ourselves to be in perfect fecurity, and have it in our choice, whether we will advance a step farther. The immediate presence of the evil influences the imagination, and produces a fpecies of belief; but being oppofed by the reflection on our fecurity, that belief is immediately retracted, and caufes the fame kind of paffion, as when, from a contrariety of chances, contrary paffions are produced. Evils, which are certain, have fometimes the fame effect as the poffible or impoffible. A man in a strong prifon, without the least means of escape, trembles at the thoughts of the rack to which he is fentenced. The evil is here fixed in itself; but the mind has not courage to fix upon it; and this fluctuation gives rife to a paffion of a fimilar appearance with fear. 7. But it is not only where good or evil is uncertain as to its existence, but also as to its kind, that fear or hope arifes. If any one were told that one of his fons is fuddenly killed; the paffion, occafioned by this event, would not fettle into grief, till he got certain information which of his fons he had loft. Though each fide of the question produces here the fame pasfion, that paffion cannot fettle, but receives from the imagination, which is unfixed, a tremulous unfteady motion refembling the mixture and contention of grief and joy. 8. Thus all kinds of uncertainty have a strong connection with fear, even though they do not caufe any oppofition of paffions by the oppofite views which they prefent to us. Should I leave a friend in any malady, I should feel more anxiety upon his account than if he were prefent; though perhaps I am not only incapable of giving him affiftance, but likewife of judging concerning the event of his fickness. There are a thousand littie circumftances of his fituation and condition which I defire to know; and the knowledge of them would prevent that fluctuation and uncertainty fo nearly allied to fear. HORACE has remarked this phænomenon. Ut Ut affidens implumibus pullus avis Magis relictis; non, ut adfit, auxili A virgin on her bridal night goes to bed full of fears and apprehenfions, though fhe expects nothing but pleasure. The confufion of wishes and joys, the newness and greatness of the unknown event, fo embarrass the mind, that it knows not in what image or paffion to fix itself. 9. Concerning the mixture of affections, we may remark, in general, that when contrary paffions arife from objects nowife connected together, they take place alternately. Thus when a man is afflicted for the lofs of a law-fuit, and joyful for the birth of a fon, the mind, running from the agreeable to the calamitous object; with whatever celerity it may perform this motion, can scarcely temper the one affection with the other, and remain between them in a ftate of indifference. It more easily attains that calm fituation, when the fame event is of a mixed nature, and contains fomething adverfe and fomething profperous in its different circumftances. For in that cafe, both the paffions mingling with each other by means of the relation, often become mutually deftructive, and leave the mind. in perfect tranquillity. But fuppofe that the object is not a compound of good and evil, but is confidered as probable or improbable in any degree; in that cafe, the contrary paffions will both of them be prefent at once in the foul, and inftead of balancing and tempering each other, will fubfift together, and by their union produce a third impreffion or affection, fuch as hope or fear. The influence of the relations of ideas (which we fhall explain more fully afterwards) is plainly feen in this affair. In contrary paffions, if the objects be totally different, the paffions are like two oppofite li quors quors in different bottles which have no influence on each other. If the objects be intimately connected, the paffions are like an alcali and an acid, which, being mingled, deftroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect, and confist in the contradictory views of the fame object, the paffions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate. The effect of a mixture of paffions, when one of them is predominant and swallows up the other, fhall be explained afterwards. SECT. II. 1. BESIDES those paffions above-mentioned which arife from a direct pursuit of good and averfion to evil, there are others which are of a more complicated nature, and imply more than one view or confideration. Thus Pride is a certain fatisfaction in ourfelves, on account of fome accomplishment or poffeffion which we enjoy. Humility, on the other hand, is a diffatisfaction with ourselves, on account of fome defect or infirmity. Love or Friendship is a complacency in another, on account of his accomplishments or fervices: Hatred, the contrary. 2. In these two sets of paffion, there is an obvious diftinction to be made between the object of the paffion and its caufe. The object of pride and humility is felf: The cause of the paffion is fome excellence in the former cafe; fome fault, in the latter. The object of love and hatred is fome other perfon: The causes, in like manner, are either excellencies or faults. With regard to all these paffions, the caufes are what excite the emotion; the object is what the mind directs its view to when the emotion is excited. Our merit, for inftance, raises pride; and it is effential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and fatisfaction. Now, as the causes of these paffions are very numerous and various, though their object be uniform and fimple; it may be a fubject of curiofity to confider, what that circumftance is, in which all these various caufes agree: or in other words, what is the real efficient caufe of the paffion. We fhall begin with pride and humility. 3. In order to explain the causes of these paffions, we must reflect on certain principles, which, though they have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and paffions, are not commonly much infifted on by philofophers. The firft of thefe is the affociation of ideas, or that principle by which we make an easy tranfition from one idea to another. However uncertain and changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. They ufually pass with regularity, from one object, to what refembles it, is contiguous to it, or produced by it *. When one idea is prefent to the imagination, any other, united by thefe relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more fa cility by means of that introduction. The Second property, which I fhall observe in the human mind, is a like affociation of impreffions or emotions. All resembling impreffions are connected together; and no fooner one arifes, than the rest naturally follow. Grief and disappointment give rife to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again. In like manner, our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generofity, courage, pride, and other resembling affec tions. In the third place, it is obfervable of these two kinds of affociation, that they very much affift and forward each other, and that the transition is more eafily made, where they both concur in the fame ob * See Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sec. III ject. ject. Thus, a man, who, by an injury received from another, is very much difcompofed and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred fubjects of hatred, discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneafy paffions; especially if he can discover these subjects in or near the person who was the object of his firft emotion. Those principles, which forward the tranfition of ideas, here concur with thofe which operate on the paffions; and both, uniting in one action, beftow on the mind a double impulse. 66 Upon this occafion I may cite a passage from an elegant writer, who expreffes himself in the following manner*: "As the fancy delights in every thing that "is great, ftrange, or beautiful, and is ftill the more pleased the more it finds of these perfections in the "fame object, fo it is capable of receiving new fatif"faction by the affistance of another fenfe. Thus, "any continual found, as the music of birds, or a fall "of waters, awakens every moment the mind of the "beholder, and makes him more attentive to the "feveral beauties of the place that lie before him. "Thus, if there arifes a fragrancy of fmells or per"fumes, they heighten the pleasure of the imagina66 tion, and make even the colours and verdure of "the landscape appear more agreeable; for the ideas "of both fenfes recommend each other, and are plea"fanter together than where they enter the mind feparately: As the different colours of a picture, "when they are well difpofed, fet off one another, and receive an additional beauty from the advan"tage of the fituation." In these phænomena we may remark the affociation both of impreffions and ideas, as well as the mutual affistance these affociations lend to each other. 4. It seems to me, that both thefe fpecies of relation have place in producing Pride or Humility, and are the real, efficient caufes of the pallion. With regard to the first relation, that of ideas, there can be no queftion. Whatever we are proud of must, ADDISON, Spectator, No. 412. |