-collative, -and on next presentation only, is com plete. For benefices however, induction also would seem to be necessary (h). Admission refers to the ability of a clerk, but sometimes includes institution also (i), and, strictly speaking, relates to the admission of a clerk on the presentation of another, and not to collation by a bishop, and is where a third person brings and presents his clerk to the bishop (j), who, if he approve him, "admits" him, thereby ratifying and approving the presentation of the patron (k). A curate is admitted only: a vicar is instituted also, and generally inducted. Admission is peculiarly applicable to a curate, and institution to a vicar (1). Where the benefice is collative, it will be full against the rightful owner when the right of collation is exercised, or a presentation to the benefice is made, by another person (m). The benefice, however, is not full where the presentation is on a simoniacal contract (n), nor on a collation thereto without title (o), for collation is an ambiguous act (p); or when made in time of war, although the institution and induction, which are but as executions of the presentment, be in time of peace (7). In the case of a next presentation only to or in a benefice presentative, the possession will be complete at the same time, and the six months will be computed from thence to the teste of the writ of quare impedit (r); and when the benefice is collative, at and from the collation. The sixty years within which a patron professing the (h) Vide supra, p. 421. (i) Co. Litt. 344 a; 6 Rep. 50 a. (k) Per Cur., London v. Derry, (1) Per Lord Tenterden, Cooke v. Elphin, 5 Bli., N. S. 128. See also London v. Derry, 1 Smythe's Ir. Rep. 517. (m) 6 Co. 30 a; Co. Litt. 344 b. (n) Co. Litt. 120 a; Winchcomb v. The Bishop of Winton, Hob. 165. (0) Co. Litt. 344 b. (p) Vide supra, pp. 421, 422. (g) 1 Rep. 99 b; 2 Ib. 93; 6 lb. 30 a; Co. Litt. 249 a, b. (7) Co. Litt. 344 b. Roman Catholic religion may, by conforming to the of papist The several periods of time for rights of common or other profits à pendre, for ways or other easements, watercourses or the use of water, to be enjoyed or derived upon, over or from any land or water, and for the access and use of light to and for any building, fixed by the 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, are next before some suit or action wherein the claim or matter to which those periods relate has been or is in question (t). These periods are to be reckoned from the date of the commencement of the right claimed until the commencement of the suit (u), or possibly some other suit (v) and user beyond the period may be shown (w). The right must be proved for the full period of time prescribed, and as of right (x), and without interruption (y), and continuously (z), and that there was not an interruption for one year before the commencement of the suit (a). The first period of limitation of sixty years for prescriptions and claims of, or for, any modus decimandi, or of, or to, any exemption from, or discharge of, tithes, under the 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100 (E.), and the 1 & 2 (8) 7 Vict. c. 54, s. 4. (1) Sect. 4; Welcome v. Upton, 6 M. & W. 536; Flight v. Thomas, 3 Per. & D. 442; Cl. & F. 231; Bright v. Walker, 4 Tyrw. 502; Onley v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 76; Richards v. Fry, 7 Ad. & E. 698; Jones v. Price, 3 Bing. N. C. 52; Davies v. Williams, 20 L. J., Q. B. 330; Eaton v. Swansea Works Company, Ib. 482; Arkwright v. Gell, 5 M. & W. 203. (u) Wright v. Williams, 1 M. & W. 72; Lawson v. Langley, 4 (v) 7 Ad. & E. 707. (y) 4 Tyrw. 509. (z) Onley v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 496; Ennor v. Barwell, 2 Giff. 410. (a) Ennor v. Barwell. For profits and under 2 & 3 other rights Will. 4, c. 71. For claims under 2 & 3 For gross sums charged on land or rent, by - mortgage, Vict. c. 109 (I.), is next before the demand of tithes in kind. The second period of limitation for the same matters, sixty-three years, is, as to sixty years, from the commencement of the first of two incumbencies, of that duration, or, together with such a number of years as will amount to that term, next before the demand of the render of tithes in kind, and, as to the three years, from the commencement of a third incumbency. The twenty years for money secured by mortgage, judgment or lien, or otherwise charged upon or payable out of any land or rent, at law or in equity, or any legacy, are next after a present right to receive the money or the legacy has accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for or release of the same (b). The right to receive and to recover as against the land or rent (c) money secured by mortgage may accrue and be barred (d), whilst the right to recover the land