causes must necessarily produce corresponding results. The vague predictions of a wild spirit of prophecy depend upon accident alone for their fulfilment. Without the intervention of accident, their accomplishment fails, and the presumptuous prophet is justly exposed to the reproach of blindness, instead of receiving credit for a piercing glance into futurity. Our anticipations of the future must be calculated upon the data of past experience. There are no other means of obtaining the slightest glimpse of probable events which are yet to transpire. It requires no peculiar sagacity to perceive that the age is too enlightened, that the nations of Europe are too far advanced in civilization, to hold out to the ambition of any tyrant, though his power should be unprecedently great, a prospect of universal dominion. It requires no gift of foresight to discover, that a government founded on the extinction of every cardinal principle of honor and of virtue,—a government that encouraged the energy of crime, and discountenanced the exercise of rectitude,-a government established on the demoralisation of society,-on the public violation of truth, and faith, and justice,--on violence and inhumanity, on the reduction of the human mind to a state of comparative ignorance and barbarism,-must naturally contain within itself a morbid principle, that would ultimately weaken, and possibly expose it to annihilation.

Besides the general motives to resistance so amply supplied by the insolent, capricious, and tyrannical oppression of the French, it could not fail to be perceived that the existence of such a government, unless deprived of all political preponderance, could never be compatible with the independence of the other continental states. Between France, therefore, and all the other European nations, there existed the highest degree of political, moral, and popular

discordance. The necessity for its termination was deeply and universally felt. It was this feeling, this conviction, that laid the basis of that union which has produced such wonderful effects. Erroneous, indeed, have been the notions of those politicians who regarded it as a mere common international coalition, of which the frame would be found too slender, too delicate, to resist the shock of conflicting jealousies. All sentiments of this nature have been long smothered in one general feeling of aggravated indignation at the criminal, ambitious, and subversive policy of France, and in a firm, unshaken resolution effectually to resist it.

In the beginning of July, when the following production was published, it was suggested that the allies, in the event of a recommencement of hostilities, should declare," that the extension of the boundaries of the French empire, beyond the Rhine and the Pyrenees, is incompatible with the liberties of Europe." The proposition was deemed equally extravagant and impracticable. The progress of the contest has shown the contrary. Now, instead of reducing the territorial limits of France within these boundaries, the question under discussion is, how far towards these restricted boundaries the new limits of the French territory shall be permitted to extend, and whether they shall not be completely circumscribed within the line to which the old monarchy was confined! How far a limitation or extension of dominion may be ultimately settled by arms or by negociation, it is impossible to predetermine, even conjecturally, without a knowledge of the various feelings and views of the negociators, and the military resources of the belligerents. But no one can doubt that the allies, who have already accomplished so much, have yet much within their power to accomplish, if their military efforts and political views continue to be made subservient to each

other, and jointly conducive to the main object of the war; viz. the reduction of the power of France within such limits as shall effectually prevent her from disturbing at will the repose of the other continental states.

Although the Allies have issued a declaration, which has been much commended for the moderation of its tone and the wisdom of its views, yet, it cannot be denied, that it was rather precipitately promulgated. They found they had been too generous, and felt themselves obliged to act in some measure in opposition to their own professions. They perceived, that if the territorial dominions of France were permitted to remain larger in extent than under any of her ancient kings, the resources of that country, and the warlike character of its ambitious chief, would soon supply motives and materials for speedily involving Europe again in sanguinary warfare. These original professions of moderation appear to have since produced some degree of embarrassment. If, on passing into the French territory, they had issued a declaration, by the terms of which they were fully determined as nearly as practicable to abide, they would perhaps have been more generally supported by all the moderate party in France; and they would have had all the advantage of leaving nothing in their views ambiguous and uncertain, and of reducing to a very small class of individuals, those persons in France who might be inclined to call in question their real intentions.

It would seem that the course which the allies have now to pursue is sufficiently obvious; viz. to reduce France to her old monarchical limits, leaving the sovereign power either in the hands of the present ruler, of in those of a Bourbon, if the French themselves desire it. Though every friend to the future tranquillity of the world must naturally desire the latter, it would hardly be right to at tempt to accomplish it by force. Would there, however,

be an indiscretion in recommending to the people of France the restoration of the Bourbons, as the best means of consolidating and perpetuating that peace, for which the greater part of that nation has long anxiously sighed? If the allies should declare their willingness to treat with the sove reign power in France, when reduced within the frontier of 1789, and should at the same time frankly avow their preference to treat with a Bourbon, leaving it to the people of France to express their wishes in favor of a similar preference, would not such a declaration possess the two-fold advantage of presenting a distinct projet for negociation, without an interference which might chal lenge resistance as a point of national honor? If the more distinguished members of the House of Bourbon shewed themselves to their long abandoned countrymen with the allies in the field, and if the latter, disclaiming all compul sion, presented them as the restorers of national happiness and peace, would not a fair occasion be thus given to ascertain the temper of the public mind in France, and a clue be furnished for the ultimate operations of the combined powers? The experiment is too promising to be left untried. Its result may be of the last importance to the future tranquillity, not of Europe alone, but of the world, and to the progressive civilization of mankind, which the actual government in France is calculated to impede. Its result may be highly conducive to religion, to public and private morals, and to national faith and honor. A Bourbon, disciplined in the severe school of adversity, may, sooner than any other sovereign, heal the wounds which France has repeatedly given and received in her long and infuriated conflicts with those mighty states, with which, under a monarch of wise and moderate councils, she might have enjoyed a long and florishing period of happiness and

repose.

If the course of events should unavoidably oblige the allies to treat with Buonaparte, the main point then to be accomplished is to reduce his power within the utmost practicable limits. Perhaps it might be advisable, if the fears, or the interests, or the vanity, of the French, should favor the perpetuation of his usurped authority, not to leave within his grasp those ample means for future hostility, which the resources of so large a portion of territory as old France comprised, would supply to his ambition. If the French are determined to retain a restless, remorseless conqueror on the throne, let it be the policy of the other states not to leave him the means of rekindling the flames of war, whenever the thirst of conquest may induce him to break the bonds of peace. Without this precaution, the term of general repose will soon expire, and war, with all its horrors, will again extend its sphere of miseries, havoc, and desolation. The spirit of rapid conquest would yield to the deeper policy of slow, cautious, insidious subjugation. If the subversion of the French government could be effected, no exertions should be remitted for its accomplishment. If events make it impossible to avoid treating with Buonaparte, his power should, if practicable, be reduced to such limits as would render his ambition uninjurious to the other continental states: but the most effectual means of giving to the world a permanent and honorable peace, consists in the restoration of the Bourbons. If the allies unanimously wish it, and the people of France desire it, its accomplishment cannot be doubtful.

London, March 1, 1814.