such a proceeding is ancillary to the action of the court and simply advisory. If the verdict was not set aside the court was authorized to give it such weight as it determined it was entitled to. It could treat it as entirely conclusive, and dispense with other evidence upon the issues presented, or it could allow other evidence to be given, or entirely disregard the verdict, and find the fact according to its own judgment. Dan. Ch. Pr. 1146; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. Jr. 494, 499; Hampson v. Hampson, 3 Ves. & Bea. 41; Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 680; Watt v. Starke, 101 U. S. 247; Colie v. Tifft, 47 N. Y. 119; Birdsall v. Patterson, 51 id. 43; Vermilyea v. Palmer, 52 id. 471, 474. (2) The evidence, in reference to the agreement, was conflicting, and the testimony of both the plaintiff and defendant, who were the principal witnesses in regard to the terms of the alleged agreement, was in conflict, and there was no such preponderance in the evidence as would authorize a holding, as a matter of law, that a valid agreement was established by which the defendant was bound to reuder an account to the plaint iff for profits made, or for one-half of the stock purchased by him by reason of such agreement. It is well settled, that under such circumstances, upon an appeal to this court, the facts are not reviewable. Code Civ. Pro., § 1337; Matter of Ross, 87 N. Y. 514. See also Vermilyea v. Palmer, 52 id. 471. Within this rule, under ordinary circumstances, the facts cannot be reviewed upon appeal to this court. (3) An omission of one of the parties to a transaction to answer a letter written to him, after the transaction by the other party thereto, giving the latter's version thereof, may not be taken as an admission of the truth of the statements in the letter; they are mere declarations of the writer in his own behalf, which do not demand an answer, and are not admissible as evidence against the person to whom the letter was sent. The letter in question contained a statement of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant, and it is insisted that it was admissible as a part of the res gesta. If the letter is admissible and competent it must be on the ground that it was a statement made by the plaintiff, which called for a response from the defendaut, and none having been given, the silence of the defendant and his failure to make any reply to the same was an admission of the accuracy of the statement made in the letter. The letter itself cannot be regarded as coming within the rule that where a statement is made at the time credit is given, as in an action for falsely representing the solvency of a stranger, proof may be given that the plaintiff trusted him in consequence of the misrepresentation or evidence of declarations in kindred cases accompanying the acts done, which constitute a part of the res gesta. Taylor Ev., § 585; Beaver v. Taylor, 1 Wall. 637; Milne v. Leisler, 7 H. & N. 786, 796. The question here discussed has been the subject of consideration in a recent decision of this court. Talcott v. Harris, 93 N. Y. 567, 571. It was there said: "While a party may be called upon in many cases to speak where a charge is made against him, and in failing to do so may be considered as acquiescing in its correctness, his omission to answer a written allegation, whether by affidavit or otherwise, cannot be regarded as an admission of the correctness thereof, and that it is true in all respects. Reasons may exist why he may choose and has a right to remain silent and to vindicate himself at some future period, and on some more opportune occasion." We are unable to see why the case cited is not directly in point. The affidavits constituted a statement by the plaintiff, which was not contradicted, no motion having been made to vacate the order of arrest, upon the ground that the facts were not true, and no exception having been made to the same. The facts are very similar in reference to the letter of the plaintiff

in the case at bar, and if silence could be regarded as an admission of the correctness of the statement made, the same rule is applicable to each case, and the decision last cited is controlling. Numerous other cases tend in the same direction. Waring v. U. S. Tel. Co., 4 Daly, 233; Anthoine v. Coit, 2 Hall, 40; Robinson v. Fitchburg R. Co., 7 Gray, 92; Hill v. Pratt, 29 Vt. 119; People v. Lockwood, 3 Hun, 304; Fairlie v. Deuton, 3 Carr. & P. 103; Draper v. Crofts, 15 Mees. & Welsb. 166; MeGuire v. Corwine, 3 MacArth. 81. It may well be that under most circumstances what is said to a man to his face, which conveys the idea of an obligation upon his part to the person addressing him, or on whose behalf the statement is made, he is at least in some measure called upon to contradict or to explain; but a failure to answer a letter is entirely different, and there is no rule of law which requires a person to enter into a correspondence with another in reference to a matter in dispute between them, or that silence should be regarded as an admission against the party to whom the letter is addressed. Such a rule would enable one party to obtain an advantage over another, and has no sanction in the law. Keen v. Priest, 1 Fos. & Fin. 314; Roe v. Day, 7 Carr. & Payne, 705; Gaskill v. Skene, 14 Q. B. 664; Fenno v. Weston, 31 Vt. 345; Allen v. Peters, 4 Phila. 84, distinguished. Ridley v. Gyde, 9 Bing. 349; Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1 Metc. 242; relate to the question of intent, and have no application to the case at bar. Learned v. Tillotson. Opinion by Miller, J.

