sidered as affording to each belligerent a justifiable ground of war, to be passed over as unimportant, and to be wholly sacrificed? Certainly not: they are only to be suspended, till all these minor interests be secured by the accomplishment of the great end, for which the scabbard has been thrown aside. But what is, or ought to be, the main object of this general union? Security for the absolute political independence of each state. How is this to be effected? It is certainly not a task of easy execution; but yet it is not impracticable; and unless it be realized, short will be the interval of repose, of which the nations of Europe can hereafter, in the midst of their fondest anticipation of continued peace, indulge the expectation of enjoyment.

An effectual balance of power must be re-established.

The basis of this equipoise of relative political strength must be laid in the reduction of the physical and political resources of France: the limits of her Empire must be circumscribed. They can never be permitted, with any prospect of security for the future repose of Europe, to form an outline of colossal power, which a restless spirit of aggrandizement is incessantly laboring to complete, but which will never be completed, while the weakness and folly and blindness of the continental nations supply the chief of this mighty Empire with materials for the daily nourishment of his insatiable ambition.

It may not be altogether useless to inquire, 1st. Whether the reduction of the menacing and overgrown power of France be practicable?

2d. What means may be rendered the most efficient for this purpose

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3d. Whether the actual state of Europe be favorable to its execution?

The prodigious aggrandizement of France by conquest in war, and by aggression in peace, has augmented her resources beyond those of any other continental power. In population, Russia may perhaps claim some superiority; but with reference to the vast extent of her territories, her numerous subjects are less available for military destination. In agricultural, commercial, and financial resources, the advantage is indisputably on the side of France. But the distance which separates the two Empires will probably

render it, at least for a considerable period, extremely difficult for either singly to interfere, with a controlling direction, in each other's domestic politics. In this case their means of mutual annoyance, unaided by alliance, will be insufficient for decisive warfare...

It is quite unnecessary to make a similar estimate of the dispro portion in the resources of France, and those of any of the other Continental States. The inferiority of the latter will be denied by none!

If, therefore, there is no individual State that, with the most skilful employment of all its more limited means of hostility, can expect to make any serious impression upon the French Empire, it would be vain to indulge the hope, that a conflict, prosecuted singly, and under circumstances of material disparity, could lead to any other result than a confirmation, or perhaps an enlargement, of the very power, for the reduction of which it was expressly undertaken. -It is, then, but too evident, that, to compel France to return within just and reasonable limits, is an enterprise to which the greatest power on the Continent is unequal, unseconded by efficient co-operation.

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But are we therefore to conclude, that France may, henceforth, triumphantly bid defiance to every attempt to reduce her power within such limits as may be compatible with the liberties of other States? If a single arm be too feeble to inflict a decisive blow; are there no means of invigorating it, that it may strike with more effect? Is it impossible to sharpen the weapon, so as to render it a more formidable instrument of attack? Gigantic force may easily overcome the strength of an ordinary combatant; but may, perhaps, as easily be subdued, when assailed by the united and equalized vigor of inferior opponents, animated to the fight by a high and noble sense of justice. The only practicable mode of repressing the inordinate ambition of France is, to restrain it by the very means which she herself employs for its indulgence. Force, absolute force, superior to the collective military power of France, either in numbers or equipment, in skill or in valour, and enthusiastically animated by the justice of their cause, can alone be relied upon for the accomplishment of these salutary views. Upon this alone depends the practicability of opposing France with effect.

With reference to the second topic of inquiry, it may be remarked,

that the resources of the French Empire, upon an abstract and general calculation, can hardly be computed, including those derived from all her compulsory alliances, at much more than one-third of the whole resources of the European States. At the first view, it would appear that this numerical and physical superiority alone would furnish the latter with abundant materials for resisting those ambitious projects, for the execution of which the repose of the world has so long been disturbed. The means of resistance, there fore, exist; and until the resources of France approach much nearer to an equality with the whole collective resources of the rest of Europe, it would be premature to despair of the ultimate liberation of the Continent from the despotic ascendancy of that formidable Empire. The skilful intrigues of the French Government have. hitherto frustrated every attempt to embody a sufficient military force to counteract its views; and it remains to be seen, whether the fatal experience of past failures will have at length awakened the nations of Europe to a conviction of the necessity of acting with union, if they propose to act with effect. They undoubtedly possess the means of emancipating themselves from the capricious tyranny of French control; and if they do not avail themselves of them with equal promptitude and wisdom, the success which they may now purchase, at the price of unanimous exertion, will, hereafter, like the Sybilline books, be equally expensive and less complete..

