by section 16 of the act of December 21, 1898 (30 Stat. 759), has no application to this matter.

This being true, the owners of the vessel were liable, not only for the seaman's wages up to the termination of the voyage, but also for all expenses incident to medical care, nursing, and attendance necessary to a recovery from the injury. This does not mean that the expenses shall be borne until a complete cure is effected, as such recovery may be impossible; but it does mean that this liability exists until the condition of the seaman is such that he can be properly discharged from medical attention.

In The J. F. Card, 43 Fed. 92, Judge Brown (subsequently Mr. Justice Brown) expressed a doubt that the shipowner could be held liable for medical attention after the termination of the voyage, citing in support of this view Nevitt v. Clarke, Olcott 316; The Ben Flint, 1 Biss. 562; The Atlantic, Abb. Adm. 451; and The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390; and he refused to charge the owner with such expenses when the injury occurred on a voyage upon the northern lakes, drawing a distinction between such voyages and ocean voyages.

But this view has not been adopted by the Federal courts. In The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175, the opinion in which was delivered by the same learned justice, in laying down certain settled propositions of maritime law, it was said that:

"The vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued;" which shows that the Supreme Court had not adopted the view which the learned justice had formerly expressed, and that the question remained undetermined.

It has been subsequently held that the owners' liability for medical treatment to injured seamen does not cease with the termination of the voyage, in the following cases:

McCarron v. Dominion Atlantic Ry. Co. (opinion by Judge Lowell), 134 Fed. 762; The Svealand (C. C. A., 4th cir.) 136 Fed. 109; The Henry B. Fiske (opinion by Judge Dodge), 141 Fed. 188, 191; The Mars (C. C. A., 3d cir.), 149 Fed. 729.

A well-considered opinion upon this question, in which the same view was taken was delivered by Judge Brown of the southern district of New York in The W. L. White, 25 Fed. 503, decided shortly after the passage of the amendment of 1884.

The holding in these cases rests largely upon the authority of Mr. Justice Story's opinion in Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sumn. 195, 203, and seems to be now generally adopted by the courts, and in my opinion they declare the correct principle.

It is also well settled that the owner of the vessel is liable for the expense of transportation home of a seaman left in a hospital in a foreign port. Callon v. Williams, 2 Lowell 1; Brunent v. Taber, 1 Sprague 243; The Centennial, 10 Fed. 397.

As the medical and transportation expenses here in question have all been settled out of funds belonging to the United States, and as they were paid to relieve a distressed seaman, and after notice had been given to the Matthew Turner Co. that they were primarily liable for same and demand made for payment, it is my opinion that said company may be held liable therefor.

This conclusion is, of course, based on the assumption that there was no legitimate reason for the consul to discharge Frederickson at the instance of the master of the vessel.

Respectfully,

GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.

The SECRETARY OF STATE.

NATIONAL BANKS COLLECTING PURCHASE PRICE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS SHIPPED FROM ONE STATE INTO ANOTHER-CRIMINAL CODE, SECTION 239.

Secton 239 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits the collection of the purchase price of intoxicating liquors by a person acting in connection with the transportation thereof from one State into another, does not apply to banks, collecting drafts with bill of lading attached, where the shipment is made to a real consignee upon an order sent by him and filled by shipment from the dealer's place of business.

Where consignments of liquor are made to fictitious persons and the bills of lading, with drafts attached, are sent to a bank with such instructions that the goods are delivered to anybody who will pay the draft and accept the goods, even though the person to whom the goods are delivered has not previously ordered the liquor, such a transaction would constitute a sale by the bank and the bank in such a case would be amenable to discipline by the State for selling liquor contrary to the State law, and also to discipline by the Federal authorities for selling liquor without compliance with the provisions of the internal-revenue laws.

Such a business, moreover, is clearly beyond the powers of a national bank, and if the Secretary of the Treasury is satisfied that there is any considerable amount of dealing of that character by banks, he might well issue a general warning to them against engaging in such ultra vires transactions.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 3, 1911.

SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of 25th ultimo, transmitting to me a copy of an opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, dated April 10, 1911, replying to a suggestion that the attention of the national banks be called by proper circular to the provisions of section 239 of the Criminal Code of the United States (35 Stat. 1088) and of their application to certain transactions hereinafter referred to. This section reads as follows:

"Any railroad company, express company, or other common carrier, or any other person who, in connection with the transportation of any spirtuous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction. thereof, into any other State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or from any foreign country into any State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, shall collect the purchase price or any part thereof, before, on, or after delivery, from the consignee, or from any other person, or shall in any manner act as the agent of the buyer or seller of any such liquor, for the purpose of buying or selling or completing the sale thereof, saving only in the actual transportation and delivery of the same, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars."

The chief special officer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, writing to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, refers to a conference which he had had with the attorney general of Oklahoma concerning the enforcement of this act, and in his letter states that a practice has grown up of shipping alcoholic and intoxicating liquors from the State of Missouri, where dealing in such liquors is permitted by law, into the State of Oklahoma, where such traffic is prohibited by law. The method of carrying on the business is described in a bill in equity filed in the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Oklahoma in December, 1909, quoted in the letter of the chief special officer for the Indian Bureau in the following language:

"That their principal method and custom of making shipments into other States, including the State of Oklahoma, is to receive mail orders for said shipments from its customers outside the State for sales and shipments of liquors to be made in Missouri, and directed to such other States. That after said orders are accepted by complainants, they are delivered at Kansas City, Mo., to various railroad companies and other common carriers transporting freight from said State of Missouri to such other States, and more particularly to various points in the State of Oklahoma, where said customers reside. That in all cases where goods are sold and delivered to the carrier in Kansas City in the State of Missouri, the said sales are made outside of the State of Oklahoma and the goods are delivered to the common carrier for the purpose of making delivery to the consignee only.

"Complainant further shows that after delivering said liquors to the carriers for shipment as aforesaid in said State of Missouri to Oklahoma, they receive from the carrier a bill of lading, which bill of lading is generally made out in the following form, substantially, and forward said bill of lading to a bank or some responsible person at the home of the consignee, attached to which is a sight draft for the purchase price of the liquor. The customer pays the draft and receives the bill of lading, and presents the same to the railroad company and receives the shipment. This method, as above stated, is known to the

railroad and to the public generally by the various terms of 'shippers' order,' 'order notify,' and 'sight draft and bill of lading' method. On each box or package thus sent out is marked with either the full name or initials of the consignees and a specific number; that the bill of lading contains the full name of the consignee together with the number marked upon the box or package. The bill of lading used by complainants reads as follows:

"Received from Harvest King, in apparent good order, the following articles marked below to be delivered in like good order: Kansas City, Mo.,

by

190

R. R. To shippers' order, notify

at

No.

Article.

Marks.

Weight.

Return shipment in ten days if not accepted.
Freight prepaid No.'

"The railway company, or the common carrier, fills in the blanks so as to agree with the dates, name of purchaser, character of goods, and the name of the consignee to be notified and the point in the State of destination named in the bill of lading, and the custom and understanding between the parties to said transaction is that it gives to the shipper the right to stop said goods at any time before said goods are delivered to the purchaser at their destination in Oklahoma, and before the surrender of the bill of lading, and the goods are not delivered to said purchaser or consignee until they arrive at their destination, and are not delivered to the consignee until the production and surrender of the said bill of lading."

Upon this statement of facts, the chief special officer of the bureau requests that the Comptroller of the Currency be asked to call the attention of the national banks in the State of Oklahoma to section 239 of the Criminal Code, with the advice that the conduct of business as above described is in violation of its provisions. The Secretary of the Treasury expresses the opinion that, under the strict rule of construction applied to criminal statutes, banks are not violating the law by collecting the purchase price of liquor shipped in the course of business described above,