[Decided Oct. 7, 1884.]

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT ABSTRACT.*

PATENT INJUNCTION-NOT GRANTED TO UNITED STATES-ACTION TO REPEAL-ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT. This suit is brought by direction of the attorney general, to repeal letters-patent granting exclusive rights to inventions, and has now been heard on a motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain commencement or prosecution of suits for infringement. The patent has expired, and no injunction is asked against assignment of the patent. The right to maintain such a suit is placed upon the same ground as that to repeal a patent for land. United States v. Gunning, 18 Fed. Rep. 511. In a suit to vacate a patent for land it would hardly be claimed that the patentee should be restrained from preventing, or prosecuting suits for trespasses to the land during the pendency of the suit. Such acts would work no injury to the title or property of the United States in question in the suit. The United States deals with the lands as a proprietor, and brings such suits to be restored to its proprietary rights. United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378: United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525. Protection of the property would not impair those rights. In. fringement of a patent is a trespass upon the exclusive rights granted. The United States, as an owner or proprietor, has no interest in promoting such trespasses; and their prevention, or the prosecution of suits for their commission, cannot be an injury to the United States as a proprietor. If the patent is repealed the suits may fall, or may not; but whether they do or not is a matter entirely between the parties to the suits, and not at all between the United States and either of the parties. No reason for grauting the motion appears, and it must therefore be denied. Cir. Ct., S. D. New York, Aug. 9, 1884. United States v. Colgate. Opinion by Wheeler, J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGE -CHANGE OF GRADE-INCORPORATION BEFORE ADOP

*Appearing in 21 Federal Reporter.

TION OF CONSTITUTION.—(1) The damage to property, by the Constitution of Missouri, is placed upon the same basis as the value of the property taken, and neither can be done without compensation first made. This constitutional guaranty needs no legislative support, and is beyond legislative control. Johnson v. Parkersburg, 16 W. Va. 402-422; S. C., 37 Am. Rep. 779; Blanchard v. City of Kansas, 16 Fed. Rep. 444; Chambers v. Cincinnati R. Co., 69 Ga. 320; Thompson v. Grand Gulf R., 3 How. (Miss.) 240; Oakley v. Williamsburgh, 6 Paige, 262; Gottschalk v. C., B. & Q. R., 14 Neb. 550; Mollandin v. U. P. R., 14 Fed. Rep. 394. (2) When property is damaged by establishing the grade of a street, or by lowering or raising the grade of a street previously established, it is damaged for public use, within the meaning of the Constitution. Blanchard v. City of Kansas, 16 Fed. Rep. 444; Werth v. City of Springfield, 78 Mo. 107. (3) That a city was incorporated under a special charter before the adoption of the Constitution of 1875, and its charter continued in force, will not render the constitutional provision in respect to damages to property inoperative within the territorial limits of such city. Ct., W. D. Mo., Aug., 1884. McElroy v. Kansas City. Opinion by Brewer, J.

Cir.

