provided according to prices in the locality of export.

2

Like the licenses for the export of ordnance, they were often justified by the desire to help needy allies upon the continent. In the case of ordnance, however, popular alarm was frequently aroused by the supposed laxity of the crown in yielding to such suits without due guaranties that English guns would not thus find their way to England's enemies. While the prohibitions of the export of grain were in the interest of consumers, those upon the export of calf-skins, pelts, wool, and "white" broadcloths were for the protection of the native manufacturers. But such restrictions, rigidly enforced, would have caused serious difficulties, for the native industries were not in a position fully to utilize the advantages thus conferred. They were not able to work up all the raw material placed at their disposal, and even if they had materially increased their output they would have been unable to find a market for their products, owing to the fact that, without protection, they had already enjoyed a market for as much of their output as their crude workmanship could satisfactorily supply. The prohibitions upon export of raw materials were intended to force upon foreigners and English alike products which were completely manufactured in England. But as most of these prohibitions proved to be premature, there was the prospect of discouraging and even ruining a large part of the interests devoted to the production of raw materials. This would in the long run have reacted upon English craftsmen, reducing them to as small a supply and as high a price for their materials as before the prohibitions. To afford relief, licenses were granted either by way of exception or as privileges of long or indefinite duration. The prohibitions upon the export of calf-skins, for example, would have ruined a very important industry and a well-established branch of foreign trade. To avoid these consequences, numerous licenses

1 E. g., Cotton, Vesp. C. xiv, no. 238 (fol. 574); Pat. 3 Eliz. pt. 1 (January 24, 1561), and see warrant for licenses, July, 1592, in Appendix B, and also, in the same Appendix, the item under date of November, 1592; and Appendix H.

2 The acts against export of "gun-metal," 33 Hen. VIII & 2 Edw. VI, were sup. plemented by proclamation to cover ordnance of iron, but licenses and illicit export excited the House of Commons, and a bill was there passed against the transportation of iron-ordnance. D'Ewes, pp. 670 ff. (December, 1601), Oldys, Life of Raleigh, 1829, pp. 345 ff.

See below, chapter on the Cloth Project.

3

were granted, each for a term of years, authorizing a limited number to be shipped out of the country. Likewise licenses were granted for the exportation of Norfolk wools, notwithstanding a temporary prohibition. The most important of all the export licenses were those for the "whites" or unfinished broadcloths. Dyeing and finishing of fine cloths had not been successfully established in England, and legislation attempted to encourage the industry by drastic means. But this was continuously and almost completely nullified by licenses to the Merchant Adventurers and by smaller grants of the same sort to others. When, in the middle of James's reign, these cloth licenses were called in and an attempt was made to enforce the law, the immediate derangement of trade which resulted proved the necessity of the licenses. Some of the export licenses which were used effectually to swell the lists of monopolies presented for parliamentary discussion in 1601 can hardly have been serious grievances. Such were, for instance, the licenses for the gathering and exporting of "lists, shreds, and horns" and of "ashes and old shoes." When the fear of "regrators" or jealousy of foreign countries led parliaments to include refuse and discarded wearing apparel among the articles which must not leave the country, the crown can hardly be blamed for facilitating the efforts of those who sought to engage in the export of these commodities. Similarly, the jealousy which inspired the prohibition of transportation from Ireland, of agricultural and grazing products and a few simple manufactures such as linen yarns, was rightly checked by licenses. It might have been better, from a purely economic view, if the restrictions had not been enforced at all, but, politically considered, special exceptions were probably preferable. Taken as a whole, the presumption is that these licenses did more

1 Of these, the most important were those in the interest of the merchants of Chester. Consult Harl. 2104, nos. 4, 9, 23, 26.

2 See Appendix B. An internal license also remedied in a measure the inconvenience resulting from the statute 5 Edw. VI, c. 7, directed against wool-brokers or middlemen who were supposed to enhance the price of wools, but whose services were found indispensable to the northern drapers. See S. P. D. January, 1615, lxxx, 13-16; Lansd. 48, 66; 21, 65; B. M. Add. 34324, fols. (new) 8, 26.

33 Hen. VIII, c. 19; 8 Eliz. c. 6.

♦ See below, chapter on the Cloth-finishing Project.

See Appendices B to G.

See Appendices B and C.

good than harm, notwithstanding the evils that must have resulted from the unequal way in which the troublesome statutes were avoided.

