

In men of more ordinary talents and capacity, the focial virtues become, if poffible, ftill more effentially requifite; there being nothing eminent, in that cafe, to compenfate for the want of them, or preferve the perfon from our fevereft hatred, as well as contempt. A high ambition, an elevated courage, is apt, fays CICERO, in lefs perfect characters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity. The more focial and fofter virtues are there chiefly to be regarded. Thefe are always good and amiablet.

The principal advantage which JUVENAL difcovers in the extenfive capacity of the human fpecies is, that it renders our benevolence alfo more extenfive, and gives us larger opportunities of fpreading our kindly influence than what are indulged to the inferior creation. It muft, It, muft, indeed, be confeffeu, that by doing good only, can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being eminent. His exalted station, of itself, but the more expofes him to danger and tempeft. His fole prerogative is to afford fhelter to inferiors, who repofe themselves under his cover and protection.

But I forget, that it is not my prefent business to recommend generofity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms of the focial virtues. Thefe, indeed, fufficiently engage

*PLUT. in PERICLE.

Sat. xv. 139. & feq.

every

+Cic. de Officiis, lib. 1.

every heart, on the first apprehenfion of them; and it is difficult to abstain from fome fally of panegyric, as often as they occur in difcourfe or reafoning. But our object here being more the fpeculative than the practical part of morals, it will fuffice to remark (what will readily, I believe, be allowed), that no qualities are more intitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public fpirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender fympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and fpecies. Thefe, wherever they appear, feem to transfuse themselves, in a manner, into each beholder, and call forth, in their own behalf, the fame favourable and affectionate fentiments which they exert on all arround.

PART II.

WE may obferve, that, in displaying the praifes of any humane, beneficent man, there is one circumstance which never fails to be amply infifted on, namely, the happiness and fatisfaction derived to fociety from his intercourfe and good offices. To his parents, we are apt to fay, he endears himself by hipious attachment and duteous care, ftill more than by the connections of nature. His children never feel his authority, but when employed for their advan tage. With him, the ties of love are confolidated by beneficence and friendship. The ties of friendship approach, in a fond obfervance of each obliging office, to thofe of love and inclination. His domeftics and dependents have in him a fure resource; and no longer dread the power of fortune, but fo far as the exereifes it over him. From him the hungry receive food, the naked cloathing, the ignorant and flothful skill in industry. Like the fun,