TRUST-RESULTING-EXECUTOR PURCHASING TRUST PROPERTY-FRAUD.-An executor who negotiates a mortgage upon part of his decedent's estate, to provide funds for a child and devisee of such decedent, cannot afterward purchase the mortgage land under foreclosure proceedings and hold it for himself. The quality of his estate therein will be a resulting trust for the benefit of the child for whom the mortgage was made. In Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 552, it was held that a purchase by an executor of the property of the testator is fraudulent and void, though the sale was at public auction, judicially ordered, and a fair price was paid; that a purchase by a trustee of a particular property of which he has the sale, or in which he represents another, or which he holds in a fiduciary way for another, carries fraud on the face of it; and Justice Swayne quotes with an emphatic approval the following rule in equity from Sir Edward Sugden's chapter on "Purchases by Trustees, Agents," etc.? "It may be laid down as a general proposition that trustees, * * * agents, commissioners of bankrupts, assignees of bankrupts, solicitors to the commission, auctioneers, creditors who have been consulted as to the mode of sale, or any persons who, by their connection with any other person, or by being employed or concerned in his affairs, have acquired a knowledge of his property, are incapable of purchasing such property them. selves. ** ** For if such persons having a confidential character were permitted to avail themselves of any knowledge acquired in that capacity, they might be induced to conceal their information, and not to exercise it for the persons relying on their integrity. The characters are inconsistent." See also Church v. Marine Ins. Co., 1 Mas. 341; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252. Cir. Ct., W. D. La., March, 1884. Allan v. Gillett. Opinion by Boarmau, J. TRADEMARK CORPORATION HAS RIGHT ΤΟ ANOTHER CORPORATION CANNOT TAKE.-A corporation may acquire a property right to the use of a name other than its original corporate name as a trademark, or as incidental to the good will of a business, as well as an individual; and if it has acquired such a right, it cannot be deprived thereof by the assumption of such name subsequently by another corporation, whether the latter selects its name by the act of corporators who organize under the general laws of the State, or the name is selected for it in a special act by a legislative body. The name of a corporation has been said to be the "knot of its combination," with

out which it cannot perform its corporate functions. Smith Merc. Law, 133. It has neither the right nor the power to change the corporate name originally selected without recourse to such formal proceedings for the purpose as may be authorized by the laws under which it has been incorporated, or by the consent of the authority from which its charter is derived. Nevertheless it may become known by another name by usage; and the courts have frequently treated acts done and contracts entered into by corporations under another name, as though done or entered into by it with the true name. Minot v. Curtis, 7 Mass. 441; South School-dist. v. Blakeslee, 13 Coun. 227; Eastham v. Blackburu R. Co., 23 L. J. Exch. (N. S.) 199; Boisgerard v. N. Y. Banking Co., 2 Sandf. Ch. 23. Cir. Ct., S. D. New York, Aug. 15, 1884. Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Goodyear's Rubber Manfg. Co. Opinion by Wallace, J.

EMINENT DOMAIN-TRACK IN PUBLIC STREET--ABUTTING LOT OWNER-DAMAGES - ESTOPPEL.- Where a railroad company has, by consent of the municipal authorities, laid its track upon a public street, and such occupancy permanently obstructs the use of the street, not only by the public, but also by the occupiers of abutting lots, in an action by the owners of such abutting lots against the railroad company for damages, held, that they were entitled to recover full compensation for the depreciation in the value of their property caused thereby. In estimating the damages the same standard was to be applied as in direct proceedings by the railroad company to condemu for its use the private right of such owners in the street. A recovery in this action will estop the owners from claiming that such occupancy was without their consent, and that full compensation had not been made for it. Hatch v. C. & I. R. Co., 18 Ohio St. 92, and was recognized in Railroad Co. v. Cobb, 35 id. 94; Railroad Co. V. Williams, id. 168; Railroad Co. v. Mowatt, id. 284; Railroad Co. v. Lawrence, 38 id. 41; and the right in such a case to recover for permanent injury to the adjacent property was distinctly decided in L. M. R. Co. v. Hambleton, to appear in 40 Ohio St. A. & G. W. R. Co. v. Robbins, 35 id. 531, distinguished. Cir. Ct., S. D. Ohio, July, 1884. Grafton v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. Opinion by Matthews, J.

JURISDICTION-FOREIGN CORPORATION -DESIGNATION OF AGENT ON WHOM PROCESS MAY BE SERVED.

