NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

NEGLIGENCE JOINT LIABILITY DRIVER AND OWNER OF TEAM-PARTNERSHIP.-Defendant and one McC. entered into an agreement by which the former agreed to furnish team and wagon, for the purpose of carrying passengers, the latter was to gather the passengers, collect the fares and the avails of the business as such was to be divided between them. Plaintiff, while walking in a public street, was knocked down and run over by the team and wagon furnished by de. fendant under the agreement. Through the negligence of the driver the accident happened. Defendant was not present. In an action to recover damages, held, that as to third parties, each of the parties to the agreement became the agent of the other in the prosecution of a common enterprise and so liable for the other's negligence in relation thereto, and that defendant was liable. It is clear that there was a contract relation between the two defendants. They undertook to engage together in a money-making occupation, to which one contributed as capital the horses, harness and wagon, and food and care for the team, and the other his personal services. The reward of each was to be derived from the avails of the business as such, and not by way of compensation either for services or use of property. As to third persons therefore, within rules too well settled to permit discussion, each became the agent of the other in the prosecution of the common enterprise, and liable for his omissions and faults in regard thereto. Champion

. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 175; Leggett v. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272;17 Am. Rep. 244; Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613. Strober v. Elting. Opinion by Danforth, J. [Decided Oct. 21, 1884.]

TAXATION CORPORATION NOT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY.-A corporation organized under the act providing for the formation of water-works companies in the towns and villages of the State (Act of 1873, ch. 737; Act of 1876, ch. 418, and Act of 1877, ch. 171), which has contracted with the town or village to furnish it with specified water facilities, for an agreed compensation, is not thereby constituted a governmental agency, and its property is subject to taxation. In the City of Rochester v. Rush, 80 N. Y. 308, the property involved belonged to the city-had been purchased by it under the compulsion of a legislative act for a public purpose only, and was so retained by it. It was therefore thought to be exempt from taxation. The doctrine of that case has no application here. The village of Mt. Morris has no interest in, or concern with, the property sought to be taxed. It has simply the obligation of its owners, and they, and not the municipality, are the tax payers. Whether the tax is imposed or not, the obligation will remain. People v. Forrest. Opinion by Danforth, J. [Decided Oct. 21, 1884.]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CITIZENSHIP-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-INDIANALLEGATION OF PETITION.—(1) An Indian, born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the United States, which still exists and is recognized as a tribe by the government of the United States, who has voluntarily separated himself from his tribe, and taken up his residence among the white citizens of a State, but who has not been naturalized or taxed or recognized as a citizen, either by the United States or by the State, is not a citizen of the United States, within

the meaning of the first section of the fourteenth arti cle of amendment of the Constitution. Indians and their property, exempt from taxation by treaty or statute of the United States, could not be taxed by any State. General acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them. Const., art. 1, §§ 2, 8; art. 2, § 2; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 id. 515; United States v. Rogers, 4 How, 567; United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407; Case of the Kansas Indians, 5 id. 737; Case of the New York Indians, id. 761; Case of the Cherokee Tobacco, 11 id. 616; United States v. Whisky, 93 U. S. 188; Pennock v. Commissioners, 103 id. 44; Crow Dog's case, 109 id. 556; S. C., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693; Hastings v. Farmer, 4 N. Y. 293. The alien and dependent condition of the members of the Indian tribes could not be put off at their own will without the action or assent of the United States. They were never deemed citizens of the United States, except under explicit provisions of treaty or statute to that effect, either declaring a certain tribe, or such members of it as chose to remain behind on the removal of the tribe westward, to be citizens, or authorizing individuals of particular tribes to become citizens on application to a court of the United States for naturalization and satisfactory proof of fitness for civilized life. The distinction between citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization is clearly marked in the provisions of the Constitution, by which "no person, except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of president;" and "the Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization." Const., art. 2, § 1; art. 1, $8. By the thirteenth amendment of the Constitution slavery was prohibited. The main object of the opening sentence of the fourteenth amendment was to settle the question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion throughout the country and in this court, as to the citizenship of free negroes (Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393), and to put it beyond doubt that all persons, white or black, and whether formerly slaves or not, born or naturalized in the United States, and owing no allegiance to any alien power, should be citizens of the United States and of the State in which they reside. Slaughter House cases, 16 Wall. 36, 73; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 306. In the case of United States v. Elm, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 419, decided by Judge Wallace in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, the Indian who was held to have a right to vote in 1876 was born in the State of New York, one of the remnants of a tribe which had ceased to exist as a tribe in that State; and by a statute of the State it had been enacted that any native Indian might purchase, take, hold, and convey lands, and whenever he should have become a freeholder to the value of $100, should be liable to taxation, and to the civil jurisdiction of the courts, in the same manner and to the same extent as a citizen. N. Y. St. 1843, ch. 87. The condition of the tribe from which he derived his origin, so far as any fragments of it remained within the State of New York, resembled the condition of those Indian nations of which Mr. Justice Johnson said in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 146, that they "have totally extinguished their national fire, and submitted themselves to the laws of the States;" and which Mr. Justice McLean had in view when he observed in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 580, that in some of the old States "where small remnants of tribes remain, surrounded by white population, and who by their reduced numbers had lost the power of selfgovernment, the laws of the State have been extended