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If no doubt exist as to the practicability, by a grand comprehensive and united effort, of opposing to the numerous armies of France, armies equally numerous, and excited to military glory by higher hopes and a nobler cause, the main point to which the allies should direct all their attention, should be a perfect coincidence of military and political views: in the further prosecution of hostilities, their efforts should all terminate in one point. One object, in which all the States of Europe have, either immediately, or ultimately, the same general interest, should be inflexibly pursued by all. It should also possess a paramount importance, and should, in its realization, secure to each State, separately, the separate object which originally justified its determination to have recourse to war.

But how can various States in arms be induced to feel the same interest in prosecuting war for the achievement of the same end?

The smaller States having more to apprehend than those of the first rank, how can the latter be prevailed upon to make the same extraordinary exertions, under circumstances productive of less immediate alarm? But it should be remembered, that the cause for apprehension, though more remote in the case of the greater State, may ultimately prove equally menacing to each; and that if nations of secondary rank should now fall, from a want of support from those of the first class, the latter may be unable to prepare for their own defence, when their turn arrives to contend with the common foe, for the preservation of their national existence.

To this end, what general object can be proposed, but the limitation of the power of France the reduction of the territories under her immediate dominion to that extent, which, without infringing upon her dignity as one of the first in rank among the nations and empires of the world, shall deprive her of the means of invading the independence of other States, and interrupting the happy reign of peace, at any moment that she may think favorable to her scheme of universal dominion? But it, perhaps, will be demanded, whether this has not been the sole object of all the wars that have been waged with France, during the last twenty years? Partly, and vaguely, it has, without doubt, been blended with the other views of various belligerents. But never, in any one instance, has it been clearly and distinctly defined, and openly and manfully avowed, as the just and legitimate and sole object of hostile combination against France. Hence a collision of motives and interests could not fail to produce those effects, which were naturally to be expected from an ill-cemented union; a change in the relative position of the belligerents, more or less favorable to the aggrandizement of France, both during the actual continuance of hostilities, and on the return of peace-a period, of which she sedulously avails herself to organize her new resources as materials for new aggressions.

A Congress of the different States of Europe, convened, not for peace, (except eventually), but for the solemn purpose of recovering and securing their national independence, would, in the present posture of European affairs, contribute, more perhaps than any other proceeding, to restore the lost equipoise of the continental powers. A declaratory act of such a convention would give

renewed validity to the force of international law. It would be the first effectual, step towards the restoration of the balance of power, without which there can be no peace with any chance of duration. Occasional truges might possibly precede the utter extinction of the liberties of the Continent; but the peace that would follow, would be stripped of all the blessings that endear it to mankind. It would be a state of repose founded on a base and universal · submission to despotic sway-a torpid existence, in which the best energies of the soul would slumber in perfect uselessness.

If a declaration to this effect were issued by a Congress of Pótentates, assembled for the assertion, recovery, and defence of their sovereign rights, could it fail to produce the most beneficial result? If, at the same time, it abjured all views of conquest, all interference with the internal concerns of France, and even unequivocally expressed a desire to maintain relations of amity with that power, whenever the principles of her government, and the equitable reduction of her political preponderance, should afford a reasonable guarantee for their security, would not its justice and moderation be universally admitted, and would not this general admission materially aid the accomplishment of the end itself for which the declaration was promulgated?

Next to the assertion of their own independent sovereign rights, the precise extent of the limitation within which the power of France should be restricted, should occupy the fullest attention of this august assembly.

· Difficult it would certainly be to reduce to the same standard the securities against future encroachments, which each State might deem expedient for its own immediate safety. But in determining the scale of offensive operations, it would be a capital error to sup pose, that it should be adapted to measure, by anticipation, the obscured grandeur and degradation of the French Empire. Justice demands that her wealth, her dignity, her power, as a State of the first rank, should be duly regarded as the sanctified attributes of national independence.

But, to the support of this independence, it is not necessary that France should aggrandize her Empire by the incorporation of Holland and the Hanse Towns; that she should annex Switzerland and the greater part of Italy to her own possessions, and retain the