weighed and considered. We cannot read the great passages in our famous orations without perceiving that minute and careful attention has been given not only to the formation of the sentences, but to every word in the composition. Take, for example, the opening of the great speech of Abraham Lincoln, delivered at Springfield, Illinois, June 7, 1858. Should we attempt to replace any word in this part of the effort with another, it would be found a difficult undertaking. A similar remark might be made of all other truly great speeches. The same might not be said, perhaps, of the entire effort, but it will assuredly be found to be true of the great passages, as in the example just referred to. There are many points in a public address about which there would be but little controversy, but those great truths which the speaker wishes to have believed rather than others, the expressions which contain the pith and substance of what he intends to promulgate as his own peculiar views, must be incased in language which will exactly and precisely fit the thought, as the glove does the hand. For example, the phrases, "irrepressible conflict," "this nation cannot endure half slave and half free," "millions for defense but not one cent for tribute," "liberty and union, now and forever, one and inseparable;" these must have been the result of close attention paid to the force of expression and not mere hap-hazard ebullitions due to the spur of the moment.

Words should be employed by the orator which

are not only readily understood by the audience, but by those who, at any time, may have occasion to read the speech. An ill-chosen word may sometimes so mystify a reader or hearer that he will lose interest in the rest of the effort. There are a sufficient number of words within the comprehension of every intelligent audience, by the judicious use of which the speaker can make himself well understood. His aim should be to bring his meaning within the reach of as many as possible of his hearers. Thus where a term may be well understood by a certain portion of the assemblage but perhaps not clearly comprehended by others, he would do well to use one familiar to all. For example, is not the word "understand" more familiar than "comprehend," "coal oil" than petroleum," "opposite" than "antipodal," and so on. Yet it should not be supposed that sense should be sacrificed in order to enlighten a dull understanding; no more, in fact, than we should endanger the solidity and comfort of a public building to satisfy a vulgar taste in matters of architecture. Both should meet, if possible, but if not, then let the laws of language prevail.

The importance of mere word knowledge is nowhere made more manifest than in questions arising under our form of government. No sooner was the Federal Constitution adopted, nay, even before its adoption, the question arose as to the relative rights of the States and the government. Where did the

former end and the latter begin? In other words, was the Federal Union a simple compact, contract, bargain, or agreement to which the consent of the contracting parties was necessary and from which one could recede at any moment it considered the contract violated? or did the Constitution represent a government, stable and irrevocable, which recognized no right of separation in the States, unless that of revolution? It will readily be seen that these considerations open a wide field for discussion. The question immedia ely arises in such controversies, What is a compact? what is a government? and so on. This brings us to the consideration of the nature of these terms. Now, precisely these questions were discussed by our ablest statesmen, and they were argued largely from a purely grammatical and etymological standpoint. This is well shown in the celebrated speech of John C. Calhoun on the nature of the Federal Government, delivered in the Senate of the United States, February 26, 1833, in reply to Daniel Webster. Portions of it are as follows:

"The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) in his argument against the resolutions, directed his attack almost exclusively against the first, on the ground, I suppose, that it was the basis of the other two, and that unless the first could be demolished, the others would follow, of course. In this he was right. As plain and as simple as the facts contained in the first are, they cannot be admitted to be true without admit

ting the doctrines for which I and the state I represent contend. He commenced his attack with a verbal criticism on the resolution, in the course of which he objected strongly to two words, 'constitutional' and 'accede,' to the former, on the ground that the word as used ('constitutional compact') was obscure-that it conveyed no definite meaning-and that 'constitution' was a noun substantive and not an adjective. I regret that I have exposed myself to the criticism of the Senator. I certainly did not intend to use any expression of doubtful sense, and if I have done so, the Senator must attribute it to the poverty of my language, and not to design. I trust, however, that the Senator will excuse me when he comes to hear my apology. In matters of criticism, authority is of the highest importance, and I have an authority of so high a character in this case for using the expression which he considers so obscure and so unconstitutional, as will justify me even in his eyes. It is no less than the authority of the Senator himself, given on a solemn occasion (the discussion of Mr. Foote's resolution), and doubtless with great deliberation, after having weighed the force of the expression. [Here Mr. Calhoun read from Mr. Webster's speech in the debate on the Foote Resolutions, in 1830, as follows.]

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"Nevertheless, I do not complain, nor would I countenance any movement to alter this arrangement of representation. It is the original bargain-the compactlet it stand let the advantage of it be fully enjoyed. The Union itself is too full of benefits to be hazarded in propositions for changing its original basis. I go for the Constitution as it is, and for the Union as it is. But I am resolved not to submit in silence to accusa

tions, either against myself individually, or against the North, wholly unfounded and unjust-accusations which impute to us a disposition to evade the constitutional compact, and to extend the power of the Government over the internal laws and domestic condition of the states.'

"It will be seen by this extract," proceeded Mr. Calhoun, "that the Senator not only used the phrase 'constitutional compact,' which he now so much condemns, but, what is still more important, he calls the Constitution a compact-a bargain-which contains important admissions having a direct and powerful bearing on the main issue involved in the discussion, as will appear in the sequel. But strong as his objection is to the word 'constitutional,' it isstill stronger to the word 'accede,' which he thinks has been introduced into the resolution with some deep design, as, I suppose, to entrap the Senate into an admission of the doctrine of State Rights. Here, again, I must shelter myself under authority. But I suspect the Senator, by a sort of instinct (for our instincts often strangely run before our knowledge), had a prescience, which would account for his aversion for the word, that this authority was no less than Thomas Jefferson himself, the great apostle of the doctrine of State Rights. The word was borrowed from him. It was taken from the Kentucky Resolution, as well as the substance of the resolution itself. But I trust I may neutralize whatever aversion the authorship of this word may have excited in the mind of the Senator by the introduction of another authority-that of Washington himself—who, in his speech to Congress, speaking of the admission of North Carolina into the Union, uses this