be used as evidence, it is the misfortune of his condition and not any want of humanity in the law. If a witness objects to a question on the ground that an answer would criminate himself, he must allege, in substance, that his answer, if repeated as his admission on his own trial, to prove him guilty of a criminal offense. If the case is so situated that a repetition of it on a prosecution against him is impossible, as where it is forbidden by a positive statute, I have seen no authority which holds or intimates that the witness is privileged. It is not within any reasonable construction of the language of the constitutional provision. The term 'criminal case,' used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning, and none can be conceived other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. But it must be a prosecution against him; for what is forbidden is that he should be compelled to be a witness against himself. Now if he be prosecuted criminally touching the matter about which he has testified upon the trial of another person, the statute makes it impossible that his testimony given on that occasion should be used by the prosecution on the trial. It cannot, therefore, be said that in such criminal case he has been made a witness against himself by force of any compulsion use toward him to procure in the other case testimony which can not possibly be used in the criminal case against

himself."

In Roddy v. Finnegan, (10) it is said: "The witness ordinarily has the privilege of declining to answer a question which might subject him to a criminal prosecution; but this he can waive. It is the privilege of the witness, not the party. Where he is both party and witness for himself, he must be held on his cross-examination as waiving the privilege, as to any matter about which he has given testimony in chief. Having testified to a part of the transaction in which he was concerned, he is bound to state the whole."

RULE. The answer of a witness to a criminating question is admissible against him in another case if given voluntarily (a) but not if involuntarily (b).

(A.)

1. A. is sued for a penalty for concealing his property. The examination of A. in another case where A. without objecting had testified to the concealment by him, is introduced. His answers there made are admissible (11).

2. In a prosecution against W. for forgery, his answers given in an examination in bankruptcy are offered. They are admissible against him; it ap pearing that he was cautioned by the court and allowed to elect what questions he would answer (12). In case 1 it was said: "Every one must be supposed to be cognizant of a public law. A person examined before the commissioners of bankruptcy is like any other witness called to give evidence by

(10) 43 Md. 500 (1875).

(11) Smith v. Beadnell, 1 Camp. 30 (1807). (12) R. v. Wheater, 2 Moody, 45 (1838).

virtue of a subpoena. He speaks at the peril of his examination being turned against himself. He may demur, to be sure, to all questions which would subject him to penalties. Here the defendant might have demurred, and his objection could only have been removed by the assignees to whom the action is given, delivering him a release. Thus he might have protected himself; but having unguardedly answered the questions put to him, his answers may be employed against him for all purposes to which they are legally applicable."

(B.)

1. In an action on a bill, A. a witness was asked if he had signed it. He declined to answer, but being compelled by the judge replied that he had. A. was subsequently indicted for forging the bill. against him in the criminal case (13). The answer of A. in the civil suit is not admissible

In case 1 it was held that when a witness is com

pelled by the judge to answer a criminating question when he should not, what he says must be considered as having been obtained from him by compulsion and cannot afterward be given in evidence against him.

The refusal of a party to a suit to answer a material question, on the ground that it might criminate fusal to answer, like any other refusal to produce him raises a presumption against him. "Thus reevidence in his own power, was competent evidence against him and his partner. A party offering himself as a witness in his own behalf stands differently court to testify in a case in which he has no inin this respect from a third person brought into terest (14).

No presumption arises against either party by the allowance of the privilege would be a mockery of refusal of a witness not a party, to answer. "The justice if either party is to be affected injuriously by it. The exercise of this right by the witness is not under the control of the parties and no one can be affected by evidence which his adversary fails to produce, and which therefore cannot be met or explained by cross-examination, rebutting evidence or otherwise " (15).

ST. LOUIS, MO.

WILL-PUBLIC CHARITY

QUENT

JOHN D. LAWSON.

CONDITION SUBSE

PERPETUITIES.

SUPREME COURT OF ERROR OF CONNECTICUT, OCTOBER TERM, 1884.

TAPPAN'S APPEAL.

A gift by will of a permanent fund, "which shall be used for the charitable assistance and benefit of indigent unmarried Protestant females over the age of eighteen years, residents of the city of Bridgeport," creates a public charity, and nothing more.

(13) R. v. Garbett. 2 C. & K., 474 (1847); Stockfleth v. De Tastet, 4 Camp. 10 (1814).

