It is a property in human nature, that any emotion which attends a paffion, is eafily converted into it; though in their natures they be originally different from, and even contrary to, each other. It is true, in order to caufe a perfect union amongft paffions, and make one produce the other, there is always required a double relation, according to the theory above delivered: But when two paffions are already produced by their feparate caufes, and are both prefent in the mind, they readily mingle and unite; though they have but one relation, and fometimes without any. The predominant paffion fwallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself. The fpirits, when once excited, eafily receive a change in their direction; and it is natural to imagine, that this change will come from the prevailing affection. The connection is in many cafes clofer between any two paffions, than between any paffion and indifference.

When a person is once heartily in love, the little faults and caprices of his miftrefs, the jealoufies and quarrels to which that commerce is fo fubject, however unpleasant they be, and rather connected with anger and hatred, are yet found, in many inftances, to give additional force to the prevailing paffion. It is a common artifice of politicians, when they would affect any perfon very much by a matter of fact of which they intend to inform him, firft to excite his curiofity; delay as long as poffible the fatisfying of it; and by that means raise his anxiety and impatience to the utmost, before they give him a full infight into the bufinefs. They know, that this curiofity will precipitate him into the paffion which they purpose to raife, and will affift the object in its influence on the mind. A foldier advancing to battle, is naturally infpired with courage and confidence, when he thinks on his friends and fellow-foldiers; and is ftruck with fear and terror, when he reflects on the enemy. Whatever new emotion therefore proceeds from the former, naturally encreases the courage; as the fame emotion

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emotion proceeding from the latter, augments the fear. Hence, in martial difcipline, the uniformity and luftre of habit, the regularity of figures and motions, with all the pomp and majefty of war, encourage ourselves and our allies; while the fame objects in the enemy ftrike terror into us, though agreeable and beautiful in themselves.

Hope is, in itself, an agreeable paffion, and allied to friendship and benevolence; yet is it able fometimes to blow up anger, when that is the predominant paffion. Spes addita fufcitat iras. VIRG.

2. Since paffions, however independent, are naturally transfufed into each other, if they be both prefent at the fame time; it follows, that when' good or evil is placed in fuch a fituation as to caufe any particular emotion, befides its direct paffion of defire or averfion, this latter paffion must acquire new force and violence.

3. This often happens, when any object excites contrary paffions. For it is obfervable, that an oppofition of paffions commonly caufes a new emotion in the fpirits, and produces more diforder than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force. This new emotion is easily converted into the predominant paffion, and in many inftances, is obferved to encrease its violence, beyond the pitch at which it would have arrived, had it met with no oppofition. Hence we naturally defire what is forbid, and often take a pleafure in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful. The notion of duty, when oppofite to the paffions, is not always able to overcome them; and when it fails of that effect, is apt rather to encrease and irritate them, by producing an oppofition in our motives and principles.

4. The fame effect follows, whether the oppofition arife from internal motives or external obftacles. The paffion commonly acquires new force in both cafes. The efforts, which the mind makes to furmount the obftacle, excite the fpirits, and enliven the paffion.

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5. Uncertainty has the fame effect as oppofition. The agitation of the thought, the quick turns which it makes from one view to another, the variety of paffions which fucceed each other, according to the different views: All these produce an emotion in the mind; and this emotion transfuses itself into the predominant paffion.

Security, on the contrary, diminishes the paffions. The mind, when left to itself, immediately languishes; and, in order to preferve its ardour, must be every moment fupported by a new flow of paffion. For the fame reason, despair, though contrary to fecurity, has a like influence.

6. Nothing more powerfully excites any affection than to conceal fome part of its object, by throwing it into a kind of fhade, which at the same time that it shows enough to prepoffefs us in favour of the object, leaves ftill fome work for the imagination. Befides that obfcurity is always attended with a kind of uncertainty; the effort, which the fancy makes to complete the idea, rouzes the spirits, and gives an additional force to the paffion.

7. As defpair and fecurity, though contrary, produce the fame effects; fo abfence is obferved to have contrary effects, and in different circumftances, either encreases or diminishes our affection. ROCHEFOUCAULT has very well remarked, that abfence destroys weak paffions, but encreases strong; as the wind extinguishes a candle, but blows up a fire Long abfence naturally weakens our idea, and diminishes the paffion: But where the affection is fo ftrong and lively as to fupport itself, the uneafinefs, arifing from abfence, encreases the paffion, and gives it new force and influence.

8. When the foul applies itself to the performance of any action, or the conception of any object to which it is not accustomed, there is a certain unpliableness in the faculties, and a difficulty of the spirits moving in their new direction: As this difficulty excites the fpirits,

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fpirits, it is the fource of wonder, furprife, and of all the emotions which arife from novelty; and is in itfelf agreeable, like every thing which enlivens the mind to a moderate degree. But though furprise be agreeable in itself, yet, as it puts the spirits in agitation, it not only augments our agreeable affections, but alfo our painful, according to the foregoing principle. Hence every thing that is new is moft affecting, and gives us either more pleasure or pain, than what, ftrictly fpeaking, fhould naturally follow from it. When it often returns upon us, the novelty wears off, the paffions fubfide; the hurry of the spirits is over; and we furvey the object with greater tranquillity,

9. The imagination and affections have a clofe union together. The vivacity of the former gives force to the latter. Hence the profpect of any pleafure, with which we are acquainted, affects us more than any other pleasure which we may own fuperior, but of whose nature we are wholly ignorant. Of the one we can form a particular and determinate idea: The other we conceive under the general notion of pleasure.

Any fatisfaction which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is fresh and recent, operates on the will with more violence, than another of which the traces are decayed and almoft obliterated.

A pleasure, which is fuitable to the way of life in which we are engaged, excites more our defire and appetite than another which is foreign to it.

Nothing is more capable of infusing any paffion into the mind than eloquence, by which objects are represented in the strongest and most lively colours. The bare opinion of another, especially when enforced with paffion, will caufe an idea to have an influence upon us, though that idea might otherwife have been entirely neglected.

It is remarkable, that lively paffions commonly attend a lively imagination. In this refpect, as well as in others, the force of the paffion depends as much

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on the temper of the perfon as on the nature and fituation of the object.

What is diftant, either in place or time, has not equal influence with what is near and contiguous.

I pretend not to have here exhausted this subject, It is fufficient for my purpose, if I have made it appear, that, in the production and conduct of the paffions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is fufceptible of as accurate a difquifition as the laws of motion, optics, hydroftatics, or any part of natural philofophy.

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