over them for the protection of their persons and property." See also as to the condition of Indians in Massachusetts, remnants of tribes never recognized by the treaties or legislative or executive acts of the United States as distinct political communities. Danzell v. Webquish, 108 Mass. 133; Pells v. Webquish, 129 id. 469; Mass. St. 1862, ch. 184; 1869, ch. 463. The law upon the question before us has been well stated by Judge Deady in the District Court of the United States for the District of Oregon. In giving judgment against the plaintiff in a case resembling the case at bar, he said: "Being born a member of an independent political community.'-the Chinook-he was not born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States-not born in its allegiance." McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawy. 118, 134. And in a later case he said: "But an Indian cannot make himself a citizen of the United States without the consent (and co-operation of the government. The fact that he has abandoned his nomadic life or tribal relations, and adopted the habits and manners of civilized people, may be a good reason why he should be made a citizen of the United States, but does not of itself make him one. To be a citizen of the United States is a political privilege which no one, not born to, can assume without its consent in 'some form. The Indians in Oregon, not being born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, were not born citizens thereof, and I am not aware of any law or treaty by which any of them have been made so since." United States v. Osborne, 6 Sawy. 406, 409. Upon the question whether any action of a State can confer rights of citizenship on Indians of a tribe still recognized by the United States as retaining its tribal existence, we need not, and do not express an opinion, because the State of Nebraska is not shown to have taken any action affecting the condition of this plaintiff. See Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259; Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366; United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 420; United States v. Joseph,94 U. S. 614,618; Ex parte Reynolds, 5 Dill. 394; Ex parte Kenyon, id. 385; United States v. Crook, id. 453, distinguished. (2) A petition alleging that the plaintiff is an Indian, and was born within the United States, and has severed his tribal relation to the Indian tribes, and fully and completely surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the United States, and still so continues subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and is a bona fide resident of the State of Nebraska and city of Omaha, does not show that he is a citizen of the United States under the fourteenth article of amendment of the Constitution. Elk v. Wilkins. Opinion by Gray, J. [Decided Nov. 3, 1884.]