(14) Andrews v. Frye, 104 Mass. 234 (1870)

(15) Phelin v. Kenderdine, 20 Penn. St. 362 (1853).

P. by her will devised certain real and personal estate to an ecclesiastical society upon condition, that "within three years after my decease the said society shall erect, or cause to be erected, on the grounds of said society, near its church edifice, a chapel which shall cost not less than $30,000, and which shall be named and known as 'The Burroughs Memorial Chapel;' and on the failure or neglect so to do by said society, I give and devise the said real and personal estate to my residuary legatees and devisees, to be theirs forever."

Held, that the condition was subsequent, that the property vested in the society on the death of the testatrix, but the estate was liable to become extinguished unless the condition was complied with.

Held also, that the tying up of the property for three years was not obnoxious to the statute against perpetuities.

APPEAL from Probate Court. The opinion states

the case.

Oswald Prentiss Backus and Simon E. Baldwin, for appellant.

Morris W. Seymour and Curtis Thompson, for appellees.

PARK, C. J. The questions controverted in this case grow out of the twelfth and residuary clauses of the will of Catharine A. Pettingill, late of the city of Bridgeport, deceased. The residuary clause is as follows: "After paying and satisfying all of the above provisions of this, my last will and testament, out of my estate, all of which is charged therewith, and my executors are hereby fully empowered to sell and convey any real estate or personal estate not specifically devised for the purpose of paying any of the above legacies, if necessary so to do, which shall be determined by the judge of probate. Then all the rest and residue of my estate, real and personal, of every nature and description, and all that shall belong to my estate and be undisposed of, by reason of the lapsing or failure to take effect of any of said legacies or devises, for any cause whatsoever (for I intend hereby that no part of my estate shall become intestate estate), I give, bequeath and devise to the persons respectively who shall for the time being be the rector of the society of St. John's parish aforesaid; the pastor of the First Congregational church in said Bridgeport, and the mayor of the said city of Bridgeport, and their successors in office; and to Nathaniel Wheeler, Edward Sterling, Samuel W. Baldwin and John Hurd, all of said Bridgeport, to have and to hold the same in trust for the following purposes, and subject to the following directions, to wit:

"1. The object sought by this gift is the establishment of a permanent fund of real and personal estate, which shall be used for the charitable assistance and benefit of indigent, unmarried Protestant females over the age of eighteen years, resident of said city of Bridgeport; and it is my wish that this fund shall be held and managed by the managers or directors of the Bridgeport Prostestant Widows' Society of said Bridgeport, and their successors in office forever as they, from their knowledge and experience in a similar department of humane work, would probably be better acquainted with the class of women this fund is intended to help and benefit; and if the same can be made practicable and legal, then I authorize and em. power my said trustees, on such terms as they may fix upou, to transfer and convey the property embraced in said fund to said managers and their successors in office forever, to be held by them forever, for the charitable uses and purposes indicated above, and subject to the directions hereinafter given.

2. If for any reason the above wish and power cannot legally be carried into effect, then I direct and empower said trustees to obtain from the proper authori

ties in this State an act of incorporation for a charitable institution, to be located in said Bridgeport, under the name of 'The Burroughs Home,' the object of which shall be to help and assist indigent, unmarried Protestant females under eighteen years of age residing in said city of Bridgeport; and upon the legal organization of such incorporation I direct and empower said trustees to transfer and convey to the said 'Burroughs Home,' said fund of real and personal estate to be held by them and their successors forever for the charitable uses and purposes indicated above, and subject to the directions hereinafter given.

"3. If neither of the above provisions can legally be carried into effect, I then direct said trustees and their successors forever to hold said fund of real and personal estate, for the charitable uses and purposes indicated above, and subject to the directions hereinafter given; and if so held the same shall be known as the 'Burroughs fund,' and the said rector, pastor and mayor shall, ex officio, be members of the board of trustees, and if any vacancy occur in the other members of the board, such vacancies shall be filled by the appointment of the Court of Probate; and I direct that no bond be required of such trustees by the Court of Probate.

4. I direct that the old homestead of my father, now owned by me, on John street, shall be used for the home of such females, if it be practicable; but if it should not be best, then some other portion of my land or real estate belonging to such fund may be used to establish a home thereon; but the value thereof shall not exceed, for both land and buildings, onequarter of the value of such fund, and the remaining three-quarters or more of said fund shall be kept securely invested; but if deemed best to accomplish the humane purposes of this gift not to have land and buildings of one-quarter of the value of the fund as aforesaid invested in a home for such females, then all of said fund shall be securely invested; and I further direct that full power of sale, conveyance, exchange and reinvestment be had and exercised as circumstances may require and the execution of all necessary instruments.

