tinct inventions are embraced in the application, for which four applications should have been filed. Applicant urges that all of the inventions embraced in his application pertain to one machine, and hence are properly presented in one application, aud could be covered by a single patent. Upon examination of the application it appears, as stated by the Examiner, that the first, second, and third claims relate to improvements in the frame and the cutter-actuating mechanism; that the fourth, fifth, and sixth claims cover mechanism for adjusting the platform; that the seventh claim covers improvements in the pitman, and that the other claims cover improvements in the rake.

Applicant cites my decision in the case of Ex parte Rasmusen, decided May 11, 1883, in support of his position in this case. In that case the applicant claimed an entire system of cable-railways, as well as the specific devices and combinations which made up the system. Applicant in this case has the right to claim and have a patent for the entire machine, if it is new, together with the subordinate combinations and parts which make up such machine. This, however, is not the claim of the applicant. In his specification he states:

My invention relates to one-wheel harvesting-machines, and is in part an improvement on the patent granted to me on the 27th of June, 1882, numbered 260,338, as will be more fully set forth hereinafter.

The inventions, therefore, as stated, and as it appears from the specification, are for improvements upon the matters set forth in said patent. These improvements relate to the different parts of the machine. Each is distinctly set out and distinctly claimed. They are independent improvements, however, for each of which applicant may be entitled to a patent, and are improvements, as stated by the Examiner, which might be attached to and used in other like machines. As presented they are combined in one machine. This, however, does not make it proper to embrace them in one patent. The statute contemplates that a patent shall issue for a single invention, not for a multiplicity of inventions, although relating to the same subject, and as in this case to a particular machine. The classification of the Office has followed the line of invention, new subclasses only being made when a new class of inventions appear. By such classification the work of the Office is greatly simplified, and without it the business thereof could not be transacted. This fact is well known to the solicitors of the applicant, if not to himself. The criticism, therefore, which is made upon the classification of the Office is without reasonable foundation.

It is to be presumed when applicants file their applications for patents that they desire, if the subject-matter is patentable, to obtain valid patents. A patent to be valid can only cover a single invention. If several distinct inventions were embraced in the same patent it would be invalid for that reason. When the Office, therefore, directs an applicant to divide his application because more than one invention is therein embraced, it is not simply for the purpose of requiring applicant to

conform to the classification of the Office, nor because it will require more time to examine the matters embraced in the application, but because the patent can only cover a single invention and be valid. The division required is for the protection of applicant's inventions, and not for the convenience of the Office, nor to increase its revenues. The ap plication, as stated by the Examiner, covers four independent inventions, and in order that valid patents may issue, if the matters described and claimed are found to be new, four applications will have to be filed. The decision of the Examiner is affirmed.

EX PARTE KIPLING.

Decided July 25, 1883.

24 O. G., 899.

1. TRADE-MARK-DESCRIPTIVE WOrds.

A word merely descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics cannot become a lawful trade-mark by virtue of a change in its orthography to that of a foreign language in which it possesses the same meaning. 2. REGISTRATION OF INVALID TRADE-MARKS SHOULD be Refused.

It is the duty of the Commissioner of Patents to refuse to register alleged trademarks which, under the decisions of the courts, are clearly not valid.

3. SAME.

The Office has no right, by accepting and registering words or symbols which are clearly not valid trade-marks, to mislead applicants or the public.

APPEAL from the Primary Examiner.

TRADE-MARK.

APPLICATION filed June 9, 1883.

Mr. A. Pollok for the appellant

MARBLE, Commissioner:

Appeal is taken from the decision of the Examiner refusing registration of applicant's alleged trade-mark because it is descriptive of the character of goods to which it is to be applied. Applicant seeks to register the word "Cristalline" as his trade-mark for artificial stones or brilliants. The word "cristalline" or "crystalline" is thus defined:

Consisting of crystal. Having a texture produced by crystallization. Imperfectly crystallized; as, granite is only crystalline. Resembling crystal; pure: clear; transparent; pellucid. (Webster.)

The Examiner was correct in holding that the word selected by applicant as a trade-mark is descriptive of the character of goods to which he desires to apply it. No other word probably could be found which would more perfectly describe the character of said goods. Artificial stones or brilliants are not new to the trade, and it is not shown that applicant manufactures any particular class of artificial stones or brilliants. The word "cristalline" would apply as well to the class of goods

manufactured by others as by applicant. There is nothing in the spelling of the word which gives it any but its ordinary meaning. The only question for decision, therefore, is whether, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Delaware and Hudson Canal Company v. Clark (1 O. G., 279), applicant is entitled to the registration of the word as his trade-mark. In said decision the Court say:

No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trade-mark or trade-name which would practically give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods other than those produced or made by himself. If he could the public would be injured rather than protected, for competition would be destroyed. Nor can a generic name, or a name merely descriptire of an article of trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, be employed as a trade-mark and the exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection.

In said decision the court quoted approvingly from the decision in the case of The Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Spear, the following:

The owner of an original trade-mark has an undoubted right to be protected in the exclusive use of all the marks, forms, or symbols that were appropriated as designating the true origin or ownership of the article or fabric to which they are affixed; but he has no right to the exclusive use of any words, letters, figures, or symbols which have no relation to the origin. or ownership of the goods, but are only meant to indicate their names or quality. He has no right to appropriate a sign or symbol which, from the nature of the fact it is used to signify, others may employ with equal truth, and therefore have an equal right to employ for the same purpose.

