VI. The Origin, Object and Operation of the Apprentice PAGE. VII. Insurance against Robbery; or the Present System of VIII. Observations on the Bill, rendering the Militia dis- Owing to the absence of Sir FRANCIS D'IVERNOIS from No. VI. will be published on the 1st of JUNE, and will contain I. On the Trade in Wool and Woollens, including an ex- position of the Commercial situation of the British Empire: extracted from the Reports addressed to the Wool-Meetings at Lewes, in the years 1809, 1810, 1811, and 1812, by the II. A Letter to THOMAS HOPE, Esq. Hereditary Go- vernor and Director of the BRITISH INSTITUTION for promoting the Fine Arts in the UNITED KINGDOM, &c. &c. on the insufficiency of the existing establishments for promoting the Fine Arts, towards that of Architecture and its Professors; attempting to show the cause of the decline of pure taste in that branch of the Fine Arts, and with some III. A Review of First Principles of Bishop Berkeley, Dr. Reid, and Professor Stewart. With an indication of IV. Narrative of the Crucifixion of Matthew Lovat, exe- cuted by his own hands, at Venice, in July, 1805. Originally communicated to the Public by CESAR RUGGIERI, M.D. Professor of Clynical Surgery at Venice, in a letter to a Me- V. A Series of Letters on the Political and Financial state of the Nation, at the commencement of the year 1814; ad- VII. On Buonaparte and the Bourbons, and the necessity of rallying around our legitimate Princes, for the safety of VIII. An Appeal to the Legislature for the repeal of the IX. A Short Sketch of a Short Trip to Paris in 1788. CONSIDERATIONS ON The_Re-establishment OF AN EFFECTIVE BALANCE OF POWER. BY THOMAS MOORE MUSGRAVE, ESQ. Second Edition. 1814. PREFACE. ALTHOUGH a short interval only has elapsed since the following performance was laid before the public, this period has been distinguished by a rapid succession of events of the highest political importance. These most memorable and most interesting events are, in truth, the natural and necessary consequences of the general and comprehensive plan of hostility, which the allied powers have so wisely and so steadily pursued. The practicability of this general system of cordial and unanimous co-operation was long denied: corruption, jealousy, imbecility, financial derangement, national supineness, in short every element. of disunion existed, it was believed, in such force, as to render a zealous combination of the continental powers against France almost equally hopeless and visionary. The eventful history of the campaign, since the rupture of the armistice, furnishes a perfect refutation of this error. The spirit of the times, and the new and characteristic features of the war, were too much overlooked by those |