"5. I direct that the income shall be applied annually, or at other times during the year, in such manner as may be thought best to accomplish the greatest good to the class I have hereby undertaken to help and benefit.

"6. I direct that the term 'unmarried' shall not exclude widows, divorced women, nor any woman who in fact has no husband, from the benefit of these provisions, providing she otherwise comes within said class.

7. It may be better to organize and establish a corporation under the general laws of this State to carry out the charitable uses and purposes of this trust; and if so, in the judgment of said board of trustees, I direct them so to do, but I am very solicitous that this gift shall not fail to be carried into effect; and I ask said trustees to act wisely in this matter."

The testatrix declares that the object sought to be accomplished by this gift is the establishment of a permanent fund, "which shall be used for the charitable assistance and benefit of indigent unmarried Protestant females over the age of eighteen years, residents of the city of Bridgeport."

It is said by the appellant that the word "benefit,” as used in the phrase "charitable assistance and benefit" in this devise and bequest, does not confine the trustees to charitable benefits in the administration of the trust, but leaves them at liberty to assist the objects of the testatrix's bounty in any manner beneficial to them, although the benefit may not be charitable, as that word has been legally construed to mean

in our statute of uses.

But we think the word char

itable qualifies the word benefit in the phrase as well as the work assistance; and the phrase means, as though it read, charitable assistance and charitable benefit. The words assistance and benefit are used in the phrase as synonymous. They are applied to an indigent class of unmarried females, and it is impossible to see how they could be assisted by a bequest without being benefited, or benefited without being assisted. It is conceded that the word "charitable" qualifies one of the words; it must therefore qualify the other, which has the same meaning. We think therefore that this devise and bequest creates a public charity, and nothing more.

The testatrix suggests four different modes for the administration and dispensation of this public charity, and declares her mind and will to be in favor of the first mode named, "if the same can be made practicable and legal" for the purpose; but "if for any reason" the first-named mode cannot be legally carried into effect, then she declares her mind and will to be in favor of the second mode suggested; and in like manner the third and fourth modes in their order.

Hence the appellant is in error when she claims that the trustees have the discretionary power to select either of the modes prescribed for the administration of the trust. They have no discretion in the matter. They must take the first, if that mode shall be found to be practicable and legal; but if not, then they must resort to the second, and that must be the mode, if legal for the purpose. And so in like manner the third and fourth modes stated.

In regard to the first made, that the managers or directors of the Bridgeport Protestant Widows' Society of Bridgeport shall hold and manage the fund, we think the object of the testatrix cannot be carried out by this mode, because, the corporation is not authorized by its charter to receive and administer charitable donations of this description as a trustee; and we must therefore consider the second mode prescribed by the testatrix. This mode for the administration of the public charity is like that provided by the testator in the case of Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352. In all essential particulars the modes are the same. There, as here, the trustees were invested with the property till an act of incorporation could be procured from the Legislature, and then the trustees were required to transfer the same to the corporation.

There, as here, it was made the duty of the trustees to apply for the act as soon as it could reasonably be done, and a reasonable time only for procuring the same was contemplated by the testator.

It was said in that case that the description of the beneficiaries was not sufficiently definite to enable a Court of Chancery to carry the donation into execution.

The same claim is made here; but it is manifest that the description of the class from which the beneficiaries are to be selected is as definite in this case as it is in that, and in other cases there referred to. The word "Protestant," ," which appears in the description in this case, is the only word entitled to consideration; but it is obvious in what sense this word was used by the testatrix. The word includes all those who believe in the Christian religion, and do not acknowledge the supremacy of the pope of Rome. We think the public charity established in the residuary clause of this will is valid.

Is the devise and bequest contained in the twelfth article of the will valid? The article is as follows:

"Article 12. I give, bequeath and devise to the society of St. John's parish, an ecclesiastical society and body corporate, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut and located near my residence in said Bridgeport, my said residence, comprising the land with the buildings thereon, bounded south on Fairfield avenue, east on land of said society of St. John's parish, north on land of said society, and west on land of Peter Norman, now or formerly; and I give also to said society ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in cash, to their own use and benefit forever; but upon this express condition: that within three years after my decease the said society shall erect or cause to be erected on the grounds of said society, near its church edifice, a chapel which shall cost not less than $30,000, and which shall be named and known as "The Burroughs Memorial Chapel;" and on the failure or neglect so to do by said society, I give and devise the said real and personal estate to my residuary legatees and devisees, to be theirs forever.