TAXATION-NAVIGATION OF RIVER-CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAWS.-A city cannot make a charge as the price of the privilege of navigating a river in accordance with the terms of the party's license from the United States. The present case would seem to fall directly within the rule of the decisions, of Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 210-214; Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 244, unless the fact that the ordinance of the city of New Orleans is the exercise of the taxing power of the State can be supposed to make a material difference. But since the case of Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, it has been repeatedly decided by this court that when a law of a State imposes a tax, under such circumstances and with such effect as to constitute it a regulation of commerce, either foreign or inter-State, it is void on that account. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, and cases there cited. In the State Freight Tax cases, 15 Wall. 232-276, it was said that it could not make any difference that the legislative purpose was to raise money for the support of the State government, and

not to regulate transportation; that it was not the purpose of the law, but its effect, which was to be considered. The fundamental proposition on the subject was expressed by Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 3545, in this comprehensive language: "The question of the taxing power of the States, as its exercise has affected the functions of the Federal government, has been repeatedly considered by this court; and the right of the States in this mode to impede or embarrass the constitutional operations of that government, or the rights which its citizens hold under it, has been uniformly denied." Otherwise unrestrained by the authority of the Federal Constitution, the taxing power of the States extends to and embraces the persons, property, and pursuits of their people; although it is not always easy, in particular cases, to draw the line which separates the two jurisdictions; as may be seen by comparing the cases of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, and of State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, id. 284, and as was said in Osborne v. Mobile, 16 id. 479. And it is undoubtedly true, as it has often been judicially declared, that vessels engaged in foreign or inter-State commerce, and duly enrolled and licensed under the acts of Congress, may be taxed by State authority as property; provided the tax be not a tounage duty, is levied only at the port of registry, and is valued as other property in the State without unfavorable discrimination on account of its employment. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471; Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365. But the license fee in the present case is not a tax upon the boats as property, according to any valuation. The very law authorizing its imposition declares that it shall not be construed to be a tax on property. It is said however to be a tax on an occupation, and for that reason not a regulation of commerce. If it were a tax upon the income derived from the business, it might be justified by the principle of the decision in the case of State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, which shows the distinction between a tax on transportation and a tax upon its fruits, realized and reduced to possession, so as to have become part of the general capital aud property of the tax payer. But here it is not a tax on the profits and income after they have been realized from the business. It is a charge explicitly made as the price of the privilege of navigating the Mississippi river between New Orleans and the Gulf, in the coastwise trade; as the condition on which the State of Louisiana consents that the boats of the plaintiff in error may be employed by him according to the terms of the license granted under the authority of Congress. The sole occupation sought to be subjected to the tax is that of using and enjoying the license of the United States to employ these particular vessels in the coasting trade; and the State thus seeks to burden with an exaction, fixed at its own pleasure, the very right to which the plaintiff in error is entitled under, and which he derives from the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Louisiana statute declares expressly that if he refuses or neglects to pay the license tax imposed upon him for using his boats in this way, he shall not be permitted to act under and avail himself of the license granted by the United States but may be enjoined from so doing by judicial process. The conflict between the two authorities is direct and express. What the one declares may be done without the tax, the other declares shall not be done except upon payment of the tax. In such an opposition, the only question is, which is the superior authority? and reduced to that, it furnishes its own answer. Moran v. City of New Orleans. Opinion by Matthews, J. [Decided Nov. 3, 1884.]

PROTECTION

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSPIRACY OF CITIZENS-REV. STAT., § 5508-INFORMATION.- (1) Section 5508 of the Revised Statutes, making amenable to penalty "any two or more persons who may conspire to injure, oppose, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States," etc., is constitutionally valid. Yarbrough's case, 110 U. S. 651; 29 Alb. L. J. 329. (2) By the original entry upon public land, a party acquires the inchoate but well-defined right to the land and its possession, which can only be perfected by continued residence, possession, and cultivation for five years. His right to continue this possession for five years for that purpose is dependent upon the act of Congress. His right to the patent after this is done rests exclusively upon the same foundation. Whenever two or more persons combine to commit acts of a character to throw obstruction in the way of such party's exercising this right, and for the purpose and with the intent to prevent it, or to injure or oppress him because he has exercised it, they render them. selves liable to prosecution for conspiracy, under Rev. Stat. 5508. (3) Whether a prosecution, the success of which would entail upon the prisoner the loss of his right "to hold any office or place of honor or trust created under the Constitution and laws of the United States," can under the fifth amendment to the Constitution, be commenced by information, quære. United States v. Waddell. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided Nov. 3, 1884.]

STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS · AKNOWLEDGMENT KANSAS STATUTE-MUNICIPAL DEBT.-The statute of the State of Kansas (Gen. Stat. Kans., ch. 80, art. 3, § 24, p. 634), providing, that in a case founded on contract, when "an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt, or claim," shall have been made, an action may be brought within the period prescribed for the same, after such acknowledgment, if such acknowledgment was in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby, requires as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Kansas, that the acknowledgment to be effective, be made not to a stranger, but to the credtor, or to some one acting for or representing him. Sibert v. Wilder, 16 Kans. 176; Schmueker v. Sibert, 18 id. 104; Clawson v. McCune, 20 id. 337; Elder v. Dyer, 26 id. 604. A committee of a city council, appointed to consider the city indebtedness, made a report containing a statement of the assets and liabilities of the city, and including among the latter a certain issue of bonds called M. bonds. The report further proposed a plan of compromise to be made with the holders of city bonds, the proposal being made in the form of a circular, which the committee recommended "to be sent to each person holding city bonds, except M. bonds, as to which we make no report." The circular, by its terms, purported to be addressed "to each person holding bonds of the city," and requested "each bondholder to express his views fully." The city council adopted the report of the committee and ordered the circular to be sent to the holders of the city bonds; and it was so sent to holders of bonds other than M. bonds, but not to holders of the latter. Held, that neither the note nor the circular was an acknowledgment of the M. bonds as a debt of the city, so as to take them out of the statute of limitations. The settled doctrine in Kansas, and the weight of authority elsewhere, is that statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, and not merely statutes of presumption of payment. Therefore to deprive a debtor of the benefit of such a statute by an acknowledgment of indebtedness, there must be an acknowledgment to the creditor as to the particular claim, and it must be shown to have

"An

been intentional. Roscoe v. Hale, before cited. acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt, or claim," withing the meaning of the Kansas statute, implies a meeting of minds, the right of the creditor to take what is written as an acknowledgment to him of the existence of the debt, as well as the intention of the debtor, as deduced from the contents of the writing and all the facts accompanying it, to make such acknowledgment. In Wetsell v. Bussard, 11 Wheat. 309, 315, Chief Justice Marshall said: "An acknowledgment which will revive the original cause of action must be unqualified and unconditional. It must show positively that the debt is due in whole or in part." To the same effect are Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 362, and Moore v. Bank of Columbia, 6 id. 86, 92. In Barlow v. Barner, 1 Dill. 418, this statute of Kansas was under consideration by Mr. Justice Miller and Judge Dillon, and the court said: "Courts by their decisions as to the effect of loose and unsatisfactory oral admissions and new promises, had almost frittered away the statute of limitations, and to remedy this, statutes similar to the one in force in this State have been quite generally enacted. City of Fort Scott v. Hickman. Opinion by Blatchf., J. [See 30 Eng. R. 206.] [Decided Nov. 3, 1884.]