The act of Congress prescribing the place where a person may be sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a defendant which he may waive; and when a foreign corporation, in pursuance of the laws of a State in which it carries on business, designates a person upon whom process may be served, it thereby consents to be sued in the district embracing such State, and waives the exemption granted to it under the act of Congress. In Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 377, 378, the Supreme Court says upon this subject: "A corporation cannot change its residence or its citizenship. It can have its legal home only at the place where it is located, by or under the authority of its charter: but it may, by its agents, transact business anywhere, unless prohibited by its charter, or excluded by local laws. Under such circumstances it seems clear that it may, for the purpose of securing business, consent to be 'found' away from home, for the purposes of a suit, as to matters growing out of its transactions. The act of Congress prescribing the place where a person may be sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one which he may waive. If the citizenship of the parties is sufficient, a defendant

special injunction, and stay the defendant's hand until the right has been tried at law." Even in cases confessedly within the jurisdiction, as partition, equity will not interfere if the complainant's title be denied until he has vindicated it at law; the court may retain the bill however until that has been done. 2 Aik. 280; Coxe v. Smith, 4 Johns. Ch. 271; North Penn. Coal Co. v. Snowden, supra. Washburn's Appeal. Opinion by Clark, J. [Decided April 7, 1884.]

LIMITATION-ADVERSE POSSESSION-TAX DEED BY GOVERNMENT.-In 1858 and 1862, lands, the title to which was still in the United States, were taxed to unknown owners, sold, and tax deeds issued therefor to A., who went into possession of a part of the tract, and subsequently quitclaimed the land to B., who has continued in possession, cultivating a part of the land, and resting his claim to the whole upon his tax deed. In 1871 the United States certified this tract and others to the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company, who more than ten years after it had acquired title brought an action against B. to quiet title. Held, that B.'s possession was adverse as to the whole tract, and that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant and his grantor claim title under the tax deeds. They were invalid, void, on the ground that the officers of the county had no authority to convey the land, for the reason that it was not taxable. But their invalidity for this reason does not prevent them being regarded as the foundation for a pretense, show, appearance, color of title. Whatever may be the source of the invalidity of a deed, if it purports to convey land, and "in form possess what purported to be the title, it gives color of title." Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 461; Rigor v. Frye, 62 Ill. 507; Hinkley v. Greene, 52 id. 223; Molton v. Henderson, 62 Ala. 426; Edgerton v. Bird, 6 Wis. 527. This court has held that a tax deed void upon its face constitutes color of title, upon which the statute of limitations may be invoked. Colvin v. McCune, 39 Iowa, 502. It is insisted that as the statute does not run against the government it cannot run against plaintiff. It may be observed that there is no provision of law declaring that a citizen cannot hold adversely to the government, or hold a color of title against it. It is true that a citizen cannot invoke the statute of limitations against the government. But this does not authorize us to presume against facts that defendant did not hold the land adversely and under claim or color of title before the government certified the land to plaintiff. The truth is he did so hold, but as against the government it would not avail as a defense. But there is no law which forbids a citizen to hold land in that way against the grantees of the government. When the certification of the land was made the statute began to run. The fact that defendant's prior possession could not have aided him to plead the statute against the government is no reason why he cannot plead his possession held after plaintiff acquired title. If defendant's possession began after plaintiff acquired title, it cannot be doubted he could do so. As against plaintiffs, defendant's possession did begin afterward. As the statute has seen its full time since that event, the action is barred. See upon this point La Frombois v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 589. The evidence clearly shows that defendant in good faith entered upon the land and held it under claim of right, and as we have seen, color of title. His possession was hostile and adverse to plaintiff's title. He cultivated a part of the land as his own, in good faith, resting his claim to the whole upon the tax deeds. The law will presume him to be

in possession of all the land within the boundaries, as prescribed by his title. The rule would not apply did the plaintiff have possession of the part defendant did not cultivate; in that case the presumption would not exist as to the land held by plaintiff. But no such state of facts is in the case; plaintiff at no time held possession of any part of the land. Upon this point see Langworthy v. Myers, 4 Iowa, 18; Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333; Teabout v. Daniels, 38 Iowa, 158; Anderson v. Darby, 1 Nott & McC. 369; Eifert v. Read, id. 374; Bailey v. Carleton, 12 N. H. 9; Little v. Megquier,2 Me. 176: Cluggage v. Duncan, 1 Serg. & R. 111; Lynde v. Williams, 68 Mo. 360; Norfleet v. Hutchins,id. 597; Scott v. Delany, 87 Ill.,146; Coleman v. Billings, 89 id. 183; Tritt v. Roberts, 64 Ga. 156; Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio St. 395. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Allfree. Opinion by Beck, J. [Decided Oct. 9, 1884.]