"In case there should be any good reason for extending said time beyond said three years, the judge of Probate can extend the time by his order in writing, limiting however said society to some definite time within which it shall erect said chapel."

The first question to be considered is whether the condition attached to this donation is a condition precedent to the vesting of the property in the society or a condition subsequent thereto? If it is a condition subsequent, then the property vested in the society on the death of the testatrix, but the estate was liable to become extinguished unless the condition is complied with. We think the condition is a condition subsequent. The language of the testatrix indicates this. The grant is in the present tense I give, not I will give when the society shall have erected a chapel, etc.

We think the charitable donation made in the residuary clause of this will comes within the principles established by this court in the case referred to, and the considerations of the court applied to the will in that case apply with equal force to the residuary clause in this.

Similar claims were made in that case against the legality of the donation that are made in this, and they were all fully considered by the court, and decided adversely to the claimants.

summing up all the cases on the subject, says: "If the condition is capable of being performed instanter, it is a condition precedent; if time is required for the per

time is appointed for the performance of the condition, but none for the vesting of the estate, it is a condition subsequent. Wigram on Wills, 272, says: "If the condition is at all capable of being construed as subsequent, it will be deemed to be such."

Washburn, in his work on Real Estate, vol. 1, pp. 468, 472, quotes approvingly of the rule laid down by Webster in Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. 362, which was: "If the act may as well be done after as before the vesting of the estate, the condition is subsequent." See also Hayden v. Inhab. of Stoughton, 5 Pick. 528; Tilden v. Tilden, 13 Gray, 110; Merrill v. Emery, 10 Pick. 507; Parker v. Parker, 123 Mass. 584. These authorities

clearly make the condition in this case a condition subsequent to the vesting of the property in the society. But it is said that the power given to the Court of Probate, to extend the time for the building of the chapel indefinitely, ties up the property indefinitely in the hands of the society, thereby rendering the donation obnoxious to our statute against perpetuities, for until the chapel shall be built the property is not the absolute property of the society, and they have no right to appropriate it to the charitable purpose designated in the will. But the appellant is in error in regard to the power given to the Court of Probate to extend the time for the building of the chapel. The language of the will is: "In case there shall be any good reason for extending the time beyond the three years," etc.

There must be a good reason shown before the Court of Probate can extend the time at all, and even then the court is limited to a reasonable time for the build. ing of the chapel under the circumstances then existing. The will contemplates only a short period of time-such time only as is reasonably necessary for the completion of the work. The judge of Probate has no discretion in the premises, other than what the will gives him, and if he errs on the subject, his action is reviewable by a higher court.

But it is said that the tying up of the property in the hands of the society for the period of three years renders the conveyance obnoxious to the statute, and authorities are cited from the State of New York to

that effect.

But it should be remembered that the statute of New York is very different from our own on the subject of perpetuities.

The statute there provides that "the absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever longer than during the term of two lives in being." And it has there been held that the suspension for a certain definite period, however short, violates the statute, for it may be longer than two lives in being. By our statute the suspension may be made during any number of lives in being when the will is made creating the suspension, and during such time afterward as will leave it impossible for the estate to be carried by the terms of the will to parties not in being when the will was made, and not the immediate issue of parties then in being. A will must make it possible by its terms for parents to be born after the making of the same, whose issue will take the estate, in order to render the will obnoxious to our statute, which manifestly would require a much longer period than three years. This is obvious. Our statute allows wills to be made conveying property to parties in being when the will is made, or to their immediate issue, born or unborn. Hence to make them obnoxious to the statute, they must go one step further. The will must leave it possible for the issue of unborn issue to take the estate.

The cases cited from New York therefore are not authority in regard to our statute.

We think the donation to the society is not obnoxious to our statute of perpetuities.

We advise the Superior Court that the reasons of appeal are insufficient.

MANUFACTURING CORPORATION - LIABILITY
OF TRUSTEE UNDER NEW YORK ACT.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
MARCH 2, 1885.

