SECTION

XII.

Of the ACADEMICAL or SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

TH

PART I.

HERE is not a greater number of philofophical reafonings difplayed upon any fubject than thofe which prove the existence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most religious philofophers ftill difpute, whether any man can be fo blinded as to be a fpeculative atheist. How fhall we reconcile these contradictions? The knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants, never entertained the leaft doubt with regard to the existence of thefe monsters.

The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philofophers; though it is certain, that no man ever met with any fuch abfurd creature, or converfed with a man who had no opinion or principle concerning any fubject, either of action or fpeculation. This begets a very natural queftion, What is meant by a fceptic? And how far it is poffible to push these philofophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?

There is a fpecies of fcepticifm, antecedent to all ftudy and philofophy, which is much inculcated by DES CARTES, and others, as a fovereign prefervative against error and precipitate judgment. It recommends an univerfal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but alfo of our very faculties; of whofe veracity, fay they, we muft affure ourselves, by a chain of reafoning, deduced from fome original principle,

principle, which cannot poflibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any fuch original principle which has a prerogative above others that are felf-evident and convincing: Or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties of which we are fuppofed to be already diffident? The CARTESIAN doubt, therefore, were it ever poffible to be attained by any human creature. (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of affurance and conviction upon any subject.

It must, however, be confeffed, that this fpecies of fcepticifin, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable fenfe, and is a neceffary preparative to the ftudy of philofophy, by preferving a proper impartiality in our judgments, and weaning our mind from all thofe prejudices which we may have imbibed from education or rafh opinion. To begin with clear and felfevident principles, to advance by timorous and fure fteps, to review frequently our conclufions, and examine accurately all their confequences; though by thefe means we fhall make both a flow and a fhort progrefs in our fyftems; are the only methods by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper ftability and certainty in our determinations.

There is another fpecies of feepticism, confequent to fcience and enquiry, when men are fuppofed to have difcovered, either the abfolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all thofe curious fubjects of fpeculation about which they are commonly employed. Even our very fenfes are brought into difpute by a certain fpecies of philofophers; and the maxims of common life are fubjected to the fame doubt as the most profound principles or conclufions of metaphyfics and theology. As these paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in fome philofophers, and the refutation of them in fe

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veral,

veral, they naturally excite our curiofity, and make us enquire into the arguments on which they may. be founded.

I need not infift upon the more trite topics, employed by the fceptics in all ages, against the evidence of fenfe; fuch as thofe which are derived from the imperfection and fallacioufnefs of our organs, on numberlefs occafions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the various aspects of objects, according to their different diftances; the double images which arife from the prefling one eye; with many other appearances of a like nature. Thefe fceptical topics, indeed, are only fufficient to prove, that the fenfes alone are not implicitly to be depended on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by confiderations, derived from the nature of the medium, the diftance of the object, and the difpofition of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere, the proper criteria of truth and falfehood. There are other more profound arguments against the fenfes, which admit not of fo cafy a solution.

It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural inftinct or prepoffeffion, to repofe faith in their fenfes; and that, without any reafoning, or even almoft before the ufe of reafon, we always fuppofe an external univerfe, which depends not on our perception, but would exift though we and every fenfible creature were abfent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preferve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, defigns, and actions.

It seems alfo evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful inftinct of nature, they always fuppofe the very images, prefented by the fenfes, to be the external objects, and never entertain any fufpicion, that the one are nothing but reprefentations of the other. This very table, which we fee white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exift, inde

pendent

pendent of our perception, and to be fomething external to our mind, which perceives it. Our prefence beftows not being on it: Our abfence does not annihilate it. It preferves its exiftence uniform and entire, independent of the fituation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.

But this univerfal and primary opinion of all men is foon destroyed by the flighteft philofophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the fenfes are only the inlets, through which thefe images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourfe between the mind and the object. The table, which we fee, feems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exifts independent of us, fuffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. Thefe are the obvious dictates of reafon; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we confider, when we fay, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other exiftences, which remain uniform and independent.

So far, then, are we neceffitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary inftincts of nature, and to embrace a new fyftem with regard to the evidence of our fenfes. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarraffed, when fhe would juftify this new fyftem, and obviate the cavils and objections of the fceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: For that led us to a quite different fyftem, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to juftify this pretended philofophical fyftem, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.

By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions

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perceptions of the mind must be caufed by external objects, entirely different from them, though refembling them (if that be poffible), and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the fuggeftion of fome invifible and unknown spirit, or from fome other caufe ftill more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of thefe perceptions arife not from any thing external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body fhould fo operate upon mind, as ever to convey an image of itself to a fubftance, fuppofed of fo different, and even contrary a nature.

It is a queftion of fact, whether the perceptions of the fenfes be produced by external objects, refembling them: How fhall this question be determined? By experience furely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely filent. The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot poffibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The fuppofition of fuch a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reafoning.

To have recourfe to the veracity of the fupreme Being in order to prove the veracity of our fenfes, is furely making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our fenfes would be entirely infallible, because it is not poffible that he can ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once called in question, we fhall be at a lofs to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being, or any of his attributes.

This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philofophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to introduce an univerfal doubt into all fubjects of human knowledge and enquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propenfities of nature, may they fay, in affenting to the veracity

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