Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

existence of disability, but only from the time when it ceases; thus, after fixing the period (a), persons under disability when the cause of action accrues, have the same period calculated from the time when the disability ceases (y). So that no limit to the period in respect of disabilities similar to that of forty years, under the c. 27, was requisite.

extension.

The disabilities specified in the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, Disabilities for are infancy, coverture, idiotcy, lunacy, unsoundness of Sect. 16, c. 27. mind, and absence beyond seas (z).

The meaning of the mental disabilities of idiotcy and Unsoundness of mind, what, lunacy is clear, but the meaning of unsoundness of mind, used, as it is here, in contradistinction to idiotcy and lunacy, is somewhat vague. The three terms are also used in the Fines and Recoveries Acts (a), but with the additional words, "whether found by inquisition or not."

Formerly, all these disabilities were designated by the general term non sane memory (b), or non compos mentis (c), or insanæ mentis (d), or, in English, unsound mind (e); and in one of the modern Statutes of Limitation (f), the term non compos mentis is also used. In the old Statute of Limitation (g) is no such disability.

Non compos mentis, or insanæ mentis, or unsound mind, is the generic state, and, in law, has a definite and well understood signification (h). The terms fatuus et idiota, however, have sometimes a more com

(x) Sect. 3.

(y) Sect. 4.

(z) Sect. 16.

(a) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74; 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 92 (I.).

(b) 1 Ric. 3, c. 7; 4 Hen. 7, c. 24; Litt. s. 405.

(c) 17 Edw. 2, c. 10; 21 Jac. 1, c. 16; Co. Litt. 246 b, 247 a.

533.

(e) Plowd. 368; 3 Atk. 171,
173.

(f) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42.
(g) 32 Hen. 8. c. 2.

(h) Litt. s. 405; Plowd. 368;
Co. Litt. 246 b, 247 a; 4 Rep. 124,
127, 128; 2 Sch. & L. 304; 12 Ves.
450; 3 Atk. 171, 173; 1 Ridgw. P.
C. 533.

(d) 3 Atk. 171; 1 Ridgw. P. C.

-how arising,

prehensive signification, including both non compos mentis, and idiota à nativitate (i).

According to Lord Coke, the term non compos mentis, which is most sure and legal (k), is applied to four sorts of persons: 1. Idiota, who from birth, by a perpetual infirmity, fatui naturales (1), is non compos mentis; 2. He who, by accident, wholly loseth memory and understanding; 3. A lunatic, who aliquando gaudet lucidis intervallis, called non compos mentis, so long as he has not understanding; and 4. He who by his own vicious act, as drunkenness, temporarily deprives himself of memory and understanding (m).

Idiotcy, therefore, is one species of non compos mentis, and is by nature (n); and lunacy is another species, but accidental or adventitious, and is either periodical or permanent (o).

Unsoundness of mind arises in various ways (p), and is produced from various causes, some of a temporary, others of a permanent character (7).

When the question is whether a person be or be not of sound mind, the inquiry is whether or not he possessed his faculties, and possessed them in a healthy state. His mental powers may be still subsisting; no disease may have taken them away; and yet they may have been affected with disease, and thus may not have entitled their possessor to the appellation of a person whose mind was sound. Again, the disease affecting them may have been more or less general; it may have affected more, or it may have affected fewer, of the mental faculties; for the mind is one and indivisible, but acts variously, that is, remembering, fancying, reflect

(i) Beverley's case, 4 Rep. 127 b.

(k) Co. Litt. 246 b.

(7) 17 Edw. 2, c. 9; 4 Rep. 126 a.
(m) Co. Litt. 247 a.

(n) 4 Rep. 124 b.

(0) Rockfort v. Lord Ely, 1 Ridgw. P. C. 517, 533.

(p) Harrod v. Harrod, 1 K. & J. 4.

(q) Dimes v. Dimes, 10 M. P. C. Č. 428.

ing, the same mind in all these operations being the agent (r).