CHASE V. CURTIS.*

The twelfth section of the New York legislative act of 1848, chapter 40, controlling "the formation of corporations for

*S. C., 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554.

IN

manufacturing, mining, mechanical, or chemical purposes," is penal in its character, and must be construed most favorably for those sought to be charged under it, and with strictness against their alleged liability. Under such a rule of construction the language of the act is limited by its own terms to a liability, on the part of the trustees, to debts of the corporation arising ex contractu.

N error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The statute on which the action is founded is as follows (Laws N. Y. 1875, ch. 510):

"Section 1. The twelfth section of the 'Act to authorize the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical, or chemical purposes,' passed February 17, 1848, as said section was amended by chapter 657 of the Laws of 1871, is hereby further amended, so that section twelve shall read as follows:

"Section 12. Every such company shall, within twenty days from the first day of January, if a year from the time of the filing of the certificate of incorporation shall then have expired, and if so long a time shall not have expired, then within twenty days from the first day of January in each year after the expiration of a year from the time of filing such certificate, make a report, which shall be published in some newspaper published in said town, city, or village; or if there be no newspaper published in said town, city, or place where the business of the company is carried on, village, then in some newspaper published nearest the which shall state the amount of capital, and of the proportion actually paid in, and the amount of its existing debts; which report shall be signed by the president and a majority of the trustees, and shall be verified by the oath of the president or secretary of said company, and filed in the office of the clerk of the county where the business of the company shall be carried on; and if any of said companies shall fail so to do, all the trustees of the company shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the company then existing, and for all that shall be contracted before such report shall be made. But whenever under this section, a judgment shall be recovered against a trustee severally, all the trustees of the company shall contribute a ratable share of the amount paid by such trustee on such judgment, and such trustee shall have a right of action against his co-trustees, jointly or severally, to recover from them their proportion of the amount so paid on such judgment; provided that nothing in this act contained shall affect any action now pending."

H. J. Scudder and G. A. Black, for plaintiff in error.

G. P. Lowrey, for defendants in error.

MATTHEWS, J. It is the well-settled rule of decision, established by the Court of Appeals of New York in numerous cases, that this section of the statute, to enforce which the present action was brought, is penal in its character, and must be construed with strictness as against those sought to be subjected to its liabilities. Merchants' Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412; Wiles v. Suydam, 64 id. 173; Easterly v. Barber, 65 id. 252; Knox v. Baldwin, 80 id. 610; Veeder v. Baker, 83 id. 156; Pier v. George, 86 id. 613; Stokes v. Stickney, 96 id. 323. In the case last cited the action authorized by it was held to be ex delicto, and that it did not survive as against the personal representative of a trustee sought to be charged.

In Bruce v. Platt, 80 N. Y. 379, it was said: "It is that the statute in question (Laws 1848, ch. 40, § 12) is settled by repeated decisions applicable to this case, penal, and not to be extended by construction; that in an action to enforce a liability thereby created,

nothing can be presumed against the defendants, but that every fact necessary to establish their liability must be affirmatively proved; citing Garrison v. Howe, 17 N. Y. 458; Miller v. White, 50 id. 137; Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 id. 62. The rule of construction in reference to this and similar statutory provisions has been heretofore adopted and applied by this court. Steam-engine Co. v. Hubbard, 101 U. S. 188; Flash v. Conn, 109 id. 371.

In the case last mentioned this court, following the Court of Appeals of New York in the case of Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 173, showed the distinction between the liability of stockholders for the debts of the corporation, under a section of the same act, making them severally individually liable for the debts and contracts of the company to an amount equal to the amount of stock held by them respectively until the whole amount of the capital stock fixed and limited by the company has been paid in, and the liability imposed upon the trustees by the section now under discussion. It was held that the former was a liability ex contractu, enforceable beyond the jurisdiction of the State, and that the statute should be construed liberally in furtherance of the remedy; that the latter was for the enforcement of a penalty, and subject to all the rules applicable to actions upon statutes of that description. The distinction is illustrated and enforced in Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9, and Stephens v. Fox, 83 id. 313.

