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abfurd confequence, if neceffary, proves the original doctrine to be abfurd; in the fame manner as criminal actions render criminal the original caufe, if the connection between them be neceffary and inevitable.

This objection confifts of two parts, which we fhall examine separately; First, That if human actions can be traced up, by a neceffary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite perfection of that Being from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, fecondly, If they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we afcribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.

The answer to the first objection feems obvious and convincing. There are many philofophers, who, after an exact fcrutiny of all the phænomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, confidered as one fyftem, is, in every period of its existence, ordered with perfect benevolence; and that the utmoft poffible happiness will, in the end, refult to all created beings, without any mixture of pofitive or abfolute ill and mifery. Every phyfical ill, fay they, makes an effential part of this benevolent fyftem, and could not poffibly be removed, even by the Deity himself, confidered as a wife agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or excluding greater good, which will refult from it. From this theory, fome philofophers, and the ancient Stoics among the reft, derived a topic of confolation under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils, that thofe ills under which they laboured, were, in reality, goods to the universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the whole fyftem of nature, every event became an object of joy and exultation. But though this topic be specious and fublime, it was foon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You would furely

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more irritate than appease a man, lying under the racking pains of the gout, by preaching up to him the rectitude of those general laws, which produced the malignant humours in his body, and led them through the proper canals, to the finews and nerves, where they now excite fuch acute torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and fecurity; but neither can they dwell with conftancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or paffion; much lefs can they maintain their ground, when attacked by fuch powerful antagonists. The affections take a narrower and more natural furvey of their object; and by an œconomy, more fuitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings around us, and are actuated by fuch events as appear good or ill to the private fyftem.

The cafe is the fame with moral as with phyfical ill. It cannot reasonably be fuppofed, that thofe remote confiderations, which are found of fo little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is fo formed by nature, that upon the appearance of certain characters, difpofitions, and actions, it immediately feels the fentiment of approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more effential to its frame and conftitution. The characters which engage our approbation, are chiefly fuch as contribute to the peace and fecurity of human fociety; as the characters which excite blame, are chiefly fuch as tend to public detriment and difturbance: Whence it may reasonably be prefumed, that the moral fentiments arife, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection on these oppofite interefts. What though philofophical meditations eftablish a different opinion or conjecture; that every thing is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities which disturb fociety, are, in the main, as beneficial, and

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are as fuitable to the primary intention of nature, as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare? Are fuch remote and uncertain fpeculations able to counterbalance the fentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects? A man who is robbed of a confiderable fum, does he find his vexation for the lofs any wife diminished by these fublime reflections? Why then fhould his moral refentment against the crime be fuppofed incompatible with them? Or why should not the acknowledgment of a real diftinction between vice and virtue be reconcileable to all fpeculative fyftems of philofophy, as well as that of a real diftinction between perfonal beauty and deformity? Both these diftinctions are founded on the natural fentiments of the human mind: And these fentiments are not to be controlled or altered by any philofophical theory or fpeculation whatsoever.

The fecond objection admits not of so easy and fatisfactory an answer; nor is it poffible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of fin and moral turpitude. These are myfteries, which mere natural and unaffifted reafon is very unfit to handle; and whatever fyftem fhe embraces, fhe muft find herself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to fuch fubjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend abfolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of fin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philofophy. Happy, if the be thence fenfible of her temerity, when the pries into these fublime myfteries; and leaving a scene fo full of obfcurities and perplexities, return, with fuitable modefty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life; where he will find difficulties enow to employ her enquiries, without launching into fo boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction!

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SECTION IX.

Of the REASON of ANIMALS.

LL our reafonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a fpecies of ANALOGY, which leads us to expect from any caufe the fame events which we have obferved to refult from fimilar caufes. Where the causes are entirely fimilar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference drawn from it is regarded as certain and conclufive: Nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he fees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohefion of parts; as in all other inftances, which have ever fallen under his obfervation. But where the objects have not fo exact a fimilarity, the analogy is lefs perfect, and the inference is lefs conclufive; though ftill it has some force, in proportion to the degree of fimilarity and refemblance. The anatomical obfervations, formed upon one animal, are by this fpecies of reafoning extended to all animals; and it is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for inftance, is clearly proved to have place in one creature, as a frog, or fish, it forms a strong prefumption, that the fame principle has place in all. Thefe analogical obfervations may be carried farther, even to this fcience of which we are now treating; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin and connection of the paffions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the fame theory is requifite to explain the fame phænomena in all other animals. We fhall make

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trial of this, with regard to the hypothefis, by which we have, in the foregoing difcourfe, endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings; and it is hoped that this new point of view will ferve to confirm all our former obfervations.

First, It seems evident, that animals, as well as men, learn many things from experience, and infer, that the fame events will always follow from the fame causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth, ftones, heights, depths, &c. and of the effects which refult from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and fagacity of the old, who have learned, by long obfervation, to avoid what hurt them, and to purfue what gave ease or pleafure. A horse, that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will truft the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and will place himself fo as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures which he forms on this occafion, founded in any thing but his obfervation and experience.

This is ftill more evident from the effects of difcipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any courfe of action, the moft contrary to their natural instincts and propenfities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehenfive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience which makes him answer to his name, and infer from fuch an arbitrary found, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pro

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