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AN

ENQUIRY

CONCERNING

HUMA N

UNDERSTANDING.

SECTION I.

Of the DIFFERENT SPECIES of PHI

Mi

LOSOPHY.

ORAL philofophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, inftruction, and reformation of mankind. The one confiders man chief ly as born for action; and as influenced in his meafures by taste and fentiment; purfuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to poffefs, and according to the light in which they prefent themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this fpecies of philofophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their fubject in an easy and obvious manner, and fuch as is beft fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They felect the most ftriking obfervations and inftances from common life; VOL. II.

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place oppofite characters in a proper contraft; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the foundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our fentiments; and fo they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

The other species of philofophers confider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a fubject of peculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find thofe principles which regulate our understanding, excite our fentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philofophy fhould not yet have fixed, beyond controverfy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and fhould for ever talk of truth and falfehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the fource of thofe diftinctions. While they attempt this arduous tafk, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular inftances to general principles, they ftill pufh on their inquiries to principles more general, and reft not fatisfied till they arrive at thofe original principles; by which, in every science, all human curiofity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abftract and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim, at the approbation of the learned and the wife; and think themselves fufficiently compenfated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover fome hidden truths, which may contribute to the inftruction of pofterity.

It is certain that the eafy and obvious philofophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abftrufe; and by

many

many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more ufeful, than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it defcribes. On the contrary, the abftrufe philofophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philofopher leaves the fhade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our paffiors, the vehemence of our affections, diffipate all its conclufions, and reduce the profound philofopher to a mere plebeian.

This also must be confeffed, that the moft durable, as well as jufteft fame, has been acquired by the easy philofophy; and that abftract reafoners feem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to fupport their renown with more equitable pofterity. It is eafy for a profound philofopher to commit a mistake in his fubtile reafonings; and one mistake is the neceffary parent of another, while he pushes on his confequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclufion, by its unufual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion, But a philofopher, who purposes only to reprefent the common fenfe of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common fenfe, and the natural fentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and fecures himself from any dangerous illufions. The fame of CICERO flourishes at prefent; but that of ARISTOTLE is utterly decayed. LA BRUYERE paffes the feas, and ftill maintains his reputation; but the glory of MALEBRANCHE is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And ADDISON, perhaps, will be read

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with pleasure, when LOCKE fhall be entirely forgot

ten.

The mere philofopher is a character which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being fuppofed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of faciety; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehenfion. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is ftill more defpifed; nor is any thing deemed a furer fign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the fciences flourish, than to be entirely deftitute of all relifh for thote noble entertainments. The most perfect character is fuppofed to lie between thofe extremes; retaining an equal ability and tafte for books, company, and bufinefs; preferving in converfation that difcernment and delicacy which arife from polite letters; and in bufinefs, that probity and accuracy which are the natural refult of a juft philofophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate fo accomplished a character, nothing can be more useful than compofitions of the eafy ftyle and manner, which draw not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and fend back the ftudent among mankind full of noble fentiments and wife precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of fuch compofitions, virtue becomes amiable, fcience agreeable, company inftructive, and retirement entertaining.

Man is a reasonable being; and as fuch, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But fo narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little fatisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent or fecurity of his acquifitions. Man is a fociable, no less than a reasonable, being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amufing, or preferve the proper relifh for them. Man is also an active being; and from that difpofition, as well as from the various neceflities of

human

human life, muft fubmit to bufinefs and occupation: But the mind requires fome relaxation, and cannot always fupport its bent to care and induftry. It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as moft fuitable to human race, and fecretly admonished them to allow none of these biaffes to draw too much, fo as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your pallion for fcience, fays fhe, but let your science be human, and fuch as may have a direct reference to action and fociety. Abftrufe thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will feverley punish, by the penfive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which the involve you, and by the cold reception your pretended difcoveries fhall meet with, when communicated. Be a philofopher; but amidst all your philofophy, be ftill a man..

Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the eafy philofophy to the abstract and profound, without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without oppofition, his own tafte and fentiment. But as the matter is often carried farther, even to the abfolute rejecting of all profound reafonings, or what is commonly called metaphyfics, we fhall now proceed to confider what can reasonably be pleadded in their behalf.

We may begin with obferving, that one confiderable advantage, which refults from the accurate and abstract philofophy, is, its fubferviency to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a fufficient degree of exactnefs in its fentiments, precepts, or reafonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and fituations; and infpire us with different fentiments, of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the object which they fet before An artist must be better qualified to fucceed in this undertaking, who, befides a delicate taste and a

us.

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