or the rent itself comprised in the mortgage may not have accrued (e). The last case was decided on the doctrine of nonadverse possession (f), a circumstance which seems to have been overlooked in Dearman v. Wyche. The question in Doe v. Williams was what, as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, was the nature of the possession by the former, and the possession was determined not to have been adverse to the latter, and that he was, by the section 15, not barred until five years after the passing of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27. Although a mortgagee who has lost his right at law will not be assisted in equity in recovering either the land or the money (g), yet his right to the former (b) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 40. (d) Dearman v. Wyche, 9 Sim. 570. (e) Doe d. Jones v. Williams, 5 Ad. & E. 291. (f) 2 Con. & L. 150. On that case see also 1 Ib. 514; 2 Hare, 332. (g) Dearman v. Wyche, supra. may accrue before his right to the mortgage money, and, consequently, the former right may be barred whilst the latter remains. Thus, where the mortgagor is not entitled to the possession of the land, from the time of the making of the mortgage until default is made in payment of the mortgage money, the right of the mortgagee to the land first accrues on the execution of the mortgage (h), and would be barred within twenty years from that time; but his right to the mortgage money would first accrue at the time appointed for the payment, and that time is usually at the end of six months, and sometimes of a longer period, from the date of the mortgage. The converse of this case also holds, and the right of the mortgagee to recover the debt at law may be lost, and his right to the property in mortgage may be unaffected, as where the property is reversionary, and does not fall into possession until after the right to the money is lost (i). Mortgagees who give to subsequent ones priority have not, whilst the income is insufficient to pay the interest of the subsequent mortgages, any present right to receive their mortgage money within the meaning of the statute (k), A judgment revived on a sci. fa. as against fresh judgment, parties confers a new right of action (7). So, also, where there is no change of parties (m). But this has been doubted (n). Such a judgment may be sued upon after the lapse of more than twenty years after the obtaining of the original judgment, and is not an ex (h) Doe d. Roylance v. Lightfoot, 8 M. & W. 559. See also Doe d. Jones v. Williams, 5 Ad. & E. 291; Wilkinson v. Hall, 3 Bing. N. C. 508. (i) Seager v. Aston, 3 Jur., N. S. 484. (k) Jortin v. South Eastern Railway Company, 6 De G., M. & G. 270. (1) Farran v. Beresford, 10 Cl. & F. 319; Farrell v. Gleeson, 11 Ib. 702. (m) Re Blake, 2 Ir. Ch. Rep. 643; Murray v. Clarke, 4 Ir. C. L. Rep. 610; Ottiwell v. Farran, 1 Sausse & S. 218, n. (n) See Farran v. Beresford, sup. -lien. Legacies. ception within the sect. 40 of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27 ; and the right to receive the amount of such a judgment accrues, not on the date of the original judgment, but on the last revival, or award of execution (o); and the judgment affects those lands the conusor of the original judgment had when the latter was obtained, although he alienated them before the revivor (p). In the case of a lien of a vendor upon land for the unpaid purchase-money for it, the time when the right to receive such money accrues depends upon the time when the title is shown upon the original contract. The money does not become payable necessarily at the time fixed for completion of the purchase. The right would accrue upon the title being perfected by evidence. The right to the purchase-money does not accrue till the time arrives for completion, and the right to receive interest accrues at the same time. If no title be made, there is no right to principal or interest (q). The present right to receive a legacy charged on a reversion accrues on the death of the tenant for life, or otherwise on the reversion coming into possession (r). Not charged on land, and payable on the death of a third person, such right accrues on the death of such person (s). A present right to receive a legacy charged upon land is not prevented or postponed by the existence of prior charges upon the land charged with the legacy (t). This clause of the statute assumes the co-existence, to and against when the right first accrues, of a person capable of whom right giving a discharge or release, and also of another dis When person (0) Kealey v. Bodkin, 1 Sausse (p) Murray v. Clarke, supra. (r) Earle v. Bellingham, 24 Beav. 448; 27 L. J., N. S., Ch. 545. (8) Prior v. Horniblow, 2 You. & C. 260; Seager v. Aston, 3 Jur., N. S. 481. (t) Proud v. Proud, 32 Beav. 234. |