not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not fenfible to shame, when detected in a falfehood: were not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities inherent in human nature, we fhould never repofe the leaft confidence in human teftimony. A man delirious, or noted for falfehood and villany, has no manner of authority with us. And as the evidence, derived from witneffes and human teftimony, is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report, and any kind of object, has been found to be conftant or variable. There are a number of circumAtances to be taken into confideration in all judgements of this kind; and the ultimate ftandard, by which we determine all difputes, that may arife concerning them, is always derived from experience and obfervation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any fide, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the fame oppofition and mutual deftruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the oppofite circumftances which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and when we difcover a fuperiority on any fide, we incline to it; but ftill with a diminution of affurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist. This contrariety of evidence, in the prefent cafe, may be derived from feveral different caufes; from the oppofition of contrary teftimony; from the character or number of the witneffes; from the manner of their delivering their teftimony; or from the union of all these circumftances. We entertain a fufpicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witneffes contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in H3 what what they affirm; when they deliver their teftimony with hesitation, or, on the contrary, with too violent affeverations. There are many other particulars of the fame kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument derived from human teftimony. Suppofe, for inftance, that the fact, which the teftimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that case, the evidence refulting from the testimony admits of a diminution greater or lefs, in proportion as the fact is more or lefs unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witneffes and hiftorians, is not derived from any connection which we perceive, à priori, between teftimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has feldom fallen under our obfervation, here is a contest of two oppofite experiences, of which the one destroys the other as far as its force goes; and the fuperior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very fame principle of experience which gives us a certain degree of affurance in the teftimony of witneffes, gives us alfo, in this cafe, another degreee of affurance against the fact which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there neceffarily arises a counterpoife, and mutual deftruction of belief and authority. I fhould not believe fuch a story were it told me by CATO, was a proverbial faying in ROME, even during the lifetime of that philofophical patriot*. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate fo great an authority. The INDIAN prince, who refused to believe the firft relations concerning the effects of froft, reafoned justly; and it naturally required very strong teftimony to engage his affent to facts that arofe from a state of nature with which he was unacquainted, and which bore fo little analogy to those jevents of which he had PLUTARCH in vita Catonis. had had conftant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it f. But in order to encrease the probability against the teftimony of witneffes, let us fuppofe, that the fact which they affirm, instead of being, only marvellous, is really miraculous; and fuppofe also, that the testimony, confidered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that cafe, there is proof against proof, of which the ftrongest must prevail, but ftill with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can poffibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men muft die; that lead cannot of itself remain fufpended in the air; that fire confumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man seemingly in good health fhould die on à fudden; becaufe fuch a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently obferved to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been obferved in any age or country. There muft, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwife the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof from the nature of the fact against the existence of any miracle; nor can fuch a proof be destroyed, or the miracle H4 + See NOTE [I]. miracle rendered credible, but by an oppofite proof, which is fuperior*. . The plain confequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), "That no teftimony "is fufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testi"mony be of fuch a kind, that its falfehood would "be more miraculous than the fact which it endea"yours to establish: And even in that cafe there is "a mutual destruction of arguments, and the fuperior only gives us an affurance fuitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the in"ferior." When any one tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately confider with myself, whether it be more probable that this perfon fhould either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates fhould really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the fuperiority which I discover, I pronounce my decifion, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falfehood of his teftimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion. PART II. In the foregoing reafoning we have fuppofed that the teftimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may poffibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that teftimony would be a real prodigy: But it is easy to show, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our conceffion, and that there never was a miraculous event established on fo full an evidence, For, first, There is not to be found, in all hiftory, any miracle attefted by a fufficient number of men of fuch unquestioned good fenfe, education, and learning, as to fecure us against all delufion in themselves; of fuch undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond * See NOTE [K]. all all fufpicion of any defign to deceive others; of fuch credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lofe in cafe of their being detected in any falfehood; and at the fame time, attesting facts performed in fuch a public manner, and in fo celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumftances are requifite to give us a full affurance in the teftimony of men.. Secondly, We may obferve in human nature a principle, which, if ftrictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the affurance which we might, from human teftimony, have in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourfelves in our reafonings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, refemble thofe of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an oppofition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to fuch as are founded on the greatest number of past observations: But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind obferves not always the fame rule; but when any thing is affirmed utterly abfurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of fuch a fact, upon account of that very circumftance which ought to deftroy all its authority. The paffion of furprise and wonder, arifing from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a fenfible tendency towards the belief of thofe events from which it is derived. And this goes fo far, that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the fatisfaction at fecondhand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others. With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their defcriptions of fea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adven tures, |