forces, every individual engaged contending for victory, as if fully aware of the absolute necessity on one side of retaining, on the other of forcing these formidable passes.

Upon the evening of the engagement, which terminated about four in the afternoon, General Wellesley took up his position somewhat in advance of the well-contested field; and at the same time came intelligence of General Anstruther having arrived off the coast with a large reinforcement. The French now made a general movement; Loison joined La Borde at Torres Vedras, and both commenced their march towards Lisbon. Junot, also, having reached Torres Vedras, there was every appearance of a combined movement, with a view, perhaps, to retrieving their lost ground, or striking some sudden blow against the British. Sir Arthur, therefore, marched next day to Lourinha, on the road to which his right already rested; and, on the 19th, he proceeded to Vimiero, with the double purpose of strengthening his own army and favouring the progress of General Anstruther. By these cautious movements the junction was early and safely effected, notwithstanding that large bodies of French cavalry hung upon the British rear and threatened repeated attacks. Each of the armies having now formed, its respective junction appeared to rest on their arms, as if to await the attack of the enemy. But the series of important events that followed will best be treated in the opening of the ensuing chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

(1808 to 1814.)

Observations on the battle of Roliça-Skilful combinations-Rapid pursuit -Preparations to engage Junot-Compelled to abandon the designAttacked by the French-Battle of Vimiero-Compelled to forego the advantages-Arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple-Armistice-Convention of Cintra-Discontent of the Portuguese-And of England-AnecdotesSignal exploits-Tribute to British valour-Court of Inquiry-Vindication of Sir Arthur Wellesley-His noble and disinterested conduct-Resumes office-Efforts of Napoleon-Fate of the Spanish armies-Weakness of the ministry-Campaign of Sir John Moore-Causes of its failure -Opinion of Napoleon-Memorable retreat-Victory of CorunnaDeath and character of Sir John Moore.

WITH the victory of Roliça the great Peninsular war, so important in all its results, may be said to have auspiciously commenced. Here, for the first time, the veteran legions of Napoleon, led by commanders of consummate ability and skill, were attacked and routed in the open field, notwithstanding every advantage of established reputation, experience, and the almost impregnable positions which they occupied. Up to this period the imperial eagles had held on their glorious flight unchecked, or with scarcely greater opposition than is met with by the monarch of the air when he pounces upon his helpless victims. But a foe had now appeared on the scene of his brilliant conquests, to dispute with the master of continental Europe, on his own ground, the supremacy of his military dominion; and, like the Roman Camillus, in the last hour of need to cast England's sword into the scale, and rescue the bartered nations from the grasp of the invader. No brighter promise; no stronger earnest could have been given of the future services and splendid achievements of one comprehensive and indefatigable mind than the battle of Roliça; the very

difficulties under which it was won produced a moral influence no less important than the manifestation of physical power. The rapid march, the mode of attack, the fine combination of movements and manoeuvres during the heat of the action, all directed to one result, displayed the genius of a commander confident in his own resources; while his personal exertions, activity, and fearless courage equally excited the respect and admiration of his army. At every critical moment, and in the severest struggle, he was always to be seen; and it was observed by those around him that the day was carried no less by his personal gallantry than by his skill. That this must have been the fact, would appear both from the nature of the engagement, and the expressions used by the General himself in an affecting letter to a relative of the lamented Colonel Lake, "that he fell in the achievement of one of the most heroic actions that had been performed by the British army."