As above stated, the word selected by applicant as his trade-mark signifies as clearly as any word can the character of the goods to which he desires to apply it, and under the decisions referred to would not be a valid trade-mark.

While it is true that under the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia the registration of a trade-mark by the Commissioner of Patents is to a large degree simply a ministerial duty, yet in the exercise of that duty it must be conceded that he has the right to refuse to register alleged trade-marks which are clearly not valid under the decisions of the courts. It is still the duty of the Commissioner of Patents, I think, to inform applicants that sigus, symbols, or words selected by them as trade-marks are not such, so that they may not be deceived in applying them to any class of goods. It is also his duty, I think, to the public to refuse the registration of an alleged trademark which would not be a valid trade-mark. Neither an applicant nor the public should be misled by the action of this Office in accepting and registering words, signs, or symbols as trade-marks which are clearly not such.

I find no error in the decision of the Examiner refusing registration of applicant's alleged trade-mark, and therefore affirm the same.

1. AMENDMENTS AFTER DECISION OF APPELLATE TRIBUNALS.

Amendments of the specification offered after the decision of an appellate tribunal will be forwarded at once to the Primary Examiner, whose duty it is to determine in the premises all questions relating to the admissibility and merits of such amendments.

2. RIGHT OF AMENDMENT.

Regarding two years from the date of the last official action as the natural life of an application, it is clear that an applicant is entitled at any time within that period to take such action in his case, whether by appeal or amendment, as shall be necessary to protect his right to a patent, subject, however, to such regulations, not inconsistent with this fundamental right, as the Commissioner and Secretary shall establish for the conduct of business in the Office.

3. SPECIAL AMENDMENTS ABOLISHED-Rule 67.

By the omission from Rule 67 of the clause in old Rule 31, relating to the recommendation of amendments, the whole distinction of special amendments, co nomine, was abolished and the Primary Examiner, by implication, is made the judge as well of the inadmissibility as of the merits of all amendments.

MOTION for rehearing.

PASSENGER-TICKET.

APPLICATION filed June 21, 1883.

Mr. Jas. H. Mandeville, for appellant.

MARBLE, Commissioner:

On the 6th instant I made a ruling in this case rejecting certain claims which had been adversely passed upon by the lower tribunals, appeal having been taken in due form. The applicant now moves to set aside such decision for the purpose of amending his specification.

While I am ready on this and all occasions to afford an applicant every opportunity to perfect his specification and claims before the issuance of his patent or the final determination of the case against him, I do not think the formality of my approval is necessary to the consideration of amendments such as are presented in the present case. As some misunderstanding seems to exist in regard to the practice upon this subject, I will take this occasion to state what I consider to be the correct practice under the present rules in this respect. It will be noted that, while the law regulates the limit of appeal from adverse decisions in contested cases (section 4904 R. S.) in prescribing the course of appeal in ex parte cases upon the merits no reference is made to any limi. tation of the right of appeal. (Sections 4909-4915, inclusive.) The practice in this respect, therefore, must be governed by the more general provisions of section 4894 R. S., declaring that an application will be regarded as abandoned by the parties thereto upon the failure of an applicant to prosecute the same within two years after any action therein.

In the absence of more specific legislation the applicant would undoubtedly be entitled under the provisions of this section to perfect his appeal from the decision of the lower tribunal at any time within two years from the date of said decision. Regarding, then, two years from the date of the last official action thereon as the natural life of an application, it is clear that an applicant is entitled at any time within that period to take such action in his case, whether by appeal or amendment, as shall be necessary to perfect his right to a patent, subject, however, to such regulations, not inconsistent with this fundamental right, as the Commissioner and Secretary shall establish for the conduct of business in the Office. The misunderstanding upon this subject has risen from inattention to the changes introduced into the rules at the time of the general revision in 1879. According to the rules as they existed previous to that time, it was necessary in all cases where it was proposed to amend an application after an adverse decision by an appellate tribunal, whether subject to suggestions or otherwise, to first obtain the "recommendation" of the tribunal last acting upon the case and also the "approval" of the Commissioner. It was deemed expedient, however, upon the revision of the rules to dispense with these multiplied proceedings, which were in most cases a mere form, and to remit the whole matter to the jurisdiction of the Primary Examiner. This purpose is indicated in the omission from the Rule 67 of the following cause, which formed a part of the corresponding Rule 31 of the old edition: After a second rejection and at any time before the issuance of a patent, special amendments may be received for examination by the approval of the Commissioner, but such amendments must first be submitted to the tribunal last acting upon the case for recommendation or objection, and will be subject to revision and restriction the same as original amendments.

By this omission the whole distinction of special amendments, eo nomine, was abolished and the Primary Examiner by implication is made the judge as well of the admissibility as of the merits of all amendments.

The rule, as further amended, contains specific provisions regulating the admissibility of amendments offered after a second rejection, but no distinct rule is laid down for the guidance of the examiner in judg ing of the propriety of admitting amendments offered after an adverse decision by an appellate tribunal. In one respect, however, the examiner is necessarily limited in the consideration of such amendments. The examiner is evidently without authority to pass upon any matter which has been expressly decided by a superior tribunal. (Rule 134.) It is his duty in the premises, therefore, to ascertain whether the amendment presented raises questions which have already been decided, and upon his ascertaining this to be the fact he should refuse to consider or act upon such amendment without special authority from the Commissioner, obtained in due form by interlocutory appeal or by specific directions to that end. Having ascertained, however, that the proposed