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-ALTERATION-ADDING SURETY-MAKER LIABLE.-The addition of the signature of a surety to a promissory note is not such a change in the terms of the contract as will discharge the maker. A mortgage executed by husband and wife of her land, for the accommodation of a partnership of which the husband is a member, and as security for the payment of a negotiable promissory note made by the husband to his partner and indorsed by the partner, for the same purpose, and to which note the partner before negotiating it, adds the wife's name as a maker, without the consent or knowledge of herself or her husband, is valid in the hands of one who, in ignorance of the alteration, lends money to the partnership upon the security of the note and mortgage. An erasure of the name of one of several obligors is a material alteration of the contract of the others, because it increases the amount which each of them may be held to contribute. Martin v. Thomas, 24 How. 315; Smith v. United States, 2 Wall. 219. And the addition of a new person as a principal maker of a promissory note, rendering all the promisors, apparently, jointly and equally liable, not only to the holder, but also as between themselves, and so far tending to lessen the ultimate liability of the original maker or makers, has been held in the courts of some of the States to be a material alteration. Shipp v. Suggett, 9 B. Mon. 5; Henry v. Coats, 17 Ind. 161; Wallace v. Jewell, 21 Ohio St. 163; Hamilton v. Hooper, 46 Iowa, 515. However that may be, yet where the signature added, although in form that of a joint promisor, is in fact that of a surety or guarantor only, the original maker is, as between himself and the surety, exclusively liable for the whole amount, and his ultimate liability to pay that amount is neither increased nor diminished; and according to the general current of the American authorities, the addition of the name of a surety, whether before or after the first negotiation of the note, is not such an alteration as discharges the maker. Montgomery R. Co. v. Hurst, 9 Ala. 513, 518; Stone v. White, 8 Gray, 589; McCaughey v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 39; Brownell v. Winnie, 29 id. 400; Wallace v. Jewell, 21 Ohio St. 172; Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 249. The English casses afford no sufficient ground for a different conclusion. In the latest decision at law indeed Lord Campbell and Justices Erle, Wightman and Crompton held that the signing of a note by an addi

tional surety, without the consent of the original makers, prevented the maintenance of an action on the note against them. Gardner v. Walsh, 5 El. & Bl. 83. But in an earlier decision, of perhaps equal weight, Lord Denman and Justices Littledale, Patteson,,and Coleridge held that in such a case the addition did not avoid the note, or prevent the original surety, on paying the note, from recovering of the principal maker the amount paid. Catton v. Simpson, 8 Adol. & F. 136; 8. C., 3 Nev. & P. 248. See also Gilb. Ev. 109. And in a later case, in the court of chancery, upon an appeal in bankruptcy, Lords Justices Knight, Bruce and Turner held that the addition of a surety was not a material alteration of the original contract. Ex parte Yates, 2 De G. & J. 191; see also Angle v. N. West. Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 330; Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall. 80; Greenfield Saving Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196, and cases cited. Mersman v. Werges. Opinion by Gray, J. [See 7 Am. Rep. 669; 27 Hun, 349; 1 id. 504, 506; 20 Eng Rep. 594; 13 Alb. L. J. 263; 29 id. 519.-ED.] [Decided Nov. 3, 1884.]

FINANCIAL LAW.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-CHECK-PRESENTATION FOR PAYMENT-FAILURE OF BANK.-The presentation of a check to the bank on which it is drawn must be made within a reasonable time, taking all the circumstances into consideration; but where the check is given in a rural district, twenty miles distant from the place of payment, and not in time to reach the bank before it closed that day, and pressing business prevents the holder from presenting it the following day, and the next day being Sunday, on Monday morning it is placed in the local bank for collection, the delay is uot unreasonable, and if the bank has failed the holder may recover the amount of the check from the drawer. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501; Nutting v. Burked, 48 id. 241. Sup. Ct. Mich., Oct. 15, 1884. Frieberg v. Cody. Opinion by Sherwood, J. [20 N· W. Rep. 813.]

CRIMINAL LAW.

INDICTMENT-ARSON-SUGAR-HOUSE-PLEADING.Section 2126, R. L., prescribes the penalty for burning a dwelling-house or its out-houses; section 4128 prescribes a less severe penalty for burning various other buildings specially named, "or other house or building of another not constituting a dwelling-house or its out-buildings; the indictment charged the respondent with burning a "certain building commonly known and called a sugar-house," but without averment that the" sugar-house" did not constitute a dwellinghouse or its out-buildings. The term sugar-house is not used in section 4128. Held, that the case does not come within the rule that a proviso or exception in a statute must be negatived when descriptive of the offense; and that the indictment is sufficient. A judgment on an indictment for the mitigated offense would be a bar to an indictment charging the same offense with aggravation. The views here shortly expressed are fully sustained and much amplified in Commonwealth v. Squire, 1 Metc. 258; Devoe v. Commonwealth, 3 id. 316; Larned v. Commonwealth, 12 id. 240; Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 15 Gray, 480; Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 122 Mass. 454. Sup. Ct. Vt., Jan., 1884. State v. Ambler. Opinion by Rowell, J. [56 Vt. 672.]