senger on a train that reached his destination about midnight failed to get off because he was asleep, and after the train had started a brakeman asked him if he did not intend to get off at that station, and that if he did he "had better be getting off quick," upon which he went out on the platform of the car, and stepped down on the second or third step to look out for the depot, as he claimed, when the train gave a sudden jerk, and he was thrown to the ground and injured. Held, that he was guilty of contributory negligence, and not entitled to recover damages. It seems to us that when the jury found that the plaintiff was in a dangerous position when on the steps, it must logically follow that he cannot recover, and the jury should have so found. This is a stronger case against the plaintiff, in our judgment, than Bon v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co., 56 Iowa, 669; S. C., 41 Am. Rep. 127. There are cases where a passenger is justi fied in taking risks, where by the negligence of the company he is in danger of being carried beyond his destination, and we are not prepared to say a passenger would not be justified in making the attempt to step from the train if it was moving slowly; that is, it would be a question for the jury. Lindsey v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. Opinion by Seever, J. [See 71 N. Y. 489; 19 Eng. Rep. 231; 8 Am. Rep. 508; Secor v. Toledo, .-ED.] etc., R. Co., 10 Fed. Rep.

[Decided Oct. 7, 1884.]

PARTNERSHIP - ASSIGNMENT TO ONE PARTNERCONSIDERATION-RELEASE.-Where the property of a partnership is transferred to one of the partners for his benefit for a valuable consideration, he may hold it free from partnership debts. City of Maquoketa v. Willey, 35 Iowa, S23. See also as bearing upon 1 point Scudder v. Delashmut, 7 id. 39; Hawkeye Woc Mills v. Conklin, 26 id. 422. An agreement betw the members of a partnership and one of their num that if he will remain in the firm they will pay his vate indebtedness, shows a valuable consideration; the payment to a bank of this indebtedness held fraudulent as to creditors. Where a debt is paid securities are released. George v. Wamsley. Opi by Beck, J. [See 15 Neb. 476.] [Decided June 12, 1884.]

ANIMAL INJURY FROM BITE OF DOG-" OWNER In an action to recover damages for personal inj caused by being bitten by a dog, it is not error to struct the jury that if the defendant had the do his possession, and was harboring him on his prem as owners usually do with their dogs, then be was owner within the meaning of the statute; but if dog was casually on his premises, and not being bored by defendant as owners usually harbor t

dogs, then he was not the owner; and that in determining how this was at the time of the alleged attack, they would consider defendant's former treatment of of the dog, his declarations concerning him, and the habit of the dog as to staying at defendant's place. O'Hara v. Miller. Opinion by Beck, J. [See 1 Denio, 495; 15 Gray, 193.]

[Decided Oct. 9, 1884.]

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

MORTGAGE - POWER OF SALE ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.-A solicitor took a mortgage from his client containing a power of sale without the usual proviso that the power of sale should not be exercised unless there was default in payment of the principal after six months' notice, or some interest should be in arrear for three months. This omission was not brought to the mortgagor's notice. The mortgagee (without notice) sold part of the property at a time when interest was in fact three mouths in arrear, and other part when some interest was in arrear less than three months. The mortgagor brought an action against the mortgagee, claiming damages for wrongful sales. Held, that both the sales were wrongful as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, but the first sale not being at an undervalue, the court gave the mortgagor no damages in respect of it. The second sale, though not improperly conducted, was shown to have been in fact at an undervalue, and the court gave damages in respect of it. Ch. Div., July 8, 1884. Cradock v. Rogers. Opinion by North, J. [51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 191.]

-

TRUSTEE REMOVAL MISCONDUCT. It is the duty of a court of equity to see that trusts are properly executed, and therefore, even though no charge of misconduct is made out against a trustee, the court will remove him if satisfied that his continuance in office would be detrimental to the proper execution of the trusts. Friction or hostility between the trustee and the immediate possessor of the trust estate is not of itself a reason for the removal of the trustee, but it will not be disregarded by the court when grounded on the mode in which the trust has been administered. Judgment of the court below affirmed with a variation. Jud. Com. Priv. Com., March 22, 1884. Letterstedt v. Broers. Opinion per Curiam. [51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 169.]

