over the whole earth for eight days: suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: that all travellers who return from foreign countries bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: it is evident that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature are an event rendered probable by so many analogies that any phenomenon which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe comes within the reach of human testimony" (Hume's "Essay on Miracles"). From the above we learn that the end of the world is a matter of likelihood. If it come at all, it may come in a moment—at any moment: up to that moment the argument of experience as to the course of nature will continue in full force, but in a moment it will be exploded. The argument derived from experience as to the necessary continuance of things in their present form and order of existence utterly fails. There is no reason why a new event should be in the course, or like the hitherto manner, of nature: therefore, unlikeness is not unreasonable-is not unnatural. "So far the conception of miracles belongs to the critique of our knowledge. We call that a miracle for which we can find no analogy whatever in that which has previously existed, i.e. in the established system of our empirical knowledge" (Christlieb, "Modern Doubt and Christian Belief").

What is meant by the order of nature? That present succession and recurrence of physical events of

which we have some experience. This leaves out that of which we have no experience; and the assumption that nature in the past was, and that nature in the future will be, like that of which we have partial knowledge, is based on an unwarrantable expectation of likeness. Experience can give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and of that precise time, which fall under its cognizance; but what connection has it with past and future time, and with other objects? The inference of connection is not linked by reason to the fact—it is a mere supposition. If any one assert— "all experience is against miracles," he simply begs the question, and deserves punishment as a sturdy beggar. If he assert-" general experience is against miracles," that is merely the platitude, miracles are uncommon; for really, this assumed broad basis rests on the exceedingly narrow one of individual experience. This individual experience is not a reliable guide. Hume ("Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding," Sect. IV.) says, “Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular, that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not for the future that it will continue so. As an agent, I am quite satisfied on the point, but as a philosopher I want to learn the foundation of the inference. No reading nor inquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty." In most cases, of course, the inference is correct; but all absolute inference from the present to the past and to the future is not linked by reason. We can do no more than find a rule according to which all known instances of an event have occurred, this gives no rule for unknown instances; therefore we may infer the contrary without collision of reason; con

sequently, the general succession and recurrence of physical events with which we are acquainted, is no proof of invariable succession and recurrence of events and times with which we are unacquainted-is no proof against the miracles of Redemption. The antecedent probability is in favour of miracles, not against them: for "it is to be expected that an event unique in the world's history should be marked by accompaniments partaking of its own character" (Mansel, "Essay on Miracles").

Nature can only prevent miracles by enforcing that order, and the continuance of those events, with which we are acquainted; but Science proclaims that there is no such power of causation in nature, we are only acquainted with antecedents and consequents. The highly vaunted chain of nature, with which unbelievers thought to bind miracles and prevent their going forth, is proved to be a rope of sand: miracles march as strong men. If there are persons so defective in the choice intellectual and noble practical part of human character that they cannot persuade themselves, let them at least remember that it is as easy for them to be in error, as it is for the world to lie in wickedness. God's cabinets may open only for jewels, His secrets are made known but to few friends, even as the Spirit's whispers are heard distinctly and regarded by none but the holy. Some creatures spin and toil, yet have no understanding; there are understandings which neither spin nor toil, yet Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of them. He who hath eyesight and insight will discern the miracle.

Put the question plainly-What scientific beliefs and facts do we contradict when we assert that a Super

natural Power has on various occasions interfered with the operation of natural laws? We are told-"We deny the belief in the uniformity of nature; a belief so important that it is the foundation of all our practical judgments, and of all our scientific reasoning." We answer -It is absurd to think that a rare interference with the course of nature for a special purpose, in any way hinders our practical judgments or scientific reasoning: nature may be and is, notwithstanding miracles, for practical and scientific purposes uniform. We believe that oxygen and hydrogen will, under given conditions, combine to form water; and we believe it none the less because we also believe that Supernatural Power has sometimes interposed to prevent that result. Supernatural Power is one among the known and unknown powers at work in nature, but which never were, and perhaps never will be, reduced to comprehensible law. These unknown powers are so many and great that it is utterly impossible for human science to know that similar antecedents are always followed by similar effects; indeed similar effects are not unseldom produced by dissimilar antecedents; therefore belief in Supernatural interference is in no way inconsistent with the due uniformity of nature. Theology does not require us to modify our belief either as to the abstract or concrete parts of science; nor is science inconsistent with theology; matters of fact, which compose history in its widest sense, both of science and theology, confirm both.

A miracle is not so much contrary to nature, or unnatural, or a suspension of nature, as a superinduced nature. 'Quæ fiunt præter cursum naturæ, non fiunt contra naturam" (S. Augustine). We hold that it is a

means of healing and restoring that which has been deranged through sin; and not so much for the continuance of faith, as to lay its foundations. It is no violation of nature for a man to roll away a stone; why may not an angel roll one from a sepulchre? The physician, by skill and means known to himself, cures a patient of fever; why should not Jesus, with greater skill and higher means, heal cases much more dangerous? We all know that moral evil produces material evil. Miracles enter nature with a promise of moral and physical amelioration. They are a manifestation that a portion of our world is already drawn into a higher order of things, of more extensive range and power, for unwonted and sacred uses.

Ignorance as to the cause of miracles and the manner of their operation is not a sufficient reason for refusal of them. There are many physical events which cannot be physically investigated, nor can any one be examined so fully that we attain essential knowledge of it, or are able to exclude the miraculous from it, for there may be a miracle in its every part. Some miracles are wrought by means partly known, for example, the Deluge"The fountains of the great deep being broken up, and the windows of heaven opened." These figurative words indicate a natural operation, synchronism of nature's operations with the Divine Counsels.

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Καιρὸς

μέγιστος ἔργου παντός ἐστ ̓ ἐπιστάτης.”

SOPHOCLES, Elect., 76.

"God, looking upon His own Omnipotence, knows all possibilites, looking upon His own Determinations, He see all futurities; looking upon His own Wisdom,