The precise question involved here was decided by the Court of Appeals of New York in the case of Miller v. White, 50 N. Y. 137. In that case the complaint set forth the recovery of a judgment against the company, but not the original cause of action against it, on which the judgment was founded. The defendant moved for a dismissal on this ground which was refused, and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff on the production in evidence of the judgment roll. This was held to be erroneous on the ground that the judgment was not competent as evidence of any debt due from the corporation, and that no action could be maintained thereon against the trustees under this section of the act. Judge Peckham, delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, said: "It will be perceived that this is a highly penal act, extremely rigorous in its provisions. It is absolute that the trustees shall be liable for all debts of the company, if the report be not made, no matter by whose default. If one of the trustees did all in his power to have it made, yet if the president, or a sufficient number of his co-trustees to constitute a majority, declined to sign it, or if the president and secretary declined to verify it by oath, the faithful trustee seems to be absolutely liable as well as those who refuse to do their duty." It was accordingly held "that as against these defendants, the judgment did not legally exist, as they were neither parties nor privies to it. ** It is not a judgment as to these defendants; no action could be maintained thereon against them. * * *Nor is the judgment prima facie evidence of the debt as against these defendants."

This doctrine was repeated and reaffirmed by the same court in Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62-72. In that case the court said: "The debt must be proved by evidence competent against the defendants. The facts upon which the debt is founded must be proved. The naked admissions of the corporation, or judgment against the corporation, are not evidence against the trustees. They are res inter alios acta; but when facts are proved which would establish the existence of a debt against the corporation, the liability of the trustees for the debt follows upon the proof of the other facts upon which the liability is made by statute to depend."

The case of Miller v. White, ubi supra, has never

been overruled nor questioned by the New York Court of Appeals. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly and expressly cited and approved, and either followed or distinguished from the case under decision in the following cases: Rorke v. Thomas, 56 N. Y. 559-565; Hastings v. Drew, 76 id. 9-15; Stephens v. Fox, 83 id. 313-317; Knox v. Baldwin, 80 id. 610-613; Bruce v. Platt, id. 379-381.

It is attempted however in argument to distinguish the present case from that of Miller v. White, ubi supra, upon the facts, so as to except this from the rule of that decision. In the case of Miller v. White, ubi supra, the judgment sued on was not recovered until after the alleged default on the part of the defendants, as trustees, in filing their report; whereas in the present case the default is alleged to have occurred after the recovery of the judgment sued on. But in Miller v. White, the plaintiffs did aver defaults occurring after the rendition of the judgment, although none were proved, exccpt one occurring before it was recovered; and the court said (50 N. Y. 140): "The right of action in this case arose, if ever, at the expiration of the twenty days from the first day of January, 1865. At that time the judgment had no existence. It was not recovered until June, 1866." But this language plainly shows that the very point of the decision was that no right of action could arise upon the judgment itself, but upon the debt alone, on which the judgment was founded; and as to this it is, as we have already seen from other parts of the opinion, expressly declared that the judgment was, as against the trus tees, evidence neither conclusive nor prima facie of the existence of a debt due from the corporation, for the payment of which they could be charged.

Upon this point, it is further said in argument that it is reduced to a question of evidence, and that the rules of evidence enforced in the courts of a State do not necessarily govern courts of the United States, although sitting in the same State. However this may be in other cases, or where the laws of the United States prescribe rules of evidence for their own tribunals, it is not true that the courts of the United States, in a special statutory proceeding, would give to a judgment of a State court any other or greater effect, either as matter of evidence or as ground of action, than must be lawfully given to it in the courts of the State, whose laws are invoked to enforce it.

It is however further urged upon us in argument that in cases like the present, which is shown by the record and admitted to be founded on an action on the case for a tort, the judgment against the corporation must be evidence of the debt ex necessitate. On this head the language of counsel in their printed argument is as follows:

"The action was for trespass on the case for a tort (entering upon and taking oils from the lands of the plaintiff), which was unliquidated except by the verdict, which possibly contained an allowance in the nature of punitive damages. It was impossible of exact computation, containing allowances for costs provable in no other way. It would be absurd, unreasonable, and productive of uncertainty and confusion, to require the submission to another jury of the facts which led to this verdict, for if they found a less amount it is palpable that a part only of the debt of the company would be recovered against these defendants, who are liable for all the debts of the company. If they gave a larger verdict, these defendants would be the first to complain. Under the statute they are severally as well as jointly liable. Each one could be sued apart from the others, and if one trustee is sued alone, all the trustees shall contribute a ratable share of the amount paid on such judgment. If in each suit against each trustee the whole evidence of the original claim had to be gone into and separate verdicts rendered,