The case of the dispensing patents is analogous to that of the licenses for export. The grants of dispensation from penal laws authorized patentees either to issue pardons upon receipt of composition, to grant dispensations from the penalties of statutes upon receiving a fee, or to "take the benefit of forfeiture." The differences in the three forms were hardly more than verbal. Historically all grew out of the custom of providing in penal statutes for a division of the offender's fine between the crown and the informer, and the dispensing patents regularized the growing practice of collusion between offenders and informers. It will be seen that these transactions virtually enabled offenders to bargain, either periodically or once for all, for the right to break the law. Immunity might even be purchased without an individual bargain, for a patentee would gain most by establishing a fixed price so low that large numbers would be led to purchase exemption. This form of patent was nominally abandoned after the reign of Elizabeth, the withdrawal being due to the declaration of the judges who gave advice against them in 1604 when consulted by the Privy Council.' Yet after this "the taking the benefit of obsolete and impossible laws" was frequently heard among the grievances, for the old practice was continued in the commissions issued under James and Charles for compounding with transgressors in the name of the king himself, thus conforming with the words of the declaration of 1604. Very many of the acts of Parliament which were thus intrusted to the discretionary execution of a patentee were as illadvised as the prohibitions upon export. Thus Parliament had yielded to the popular opposition against the gig-mill, which was regarded as inimical to labor by substituting machinery for the antiquated practice of treading in the fulling of cloth, and all use of the machinery was prohibited. Proclamations subsequently

2

1 See Appendix M.

2 See e. g., the following commissions for inclosures: Pat. 5 Jac. I, pt. 18 (February 16, 1608); 6 Jac. I, pt. 37 (May 20, 1608). Pat. 15 Jac. I, pt. 5 (February 28, 1618). Pat. 11 Car. I, pt. 5 (May 8, 1635); 11 Car. I, pt. 9 (November 13, 1635). 3 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 2.

permitted their use for half the process only. Later, the crown interfered by issuing a patent for the benefit of forfeiture under the act. Ostensibly this was a measure of enforcement, but a consideration of the customary manner in which such deputations were enforced would lead to the presumption that the patentees accepted compositions or anticipatory fines which practically authorized the evasion of the law. In 1630, Charles attempted to reform "abuses" in the Shrewsbury district. The appointment of a commissioner in this district was a part of the general principle of "thorough" which characterized the king's whole economic policy. The attempt of the commissioner to interfere with the use of gig-mills was then regarded as an innovation which shows that the act had not been regularly enforced, and this is further confirmed by the serious inconveniences which followed directly upon the new policy. Another unfortunate statute was designed to reform the abuses in the tanning of leather. All that subsequently appears points uniformly to the fact that the act was in every way injurious to the trade. Regulations for tanning were minutely prescribed by a body of men no one of whom seems to have possessed the slightest knowledge of the tanner's art. Very likely the conditions required could not have been successfully obeyed by a single tanner. However this may be, it is certain that no attempt could have been more misguided than that of prescribing a uniform practice, irrespective of leather, bark, and water, all of which varied in their chemical qualities in different parts of the country. Different methods of preparation, moreover, were needed in accordance with the purposes for which the leather was intended. Hence of fifteen clauses in the statute only six, it was said," could possibly be observed. If the law had been rigidly enforced, its repeal at an early session would almost surely have resulted. But the theory upon which the crown then acted prevented it from shifting the responsibility upon Parliament and required that the burden should. remain with the executive. Discretionary powers were exercised

Pat. 36 Eliz. pt. 11 (April 17, 1594), to Roger Bineon and William Bennett. 2 S. P. D. October 29, 1630.

Procl. April 16, 1633, S. P. D. ccxv, 56.

S. P. D. August 1, 1633.

Fleetwood to Burghley, Lansd. 20, no. 4.
Lansd. 5, no. 58.

and the act remained unrepealed. Though only partially enforced, it was the foundation of subsequent regulation under Sir Edward Dyer, who was authorized to pardon and dispense with the penalties for violation of the statute.' Legitimate as were the grounds upon which the dispensing patents were based, it yet was true of them that their employment was most unfortunate, for they offered unusual temptations to those who dealt in them. Dyer and his deputies gained an evil reputation for extortion practised under cover of the patent."

No single motive is sufficient to explain all the other numerous and diversified grants. The desire to encourage invention, the advancement of political power by means of the regulation of industry, financial considerations, and the desire to reward her servants and favorites, must all be considered as influencing the monopoly policy of the queen. The encouragement of invention continued to be regarded as one of the chief public concerns, although as the years went on this consideration had diminishing weight in patent policy. The advancement of political power was sought more particularly in the licensing patents. The extension of this system was a natural though not necessarily desirable result of the effort to nationalize the country. This end was best to be attained by unity of economic interests. At the time it was thought that uniformity was equally necessary, and supervision of industry in the direction of uniformity was part of the program of centralization. Hence the crown was predisposed in favor of any project which promised a uniform regulation. But inasmuch as patents were usually granted as a result of petition on the part of some one who had a selfish interest in the grant, the desire for national regulation was not the immediate incentive in the conferring of the privileges, and the most that can safely be said is that a petitioner was more sure of success if he could show that central control of industry would incidentally result from his privilege.

The granting of patents was, as a rule, prompted by the pecuniary interest either of the crown or of the patentee. Thus in the case of the export and dispensing licenses already considered, a very important, if not the chief motive, was the financial advantage both to the crown and the favored grantees, who divided their profits with 1 See Appendix C.

2 Lansd. 24, no. 70.