from subserviency to incorporate identity, would probably be more rapid than is at present suspected. How then are these fatal consequences to be prevented, but by a perfect union of interest, and a perfect unity of co-operation? If these should still be found to be deficient, she must secure to herself effectual aid from contiguous and friendly powers, who, as their interests are identical, ought naturally to afford the demanded assistance with equal alacrity and zeal.

If Prussia be now enabled to assume an attitude of greater national independence, than at the period of her compulsory alliance with France, this advantageous change in her condition is to be ascribed to the effects produced by an explosion of patriotic feeling; which, though long nourished in secret, would, probably, not have burst forth, without the powerful protection of Russia, Without her aid, this patriot zeal might still have slumbered, and the indignation excited by the oppression of her late insidious ally, might still have been forcibly suppressed. The proposed admission of Prussia to negociate with other powers, amounts indeed to a qualified acknowledgment of her independence, and may contribute to remove her apprehension of seeing the possessions of the House of Brandenburgh transferred, by her former capricious and vindictive ally, to the dominion of his newly-created Prince of Neufchatel.

Besides the hope of resuming a dignified rank among the military powers of Europe, Prussia can hardly fail to be animated to better exertions by the painful remembrance of past errors-by the consciousness of having pursued an inglorious career, when the path of honor and of glory was open to her. She has a long list of political and military disgraces to expunge from the catalogue of her national offences; and, had she not expiated her folly and her guilt by the sacrifices they have entailed upon her, she would still owe a deep atonement to the world for the many miseries, of which her crooked policy-her criminal inactivity-and her illtimed and selfish hostilities, have been the lamentable cause. lost character is now to be redeemed-her lost independence now to be re-established. The narrow, partial, vacillating views, which formerly misguided her councils, must be dismissed-an enlightened, generous, comprehensive scale of policy should be the mea

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sure of her future efforts: and if the events of war shall give her an accession of national weight, it should, without the least reserve, be thrown into the general mass of resistance to the undermining and overwhelming power of France.

The rest of Germany has also experienced a change, from which benefit may hereafter be derived to the cause of the allies. Saxony,, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Westphalia, have materially diminished their resources, by the active share they were compelled to take in the last destructive campaign. If, therefore, they should still preserve, either voluntarily, or from necessity, their connection with France, they must, for some time, be less effective auxiliaries than at an early stage of the war. The degree in which their ability to co-operate with France is weakened, ascertains, in some measure, the comparative advantage gained by the allies; especially when it is considered, that these States may hereafter be called upon to furnish recruits for those military operations, upon the issue of which depends the happiness or misery, the independence or the future subjugation, of the Continent.

To this actual loss of available resources for future hostilities may be joined the embarrassment, which the enemy must experience from the public spirit which has manifested itself in various parts of Germany, and which must evidently increase his difficulties in the proportion in which this spirit diffuses itself, and communicates a national feeling to the war. Though it has not yet produced any very decisive results, it may yet become powerfully instrumental to the emancipation of Germany, and, possibly, to a regeneration of that Empire. The simple conviction of its existence operates as a check upon, and contributes to prevent, that concentration of military force, by which the French have been so much accustomed to command success. It is always something gained to the common cause, that this spirit cannot be extinguished either by the utmost vigilance, or by the menaced and actual visitation of the severest punishments; and that occasions may present themselves, when it may discover itself in the rear of the enemy, embodied in too formidable a shape to be viewed without apprehension.

Even in Saxony, though degraded to the condition of a tributary ally, the patriotic spirit of resistance is yet unextinguished. It

sleeps, but will awake with the dawn of German independence. The conduct of the Government, it is true, seems to be at variance with the sentiments of the people; but this discordance of feeling is more apparent than real. Satisfactorily to explain the motives of the policy pursued by the King of Saxony would be difficult; it may, however, be presumed, that, in adopting it, he has been influenced either by his peculiar views of expediency, or his peculiar impressions of religion. As the latter are well known to be deeply tinctured with bigotry, he may possibly have regarded the career of Buonaparte as under the immediate guidance of an invisible hand; and this obscure sentiment may have lent its sophistical aid to those suggestions of state-expediency, which appeared to recommend the preservation of Saxony by an union with France, rather than to risk its conquest by opposition, at a time when the general state of affairs in Germany seemed unpropitious to a hostile course.

