Their object and intention. not properly come within them, we take away, without warrant, the rights of the parties (b); and as these laws constitute a defence, the creature of positive law, therefore they are not to be extended to cases which are not strictly within them (c). Mr. Justice Story has observed, that it has often been matter of regret in modern times that, in the construction of the Statute of Limitations, the decisions had not proceeded upon principles better adapted to carry into effect the real objects of the statute; that instead of being viewed in an unfavourable light as an unjust and discreditable defence, it had not received such support as would have made it what it was intended to be, emphatically a statute of repose (d). "Of late years, however," said Lord Brougham (e), "I rejoice to say, the sounder principle pervades all our courts, both of equity and of law-that of giving the most liberal and extensive construction to whatever statute affixes a limitation of time." The object and intention of the Statutes of Limitation generally being the same, these statutes, notwithstanding any slight variation of phrase, ought to receive and do receive a uniform construction (f). The Statute of Fines (g) was made for the public good, and to settle and quiet the inheritances of the subjects of the realm, and therefore the sense of it ought to be largely extended to the benefit of those who are in possession of land, and to the destruction of the right of those who have right, and are remiss in making their claim. For the intent of the act was to favour those who had estates by fine, and to hurt those who had right, and neglected to pursue it within five years (h). The old Statutes of Limitation (i) were founded on the like (b) 1 You. 18. (c) Plowd. 375; 1 De Gex & J. (d) See Broom's Leg. Max. 694. 215; 7 Q. B. 811; 1 Phill. 338. (g) 4 Hen. 7, c. 24. (4) Plowd. 538. (i) 32 Hen. 8, c. 2; 21 Jac. 1, c. 16. reason, and therefore received the same interpretation (k); and the object of both being to limit all men to a certain time, for the tranquillity and repose of the public, no time was to be gained by exposition or equity beyond the express words of the statutes (7). So in the case of the modern Statute of Limitations in relation to real property (m), the doctrine of equitable extension cannot be applied to this act, for there is nothing on which to found it (n). When and to what extent statutes are or are not retroactive is frequently a question as important as difficult to determine. On several occasions, this question, in relation to the Statutes of Limitation, has arisen. When statutes are retroactive. In general, on the first principles of jurisprudence, no General prinstatute has a retroactive operation, or is to be supposed ciple. to apply to a past, but only to a future state of circumstances (o). Regularly nova constitutio futuris formam debet imponere, non præteritis(p), especially where a retroactive operation would defeat a vested right (q), or materially alter the relative situations of persons (r); for a retroactive statute would involve all the mischiefs of an ex post facto law, and in relation to property or to contracts would violate every sound principle of justice; and to punish those who have offended against no law, and to take away existing rights without compensation, is in the nature of punishment-would violate the first principles of justice (s). The broad principle, 6 Mee. & W. 285; Nelstrop v. (r) Kay v. Goodwin, 6 Bing. (8) 2 Exch. 41. Qualification of it. Illustrations. Enactments said Kindersley, V.-C. (t), is, that unless the court sees a clear indication in the act to legislate ex post facto, so as to deprive a man of a right which existed at the time of the passing of the act, the court will always assume that the legislature never does intend to deprive that man, by ex post facto law, of a right which existed at the time when that act passed, unless, indeed, it be in cases where an act is passed which deprives a man of his land because it is wanted for certain purposes; and in those cases compensation is provided. But putting aside cases of that sort, unless it is clear that the legislature meant to make the act retrospective, so as to take away a man's right, the court would never put that interpretation on the act. This principle is one of such obvious convenience and justice that it must always be adhered to in the construction of statutes (u). If, however, an enactment indicate beyond doubt that the legislature intended the enactment to operate retrospectively (r), this principle or rule, which is one of construction only (y), will certainly yield to that intention, although the effect be to defeat a vested right (z); and all that the decisions establish is, that we are to find out the intention of the legislature in each particular act (a). The application of this rule or principle, and of the qualification of it, may be illustrated by a few examples. It may first be remarked that in general the law, as it existed when the action is commenced, must decide the rights of the parties in the suit, unless the legislature express a clear intention to vary the relation of the litigant parties to each other (b). In February, 1676, a parol agreement founded on a not retroactive. consideration of marriage was made, and before June, (t) Evans v. Williams, 11 Jur., N. S. 256. (u) 2 Exch. 33. (x) 2 Exch. 33; 3 Exch. 687. (z) Towler v. Chatterton, 6 Bing. 258. (a) Per Lord Campbell, C. J., 8 Ell. & B. 437. (b) 6 Ad. & E. 951. 1677, an action thereon was commenced. In April, 8. 6. The same statute (7), enacts (sect. 6), that no action 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, shall be brought on any representation as to character, unless in writing and signed, &c. Between the passing and the coming into operation of this act, a parol representation of character was made. Before the time when the statute came into operation, the 1st of January, 1829, an action was commenced upon such parol representation, but the action was tried after that day, and Lord Tenterden himself, at Nisi Prius, held that the enactment was not retroactive, and that (c) 29 Car. 2, c. 3. (d) Sect. 4. (e) Gilmore v. Shuter, stated 6 Bing. 259. On this case, see the remarks of Rolfe, B., 2 Exch. 38. (f) Dwar, on Stat. 542. (g) 6 Bing. 258. (h) 9 Geo. 4, c. 14. (k) See also Fellowes v. Wil- (7) 9 Geo. 4, c. 14. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18. the promise by parol was sufficient to sustain the action (t). In Ansell v. Ansell (u), his lordship said there was a very material difference in the wording of the 1st and the 6th sections, and that the words of the latter required a very different construction to those of the former. So where in 1844 a wager on a horse race was made, and in 1845 an action for the recovery of the wager was commenced. After such action was commenced a statute (x) was passed, and enacted (y), that all contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and that no suit shall be brought or maintained in any court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall be deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made. The act was pleaded in bar to such action, but was held not to have a retrospective operation, so as to affect such contract and consequently such action. The decision was mainly rested on the first branch of the section, and the second branch of it was considered by the majority of the court as redundant. Alderson, B., doubted whether by the first branch the legislature might not have intended to put at once an end to the legal obligation both of existing and future contracts, leaving the parties to all such wagers to act thereafter on them as honourable engagements alone; and Parke, B., suggested strong reasons for limiting the operation of the words of the section, and holding that they apply to future contracts, and actions on such future contracts only-at all events to future actions only, if any distinction can be made in the degrees of apparent injustice. But suggested on the other hand, that the parties who (t) Fellowes v. Williamson, 1 Moo. & M. 306. (u) 1 Moo. & M. 299. (a) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109. |