other contract? And similarly, if the work allotted to such mechanic requires him in any one day to work upon material identified as destined for the Government under a contract and also upon material destined for private purchasers, then, to avoid a violation of the restrictive provision, is his entire day's work, or only the sum of the several periods during which he works on material for the Government, to be limited to 8 hours?

The answer to your question depends upon the proper construction to be given to the following language in section 1 of the act, namely, " in the employ of the contractor or any subcontractor contracting for any part of said work contemplated" and "upon such work."

In the bill which passed the House of Representatives of the Fifty-seventh Congress (H. R. 3076) the first phrase quoted above was contained, but the latter-namely," upon such work "was not. The Senate Committee on Education and Labor of the Fifty-seventh Congress, in adding the latter words to the House bill, submitted the following report (S. Rept. No. 2321, 57th Cong., 2d sess., p. 9):

"The advocates of the pending bill believe that this bill, which by its title limits to 8 hours a laborer's work done for the United States, reaches other laborers upon commercial work if the contractor is on the same day engaged upon Government work and work upon private contracts. The committee are unanimously of the opinion that the House bill means no more than its words import. It says the contract shall contain a provision that-

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"No laborer doing any part of the work contemplated by the contract shall be required or permitted to work more than 8 hours in any one calendar day.'

"The contract is for Government work. Upon no part of that work shall a laborer be permitted to work more than 8 hours. Therefore the committee have added the words implied by the House bill upon such work.'

They are unanimous in the opinion that the provision that no mechanic should be required or permitted to work more than 8 hours in any one day means either one of two things: First, by a strained construction that a citizen should not be permitted to work more than 8 hours out of

24 anywhere, even at his house or in his garden, if he has already worked 8 hours upon a Government contract. If it means this, such a denial of personal liberty would be unconstitutional, such a law would be impossible and absurd. Secondly, the other meaning is that no mechanic shall be required or permitted to work under a Government contract more than 8 hours in one day upon such work.

"That is, that the House bill would write into every Government contract a provision that no mechanic doing any part of the work contemplated by the contract shall be required or permitted to work more than 8 hours in any one day upon such work; namely, the work contemplated by the contract. The committee unanimously believe that the latter construction is the necessary meaning of the House bill, and a majority of the committee therefore have inserted the words 'upon such work.' Thus amended, a majority of the committee favor reporting this bill to the Senate.

"It may be profitable to quote the words of a member of this committee when discussing this amendment to this part of the bill.

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"The amendment "upon such work," after the word day," on page 2, in line 2, was inserted not for the purpose of changing the texture of the bill as grammatically and legally construed, and as your committee is of opinion. the courts would hold. It was done simply to make obvious what in our conception is the true meaning of the bill as it passed the other House. If it were designed by the bill to prohibit the laborer or mechanic from himself engaging in any other kind of work during the 16 hours of the day in which he is not occupied on contract or subcontract work for the Government, it would infringe his personal liberty to work in the construction of his own house, the cultivation of his own garden, or doing or pursuing for any of those 16 hours any self-imposed task which he might choose to exercise for the benefit of himself, his wife, or his children. As if we were to prohibit him from thus employing his own time for his own benefit, it would follow that we should impose upon him a penalty for so doing. And thus the act assumed to be for his benefit might

become an engine of extreme oppression and the inflictment of infinite annoyance and damage upon him. It would also be obviously an unconstitutional infringement of his personal liberty, as well as tyrannous subversion of the privileges to which he is entitled.""