It would be difficult to form a conception of two individuals, whose characters are more distinctly dissimilar. The dictates of religion, and the influence of moral feeling, have imparted to the King of Saxony a milo, benevolent, and pacific disposition. In general and scientific knowledge, he holds a most conspicuously distinguished rank among the Sovereigns of the age. In many of the sciences his intelligence is equally minute and profound; and those who have devoted themselves exclusively to particular branches of them, have repeatedly expressed astonishment at the vast extent and variety of his information. The arts, commonly supposed to soften the manners of mankind, (to which general remark, however, the present Ruler of France is a striking exception,) have produced in him all their wonted benignity. The retirement and timidity of his character furnished additional precautions for the preservation of those beautiful shades of moral coloring, by which it was singularly distinguished. Is there then a point of similitude between this Sovereign and his ally? The contrast in the portraits I need not depict. The faithful historian of the times will delineate the latter with striking accuracy and truth. Ambition, deeply stained with blood, striding over the earth with desolating steps, and trampling upon the feebly defended rights of nations, will hereafter exhibit the distinctive features of the fierce warrior, whose path is tracked by flame and by the sword.

The union of Saxony and France is unconnected by any common interest. Is the annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw to the Saxon dominions, a sufficient bribe to secure to France the permanent alliance of this new German kingdom? Is it an adequate compensation for the loss of independence, the extinction of the liberty of the press, and the impoverishing sacrifices which war entails? Is all honest German feeling to be absorbed by a sentiment of French predilection; and are the descendants of those champions of liberty, whose boast it was never to have been subdued, to wear, under the mask of alliance, the galling chains of a foreign adventurer?

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Happy, without doubt, would Saxony be, to abandon the wavering and fluctuating policy, by which she now endeavours to preserve her national existence; and should the current of success again set in favor of the allies, its rapidity and force in its passage through the Saxon dominions, would be increased by copious tributary streams in every direction. By a singular, yet not disadvantageous incongruity of conduct, the very motives of expediency, and the feelings of superstition, which may now influence the policy of the King of Saxony, may lead him to the adoption of a diametrically opposite decision. Expediency may then suggest the necessity of co-operating with the allies, and any marked reverse of fortune experienced by the presumptuous leader of the French armies, may induce this timid but venerable Prince to believe, that Buonaparte is no longer a favored instrument for the accomplishment of designs, into which it is not permitted to human foresight to penetrate.

With regard to the state of Poland, and of Denmark and Sweden, it may be sufficient, with reference to any change in their political relations, that may hereafter be favorable to the liberties of the Continent, to observe, that, in the present state of European affairs, the resources of these countries are less available to France, than at former periods of the war.

The farce of regeneration was exhibited in Poland, without producing any great public impression. Upon the plea of an observance of good faith towards Austria, Buonaparte felt it to be expedient to withhold from Gallicia the benefit of this regeneration. A similar plea would also have secured to Saxony the greater part of the province of Mazovia, with the capital of Poland, strip

ping the new kingdom of one of the fairest portions of its western divisions.

Twice Buonaparte held out to the Poles the seductive promise of national renovation, and upon both occasions the promise has been delusive. On the first, their limited exertions to serve him did not entitle them to the boon; on the second, the project was rendered effete, by the discomfiture and retreat of his numerous armies. Upon both, the sole object he wished to accomplish was, to procure the means of carrying on the war against Russia with the utmost vigor and effect. Had he succeeded, the kingdom of Poland might possibly have been restored; but stunted in shape, and possessing only the external form, without any of the essential attributes of royalty. To the caprice of some Marshal of the French Empire, the destinies of the new kingdom would have been confided, and the Sovereign, himself a slave to him who placed him on the throne, would employ his whole authority in virtually reducing Poland to the low condition of a tributary province of the French Empire a military out-work, or commanding central position, whence Russia, Turkey, Austria, and Germany, might be assailed in front, in flank, or in the rear, whenever the hostile projects of France might be ripe for execution.

Poland, therefore, would gain only a nominal independence, and would be exposed to all the evils incident to frequent warfare. With all the powers surrounding that country, France, under its present military government, would not be likely to remain long at peace. Her dependent connection with France would necessarily involve her in all hostilities in which she might be engaged, with the additional disadvantage of becoming, perhaps more often than any other State, the principal theatre of war. With such prospects, it is not probable that Poland will be very anxious to blend her interests inseparably with those of France, though tempted to do so by a delusive offer of independent sovereignty.

To a slackened co-operation arising from these apprehensions, should be added a feeling of disinclination towards France, which the generous conduct of the Emperor Alexander in Poland ought naturally to excite. This Monarch wisely preferred indulgent lenity to justifiable rigor, and the preference can hardly fail to produce a corresponding effect, of which Russia may hereafter feel

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