Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of fouls, is compofed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general, facts. It has a foundation in reafon, fo far as it is fupported by experience: But its best and most folid foundation is faith and divine revelation.

Morals and criticism are not fo properly objects of the understanding as of tafte and fentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt more properly than perceived. Or if we reafon concerning it, and endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.

When we run over libraries, perfuaded of these principles, what havoc muft we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphyfics, for inftance; let us afk, Does it contain any abAtract reafoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reafoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but fophiftry and illufion.

A

DISSERTATION

ON THE

PASSION S.

I.

S

SECT. I.

OME objects produce immediately an agreeable fenfation, by the original ftructure of our organs, and are thence denominated GooD; as others, from their immediate disagreeable sensation, acquire the appellation of EVIL. Thus moderate warmth is agreeable and good; exceffive heat painful and evil.

Some objects again, by being naturally conformable or contrary to paffion, excite an agreeable or painful fenfation; and are thence called Good or Evil. The punishment of an adverfary, by gratifying revenge, is good; the fickness of a companion, by affecting friendship, is evil.

2. All good or evil, whence-ever it arifes, produces various paffions and affections, according to the light in which it is furveyed.

When good is certain or very probable, it produces Joy: When evil is in the fame fituation, there arifes GRIEF or SORROW.

When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives

rife to FEAR or HOPE, according to the degree of uncertainty on one fide or the other.

DESIRE arifes from good confidered fimply; and AVERSION, from evil. The WILL exerts itfelf, when either the prefence of the good, or abfence of the evil, may be attained by any action of the mind or body.

3. None of these paffions feem to contain any thing curious or remarkable, except Hope and Fear, which, being derived from the probability of any good or evil, are mixed paffions, that merit our attention.

Probability arifes from an oppofition of contrary chances or causes, by which the mind is not allowed to fix on either fide; but is inceffantly toffed from one to another, and is determined, one moment, to confider an object as exiftent, and another moment as the contrary. The imagination or understanding, call it which you please, fluctuates between the oppofite views; and though perhaps it may be oftener turned to one fide than the other, it is impoffible for it, by reafon of the oppofition of caufes or chances, to reft on either. The pro and con of the question alternately prevail; and the mind, furveying the objects in their oppofite caufes, finds fuch a contrariety as deftroys all certainty or established opinion.

Suppofe, then, that the object, concerning which we are doubtful, produces either defire or averfion; it is evident, that, according as the mind turns itfelf to one fide or the other, it must feel a momentary impreffion of joy or forrow. An object, whose existence we defire, gives fatisfaction, when we think of thofe caufes which produce it; and for the fame reason, excites grief or uneafinefs from the oppofite confideration. So that, as the understanding, in probable queftions, is divided between the contrary points of view, the heart must in the same manner be divided between oppofite emotions.

Now,

Now, if we confider the human mind, we fhall observe, that, with regard to the paffions, it is not like a wind-instrument of mufic, which in running over all the notes, immediately lofes the found when the breath ceases; but rather refembles a ftring-inftrument, where, after each ftroke, the vibrations ftill retain fome found, which gradually and infenfibly decays. The imagination is extremely quick an agile; but the paffions, in comparison, are flow and reftive: For which reafon, when any object is prefented, which affords a variety of views to the one and emotions to the other; though the fancy may change its views with great celerity; each stroke will not produce a clear and distinct note of paffion, but the one paffion will always be mixed and confounded with the other. According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the paffion of grief or joy predominates in the compofition; and thefe paffions being intermingled by means of the contrary views of the imagination, produce by the union the paffions of hope or fear.

4. As this theory feems to carry its own evidence along with it, we shall be more concife in our proofs.

The paffions of fear and hope may arife, when the chances are equal on both fides, and no fuperiority can be difcovered in one above the other. Nay, in this fituation the paffions are rather the ftrongest, as the mind has then the leaft foundation to rest upon, and is toft with the greatest uncertainty. Throw in a fuperior degree of probability to the fide of grief, you immediately fee that paffion diffuse itself over the compofition, and tincture it into fear. Encrease the probability, and by that means the grief; the fear prevails ftill more and more, 'till at laft it runs infenfibly, as the joy continually diminishes, into pure grief. After you have brought it to this fituation, diminish the grief, by a contrary operation to that which encreased it, to wit, by diminishing the probability

bability on the melancholy 'fide; and you will fee the paffion clear every moment, 'till it changes infenfibly into hope; which again runs, by flow degrees, into joy, as you encrease that part of the compofition by the encrease of the probability. Are not these as plain proofs, that the paffions of fear and hope are mixtures of grief and joy, as in optics it is a proof, that a coloured ray of the fun, paffing through a prifm, is a compofition of two others, when, as you diminish or encrease the quantity of either, you find it prevail proportionably, more or lefs, in the compofition?

5. Probability is of two kinds; either when the object is itself uncertain, and to be determined by chance; or when, though the object be already certain, yet it is uncertain to our judgment, which finds a number of proofs or prefumptions on each fide of the queftion. Both these kinds of probability cause fear and hope; which muft proceed from that property, in which they agree; namely, the uncertainty and fluctuation which they beftow on the paffion, by that contrariety of views, which is common to both.

6. It is a probable good or evil, which commonly caufes hope or fear; because probability, producing an inconftant and wavering survey of an object, occafions naturally a like mixture and uncertainty of paffion. But we may obferve, that, wherever, from other caufes, this mixture can be produced, the paffions of fear and hope will arife, even though there be no probability.

An evil, conceived as barely poffible, fometimes produces fear; efpecially if the evil be very great. A man cannot think on exceffive pain and torture without trembling, if he runs the leaft risk of fuffering them. The fmallness of the probability is compensated by the greatness of the evil.

But even impoffible evils caufe fear; as when we tremble on the brink of a precipice, though we know 4 ourfelves