enemy drew off and then disappeared; from which circumstance, and that of the successful repulse of every attack, the sanguinary and long-contested battle of Talavera may fairly be said to have been won by the British. Still, they had to deplore a fearful loss, not less than 6000, including those who fell on the previous days. That of the French, however, was computed at not less than 10,000, though French historians of the war say much under that amount: they left seventeen guns; and were defeated in the object of expelling the English from Spain, much more of crushing them, as commanded by their imperial master, who, in fact, conducted the French campaign in Spain, by his astonishing knowledge of all that ought to be done, even while engaged on the plains of Germany.

In every point of view the battle of Talavera was most important, as regarded the success of the cause both in Spain and Portugal. By drawing on the British the whole brunt of the war, it saved the Spanish army on the frontiers, and gave time for the patriot troops, in all directions, to rally and increase their strength, while, by the splendid example of skill and valour it held forth, in repelling twice the numbers of the veteran soldiers of France, it spread confidence and respect for discipline amongst the Spanish forces, which had full leisure to observe and admire it. Nor was this all: by so severe a blow, it paralyzed, for a time, the exertions of the French; and, while it prolonged the contest, saved Portugal from the calamities of a second devastating invasion.

On the other hand, there are many circumstances connected with this battle, which show that it was compulsory, sustained at a fearful sacrifice, and would never have been fought, could Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose gallantry was always directed by prudence, by possibility have avoided it. The vast superiority in numbers on the side of the French, proves that it would have been an act of wilful folly, such as a general, like Wellington, was the least capable of committing, to say nothing of the unfavourable circumstances under which it was fought. The tremendous slaughter, and the scenes of horror by which,

throughout, and afterwards, it was attended, evince the unexampled efforts made by the British-efforts which, directed by all the genius and resources of their admirable leader, barely enabled them to retain possession of their ground. It was fought from necessity; and the struggle was one, not for victory, but for existence for no British army can exist under defeat. Every previous and subsequent fact, relating to the expedition against Victor, the opinion of Soult, and the words of the British hero himself, demonstrate the correctness of this view, so opposite to that taken by most writers; and that, with reference to itself, the march into Spain, and the projected attack,-still more the surprise and discomfiture of Victor-was a lamentable failure. Sir Arthur was disappointed in all his calculations;-of his coming up with Victor—of the co-operation of the Spanish army, which, when in the field with him, he dared not trust,-and of following the French along the Tagus, and threatening Madrid. But he did all that a great general could do to bring his army out of difficulties, in which the faults of others, and events he could in no way control, had placed them. When he found the impracticable character of Cuesta, the rapid concentration of the French troops, the extreme privations to which his army was subjected, he determined to retreat; but the egregious error committed by Cuesta, in pursuing the French, who retired behind the Alberche, delayed the departure of the British, and brought on a general battle, under such fearful odds, to rescue the Spaniards from destruction. Like the ass in the lion's skin, the obstinate old chief, when Sir Arthur was at hand, supposed that the French were retreating before him, and followed, as he believed, to destroy them. When committed, beyond redemption, by his own presumption, and when destruction or surrender stared him in the face, and not till then, he became more reasonable, and on being saved, took up the position assigned him. Sir Arthur himself assures us that the French had accurate knowledge of all his movements; and that Soult declared that, although the English were covered with glory, if they had remained two

days longer, they must all have been prisoners: and he adds, with his accustomed frank and manly spirit-" And I am afraid we must, or all have been destroyed."* This is conclusive, without requiring the confirmation of his subsequent retreat.

* Despatches, Badajos, 13th September, 1809.

CHAPTER VIII.

(1809 to 1814.)

Particulars of the battle-Singular facts-Rare ability and decision of Sir A. Wellesley-Talents for business-Promptness and despatch-Sir R. Wilson and the Portuguese-Loss of an important pass-Policy of the British general-Concentration of the French forces-Admirable measures of the English general-Excellent views of Spanish affairs-Good advice-Sufferings of the army-Spirited remonstrances-Continued retreat-Analogous circumstances-Views of government-Opposition at home-Strictures on the Spanish system-New operations-Indefatigable effortsWonderful activity-Positions of the army-State of the Spanish armies -Sir A. Wellesley's attempts to save them-Appeals to the generals and to the juntas-Destruction of successive armies.

THE battle of Talavera de la Reyna was justly characterized by the conqueror as a most desperate one;" that it was won with fearful odds, almost two to one against the British, is a singular and memorable fact; and one, except for the reasons already given, more honourable to the gallantry than to the judgment of their distinguished leader. The advance of the guards in repelling an attack, to the extent to which it was carried had nearly proved fatal, and the battle was certainly saved only by the steady conduct of the 48th regiment, upon which General Sherbrooke's division formed again. The ground in front of the Spanish troops was not unfavourable to an attack upon the enemy's flank, while engaged with the English; there were broad roads leading from Talavera and different points in their position, in a direct line to the front, as well as diagonally to the left; but they were not in a state of discipline to attempt it, and if they had got into confusion all would have been lost. The few, however, who were engaged behaved well, though the Spaniards were chiefly spectators of the combat, the entire weight of which fell upon their allies. The French, repulsed

at all points, retired during the night, but took up positions which still threatened those of the allies to whom retreat became more necessary than to the very superior numbers of the

enemy.

While still at Talavera on the 29th July, Sir Arthur was joined by a reinforcement of 3000 men, which in some measure replaced the heavy loss he had sustained in men, for that of officers was irreparable. Another painful subject that occupied his attention at this period, was the deficiency of funds, and the consequent embarrassment with regard to his own movements, and the prospect of a favourable termination of the campaign. "The demands of the Portuguese upon our funds," he wrote,*" are so very large, as well on account of debt as of subsidy, that I do not know how to answer them; but I will see what can be done in respect to this debt on bills. I wish that you would give government a hint privately that they have embarked on too wide a scale, and that the funds which they have provided cannot supply us and the Portuguese subsidy, and Sir John Moore's old debts in Portugal and Spain."

In his subsequent despatches, Sir Arthur Wellesley, whom no pressure of business ever prevented from discharging the duties of a superior officer, spoke in high terms of the conduct of some of the officers to whose gallantry, when the commanders were killed or wounded, he owed the preservation of his army. In particular he recommended to the notice of the commanderin-chief; or rather in his own words, to his particular protection, Major Middlemore, who led on the first battalion of the 48th after Colonel Donellan was struck down; and by his gallant advance, so much promoted the final success of the action, by enabling General Sherbrooke's division to form again. And as in other cases, whenever with truth he could speak with commendation, he did it heartily and with effect; "and if his conduct," he concluded, "did not then, I would

* Talavera, 29th of July. To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.