FINANCIAL LAW.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-PROTEST — WAIVED BY PAROL-Protest of a note may be waived either by a ting or by parol. A waiver of "protest" of a note in indorser before maturity releases the holder n the necessity of making demand and of sending ce of non-payment. Huckenstein v. Herman, 34 Int. 232; Scott v. Greer, 10 Penn. St. 103; BritV. Doylestown Bank, 5 W. & S. 87. Sup. Ct. ., May 19, 1884. Annville National Bank v. Ketng. Opinion by Sterrett, J. (15 W. Notes, 65.)

EGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-INDORSEMENT.-A. exted a promissory note in the following form: prrauce, February 23, 1880. Six months after date, omise to pay to the order of myself $192 at First jonal Bank at Hazleton, Penn., value received with Renatus Heller; " and indorsed, "I hereby certhat I own and am worth in personal and real esin the county of Luzerne, State of Penn., $4,000, and above all indebtedness, and that the within igation is given for goods bought by me of the Ben City Fertilizing Company, and the same is in settlement of all claims and demands of every

name and nature between said company and myself up to date of this obligation. Renatus Heller. Queen City Fertilizing Company, H. Moran." B. took said note before maturity for value without notice of any defense. Upon a suit on the same by B. against A., held, that the court could not say as matter of law that the note was not properly indorsed, and was not negotiable. It was held in Ege v. Kyle, 2 Watts, 222, that an indorsement on a negotiable note of a receipt on account of a quantity of iron, "the net proceeds of which are to be credited on the within," and which were afterward credited on it by indorsement, did not destroy its negotiable character. The usual form of indorsement is by writing the name of the indorser across the back of the note. Where the note is pay. able to order, any order in writing is sufficient, which shows an intent to pass the title. Thus "I give this note to A. George Chaworth" was held to be a sufficient indorsement. Chaworth v. Beech, 4 Ves. 555. And where the indorsement is in the form of a guaranty, it has been held sufficient. Partridge v. Davis, 20 Vt. 499; Upham v. Prince, 12 Mass. 14: Myrick v. Hasey, 27 Me. 9; Childs v. Davidson, 38 Ill. 438; Watson v. McLaren, 19 Wend. 557. Sup. Ct. Penn., April, 1883. Dunning v. Heller. Opinion by Paxson, J.

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS-EVIDENCE ACCOUNT GIVEN BY THE PRISONER-EVIDENCE TO NEGATIVE.—

On an indictment for receiving goods, knowing them to have been stolen, the prisoner's account being that he had purchased them of a tradesman in the same town, other circumstances in the case tending to negative it, though the tradesman was not called for the prosecution, held, that it was not necessary to call him on the part of the prosecution, there being other circumstances in the case from which the jury might fairly infer the falsehood of the prisoner's story. Crown Cas. Res., June 28, 1884. Reg. v. Ritson. Opinions by Grove, Hawkins, Stephen, Watkin Williams, and Mathew, JJ. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 727.)

FALSE PRETENSES-OBTAINING GOODS BY-PROOF THAT THE GOODS WERE DELIVERED ON THE FAITH OF.

-On an indictment for obtaining goods by false pretenses, the false pretense charged and proved being that the prisoner was daughter of a lady of the same name, residing at a certain place, there being no evidence that the goods were not delivered to the prisoner before her name and address were asked for, held, that there was no sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment, it being essential on a prosecution for obtaining goods by false pretenses to prove that the goods were delivered on the faith of the false pretense charged. Crown Cas. Res., June 28, 1884. Reg. v. Catherine Jones. Opinions by Grove, Hawkins, Stephen, Watkin Williams, and Mathew, JJ. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 726.)

INDECENT EXPOSURE-PUBLIC PLACE.-The crime of indecent exposure is committed if a person intentionally make such exposure in the view from the windows of two neighboring dwelling-houses. It is not necessary that any person should actually see such exposure if it was made in a public place with the intent that it should be seen, and persons were there who could have seen if they had looked. If it were the law