In his despatch also from Lourinha to the British government, he expressly mentions that had it not been for the difficulties of the ground, which prevented him from bringing up a sufficient number of troops and cannon, he should have been enabled to capture the whole army of the enemy. We are not surprised, therefore, to find in his despatches at this period, a tone of increasing confidence, and an earnest desire to follow up his successes with the least possible delay. He was now at the head of a force of from 16,000 to 18,000 men, with eighteen pieces of artillery; and though the landing of the reinforcements in the bay of Maceira caused some delay, several of the boats having unfortunately been swamped, he resolved to press on for Mafra, and attack Marshal Junot ere he had time to adopt measures of defence or to consolidate his forces. His first object was, by a forced march on the 21st, to turn the enemy's position at Torres Vedras, and advancing upon Mafra, seize the neighbouring heights, and thus intercept the French line of march. He was already within nine miles of the enemy, and there was a clear road which led from the sea-coast to the positions he wished to attack. (18th of August, 1808.) That this plan of following up his victory at Roliça was

founded on the soundest military rules, and perfect knowledge of his own and of his adversary's object, subsequent events sufficiently proved; he would have made his attack under every advantage, instead of waiting to be attacked by a superior force in his position at Vimiero.

As it was, the arrival of Sir Harry Burrard to take the chief command in the absence of Sir Hew Dalrymple, led to a change of plans not sanctioned by the judgment of the victor of Roliça. The former considered it requisite, before assuming the offensive, to call in the aid of an additional force under Sir John Moore; although Sir Arthur Wellesley, with his accustomed foresight, had carefully acquainted his superior officer with the grounds upon which he was about to proceed, and shown that he was fully equal to adopt the offensive without calling away so large a force from other points. "You will readily believe," he writes in his despatch to government,* "that this determination is not in conformity with my opinion, and I only wish that Sir Harry had landed and seen things with his own eyes before he had made it." And that evening Sir Arthur was observed, for the first time since he had landed, to return to his camp in evident chagrin and disappoint

ment.

How little did he suppose, on retiring to his tent, that fortune was preparing for her favourite soldier the only revenge of which he was ever ambitious, of proving by his actions the correctness of his judgment, and of the plans and determinations which he had previously formed. About midnight, on that very day, he had the joy of receiving the report of the approach of Junot, who was already within little less than a league of the British camp. Yet so excellent were the arrangements already made, that the English general was compelled in no way to alter his line; patroles were sent out, pickets and sentries were on the alert, and the calm manner, and undisturbed demeanour, so remarkable a trait on all occasions of the sort, even when suddenly aroused from his sleep, gave no indications of the pleasure which animated the heart of the soldier. Scarcely once during this eventful war was he com

* Dated Vimiero, August 21, 1808.

pelled to put his troops under arms by night; nor would he, if possible, deprive them of a single hour's rest. One hour before dawn, when on active service, they were accustomed to appear equipped for the field; and it was thus they stood prepared on the morning of the 21st of August, before a single enemy was to be seen.

Vimiero is a village pleasantly situated in a gentle and quiet valley, through which flows the small river of Maceira. Beyond, and to the westward and northward of this village, rises a mountain of which the western point reaches to the sea; the eastern is separated by a deep ravine from the height over which passes the road which leads from Lourinha and the northward to Vimiero. On this mountain was posted the chief part of the infantry with eight pieces of artillery; General Hill's brigade was on the right, and Ferguson's on the left, having one battalion on the heights separated from the mountain. Towards the east and south of the town lay a mill wholly commanded, and most of all on its right, by the mountain to the west side, and commanding also the surrounding ground to the south and east, on which General Fane was posted with his riflemen, and the 50th regiment; and General Anstruther's brigade, with the artillery which had been ordered to that position during the night. The ground over which the road passes from Lourinha commanded the left of this height; and it had not been occupied except by a picket, as the camp had been taken up only for one night, and there was no water in the neighbourhood.

The cavalry and reserve of artillery were in the valley between the hill on which the infantry stood, both flanking and supporting the advance of the riflemen.

About eight o'clock a picket of the enemy's horse was first seen on the heights, towards Lourinha; and after pushing forward his scouts, soon appeared in full force with the evident object of attacking the advanced guard and the left of the British. Immediately four brigades from the mountain on the east moved across the ravine to the heights on the road to Lourinha with three pieces of cannon. They were there formed with their right resting upon