OUR NEW YORK LETTER.

HE new year promises well in the way of litigation.

5, there were 245 appeals on the calendar of the General Term of the Supreme Court, enough to keep the judges busy for some time to come. We understand that there are on the present General Term calendar in this department over one hundred appeals from interlocutory orders. The judges are complaining of the burden of work cast upon them, and it is hoped that some relief will be afforded by the Legislature. The delay in litigation in this city is intolerable, and works with equal hardship upon clients and lawyers.

As is usual at this season, New Year's presents were in order, and the city of New York was no exception to the rule. The citizens of New York were presented with three mayors within the space of twenty-four hours, one whom the people had elected to fill the office, and two whom they did not have in contemplation. Mayor Kirk utilized his brief term of office to make an appointment to the office of corporation counsel, but when the appointee tried to install himself he found that possession is nine points of the law, and the entrance was barred by a big iron gate, behind which the present incumbent had entrenched himself, aud the opposing forces held a parley through the grating. We understand that a case is to be agreed upon and submitted to the General Term so as to get a speedy determination of the question as to who is entitled to the office. Both parties are fortified by the opinions of eminent counsel, and the court will be called upon to decide where doctors disagree. The question seems to be narrowed down to whether Mayor Edson's term expired at midnight December 31, or continued until noon of January 1. If it did expire at midnight December 31 we do not see why Mr. Kirk's appointee is not entitled to the office. The Consolidation Act provides: "In case of a vacancy he shall so act until noon of the first Monday of January succeeding the election at which a successor is chosen." This language is used in reference to the president of the board of aldermen. Mayor Edson held his office under chapter 335, Laws of 1873, section 20, which provides: "The mayor shall be elected at a general election, and hold his office for the term of two years, commencing on the first day of January next after his election." Under this state of facts it would seem that Mayor Edson's term expired at midnight December 31, and that there was a vacancy to be filled by the president of the board of aldermen.

The Marie-Garrison suit continues to drag its slow length along. "Men may come, and men may go, but the reference goes on forever." Recently the defendants, after having consented to the selection of the present referee, became convinced that he was too good a lawyer for them, and made an application for his removal on the ground that he was prejudiced against the defendants, and also that he insisted on trying the action as one in equity instead of a suit at law. The judge to whom the application was made very properly held that the defendants must abide by their choice, and denied the motion.

An interesting question has just been decided by Judge McAdam, of the City Court. The defendant in an action in that court had returned a reply to a counterclaim, the jurat to which was signed "Jennie Turner, Notary Public,' as unverified. A motion was made by the plaintiff to compel the defendant to accept the reply as properly verified. It appeared that Miss Turner had been appointed a notary public by the governor and confirmed by the Senate. McAdam, C. J., held that the defendant cannot in a collateral proceedings, to which the notary is not a party, try the ques.

In "the act to simplify and abridge the practice, plead

A bill has recently been drafted in this city for presentation to the Legislature, which, if passed, will accomplish a much-needed reform. This bill makes it a misdemeanor to solicit or be in any manner concerned in receiving or soliciting a contribution for any political purpose, from any person holding the office of judge or justice in any of the courts named in article 1. title 1, chapter 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or from any candidate to the office of judge or justice in any of said courts.

It is further provided that any person who shall subscribe or pay, or cause any other person to subscribe or pay, any contribution or assessment for any political purpose whatsoever, shall be ineligible for three years thereafter to hold the office of judge or justice in any of said courts.

Every person elected or appointed to hold the office of judge or justice in any of said courts is required by the bill, before assuming his said office, to file in the office of the secretary of State an oath to the effect | that he has not within three years prior to making said oath directly or indirectly subscribed or paid, or promised to pay, or solicited any other person within the same period to subscribe or pay, or promise to pay, any assessment or subscription or contribution in money or property for any political purpose what

ever.