The phrase "partial insanity" is incorrect. The better expression is "insanity" or "unsoundness" always existing, though only occasionally manifest. . . If the mind is unsound on one subject, provided that unsoundness is at all times existing upon that subject, such a mind is not really sound on other subjects. It is only sound in appearance . . . the unsoundness always exists, but requires a reference to the peculiar topic, else it lurks and appears not. But the malady is there, and as the mind is one and the same, it is really diseased while apparently sound, and really its acts, whatever appearance they may put on, are only the acts of a morbid or unsound mind (s).

Unsoundness of mind imports the notion that the import of, person is in some such state as is contradistinguished from idiotcy and from lunacy, and yet such as make him a proper subject of a commission to inquire of idiotcy or lunacy (t), or such as would justify a jury, in a commission of lunacy, in putting his property and person under the protection of the Chancellor (u).

of, to support

a commission

of lunacy.

In ascertaining whether, in any given case, unsound--and degree ness of mind of a character to subject the person to the operation of a commission of lunacy, exists, great difficulty often arises (x). Occasional unsoundness of mind, arising either from accidental and temporary causes, such as excess, or from mere weakness of intellect or mind, infirmitas mentis (y), being neither idiotcy nor lunacy (z), between which and such weakness the boundary is narrow, is no ground for a commission (a).

[blocks in formation]

Absence be

yond seas. Sect. 19.

Those who may be improved by time or instruction, though of weak understanding, are not within the meaning of the words unsound mind, or unsound memory (b).

Unsoundness of mind, therefore, used, in the provision we are considering, in contradistinction to idiotey and lunacy, seems applicable to every case of mental defect or incapacity which, in law, is neither natural idiotcy, nor lunacy, either periodical or permanent, nor mere weakness of intellect or mind.

No part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, nor the Channel Islands, nor any island adjacent to any of them under the dominion of the Crown, is beyond the seas within the meaning of the c. 27 (c).

The effect of this section is to make, for the purposes of the act only however, every part of the United Kingdom, with respect to every other part, and the Channel Islands, with respect to every part of the United Kingdom, not beyond the seas, but not for any other purposes (d).

So with respect to Scotland and Ireland, every other part of the United Kingdom, unless otherwise declared, would, in any statute applicable to them only, as to anything beyond seas, be in that position.

It has been doubted whether, with reference to the operation of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, which has been adopted in the colony of New South Wales, Ireland is beyond the seas within the section 19, in relation to that colony (e). If this statute be adopted in any of

[blocks in formation]

the Channel Islands, the same doubt, in relation to the United Kingdom, would apply.

As in the former Statute of Limitations (f), so in the recent one (g), "beyond seas" is not to be interpreted literally, but, as to the foreign possessions of the Crown, may be synonymous, in legal import and effect, with the words "out of the territories" and "out of the realm" (h).

Absence in Ireland (i), or in any of the Channel Islands, or in any Island adjacent to any of them, being part of the dominions of the Crown, before the passing of the act, is no disability.

The disability must exist when the right first accrues. The right to a rent, being a rent within the section 1, first accrues on the last payment of it (k). Therefore, in several cases where, between the last payment and the next, the claimant becomes under disability, the disability will afford him no protection (1). In other words, the operation of the statute having commenced is not suspended.

When the must exist. disability

accruer of

right, time of limitation is

extended.

If when the right accrues, the person to whom it Existing on accrues be under any of these disabilities, the period of limitation of twenty years, although expired, is extended for him, or for those claiming through him, for a further period of ten years, from the moment the impediment is removed, that is, as soon as he is in the position of having no impediment to the assertion of his right (m), or dies, whichever event first happens (n).

Thus, where the person to whom the right first accrues dies under disability, leaving his heir also under

(f) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16.
(g) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27.

(h) Ruckmayboye v. Mottichund, 8 M. P. C. Č. 4. See also Devine v. Holloway, 14 Ib. 290; Hogan v. Hand, Ib. 310.

(i) Ex parte Hassell, 3 You. & C. 617.

(k) Owen v. De Beauvoir, 16 M. & W. 547, affirmed on error, De Beauvoir v. Owen, 5 Ex. 166.

(1) Ib.

(m) See Lafond v. Ruddock, 13 C. B. 813.

(n) Sect. 16.

« ZurückWeiter »