The making a false oath is declared to be perjury, and the punishment for such offense is imprisonment for not less than two or more than ten years, and in addition disqualification from ever holding the office of judge or justice in any of said courts.

We hope to see this bill speedily passed, and think it 'would have the effect of elevating the judiciary.

The members of the Ladies' Health Protective Association are much encouraged at their success in having Mr. Kane convicted of maintaining a nuisance at the foot of Forty-sixth street and the East river. They propose to extend their organization to take in other portions of the city. They have shown a great deal of energy and ability in prosecuting their crusade against the bad odors in this city. If the male citizens were half as active New York would be a cleaner and more desirable place to live in.

A synopsis of the business transacted by the City Court of New York has just been published in the Daily Register. There were 1,885 cases tried at the different trial terms, and only 97 appeals to the Court of Common Pleas. This speaks well for the judges of the City Court. The total amount of judgments rendered was $3,067,557.50.

NEW YORK, January 7, 1885.

reported by Arphaxed Loomis, David Graham, and David Dudley Field, in 1848, and in that year adopted by the Legislature, it is provided by section 120 that complaints in actions shall be "a statement of facts constituting the cause of action without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended."

It seems inconsistent with the idea of simplicity contemplated by the Code to employ in this discussion these learned and scholastic terms and polysyllables, which may possibly puzzle the brains of some of the members of our Legislature who ought to understand before they vote on the question. It may require a purchase of the largest and latest edition of Webster or Worcester, with some doubt as to whether they can all be solved with the use of either or both.

January 12, 1885.

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 2532. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

**

According to Wait's Code of Civil Procedure and Parson's Pocket Code, $2532 reads as follows: "Proof of service of a citation, or a subpoena, issued from a Surrogate's Court, must be made in the manner prescribed by law for proof of service of a summons issued out of the Supreme Court. In every case, proof of service must be made by affidavit; or where the person served is of full age and not incompetent, by a written admission signed by him, accompanied with proof, by affidavit or otherwise, of the genuineness of his signature."

Now, prima facie, either the two paragraphs of this section, as given above, are contradictory and inconsistent, or the first paragraph is superfluous. "Proof of service of a summons issued out of the Supreme Court is elsewhere defined and provided for, and the second paragraph of section 2532 either reiterates unnecessarily, or conflicts with the previous provision.

The mystery however is explained by consulting the section as originally passed with the statute at large, and as correctly printed in Bliss, Banks, and Throop's Codes, where it appears that the word "other" has been omitted in Wait's and Parson's editions, between words "every " and "case at the commencement of the second paragraph. The correct reading therefore is: "In every other case, proof of service must be made by affidavit," etc. J. C. LEVI.

NEW YORK, Jan, 12, 1885.

CORRESPONDENCE,

SIMPLE WORDS THE BEST.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I have received by mail (thanks for the same) two pamphlets. One by James C. Carter, entitled "A Paper on the proposed Codification of our Common Law," well written and able. The other, an answer to Mr. Carter's objections to Codification, by Robert Ludlow Fowler. On the merits I agree with Mr. Fowler, but object to the use of such words in the discussion as "denigration," "deontology," "bicameral legislature," "adytum," "logomachy," "dichotomy," and the like.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

CORD'S MARRIED WOMEN.

A Treatise on the Legal and Equitable Rights of Married Women; as well in respect to their property and persons as to their children. Second edition, revised and annotated fully down to the present. In two volumes. By William H. Cord, Counsellor at Law, Philadelphia. Kay and Brother, 1885. Pp. xi, 797, 823.

The first edition of this work was published in 1860. Since then the law of marriage has been greatly changed. It would seem that Bishop and Schouler have exhausted the topic in their celebrated and able treatises, but we are bound to say that the present work has independent merits as a commentary, and a peculiarly good classification and distribution of the subject. The author is a wise and interesting writer,