If the language of the act now under consideration were given its broadest construction, it would not, of course, cover labor performed by an employee for himself, and the decisions in Ellis v. United States (206 U. S. 246), and the Opinion of Justices (94 N. E. Rep. 1043 [Mass.]), which sustain the constitutionality of legislation such as this, clearly imply that Congress has the power to require the establishment of a complete 8-hour day on the part of those persons who choose to enter into contracts with the United States. Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress inserted the words " upon such work "into this legislation for the purpose of limiting its scope in some way and of drawing a line on one side of which should fall work within the 8-hour restriction and on the other side some character of work which was not within said restriction. The only line which can be thus drawn conforming to the plain natural meaning of the words used is that suggested by the committee of the Senate; namely, that the 8-hour stipulation and restriction applies only to work done for the Government and not to work done for private individuals. This view of the statute is emphasized by the provision that "every such contract shall stipulate a penalty for each violation of such provision in such contract of $5 for each laborer or mechanic for every calendar day in which he shall be required or permitted to labor more than 8 hours upon said work." Clearly, no penalty could be collected under the authority of this provision if the laborer or mechanic were required or permitted to labor more than 8 hours a day upon some other work than that contemplated by the contract.

2. Your second question involves the proper construction of "any part of the work contemplated by the contract," and "for any part of said work contemplated,” in section 1 aforesaid. You state that in the ordinary conduct of the business of the contractor work may be done that is

applicable equally to the prosecution of Government contracts within the scope of the act and private contracts; such, for instance, as the generating of power for his plant, the operating of facilities for handling materials, etc. Work may also be done in the way of producing or preparing raw materials finally available for a variety of purposes, but before the fashioning of the specific thing is begun not susceptible of identification as destined for the Government. For example, a contractor for the construction of heavy guns operates a large steel plant and manufactures a great number of steel products for the general market. Through a long process, involving the handling and smelting of ore and the treatment of pig iron, steel is produced, which in this stage as a raw product can be made into cannon for the Government or articles for other patrons. You request my opinion as to whether the words in the act "any part of the work contemplated by the contract," include work of the kind referred to, necessary for the general operation of the plant, or done in the production or preparation of material which, until segregated for employment on Government work, is indistinguishable from that destined for general commercial purposes; or whether they include the work only from the point where specific material is identified as intended for use in the production of the thing contracted for by the Government. This general subject was discussed in the debates in the House on the present bill. (See pp. 339, 340, 341, Cong. Rec., 62d Cong., 2d sess.) For example: "Mr. CANNON. * * * but I wanted to see how far the law would apply in the production of armor and armor plate. In the first place, it is made of iron. In the second place, the iron is produced from iron ore.

"That involves the labor of producing the ore; then the coal or the coke, or perchance the charcoal; that involves labor that goes into the armor plate. Then the furnace in which the armor plate is constructed, so far as the furnace is used, and the furnace itself is built of fire brick. Now, what I want to ask is whether, in all the factors that enter into the production of armor plate, the 8-hour provision as

sions of this act; but if it could be usually bought in the open market, then it would not be required to conform to this act, but in the very nature of the exception there is some latitude that must be allowed to administration."

There is further debate to the same effect, but these quotations are sufficient to show that Congress intended to draw some line in the manufacture or production of material or articles for the Government beyond which the 8-hour provision should not extend. In an extreme sense a contract for the manufacture of an article "contemplates" the entire process from the obtaining of the raw material to the end, and requires or involves " a successive employment of labor therein from the beginning to the end. But the natural and practical view is that which, as suggested by the debate quoted, confines the 8-hour restriction to labor upon the work directly and proximately in view in the contract.

The statute provides that "any officer or person designated as inspector of the work to be performed under any such contract, or to aid in enforcing the fulfillment thereof, shall, upon observation or investigation, forthwith report to the proper officer of the United States, or of any Territory, or of the District of Columbia, all violations of the provisions of this act directed to be made in every such contract, together with the name of each laborer or mechanic who has been required or permitted to labor in violation of such stipulation, and the day of such violation

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It appears, therefore, that the law places upon the Government the burden of investigating and discovering violations of the terms thereof, and it is clear that, unless the words "work contemplated by the contract" be construed in the manner I have just stated, the law could not be practically enforced. It is impossible in the nature of things for the Government to oversee the enforcement of the 8-hour law in all the ramifications of the industries which go to the production of an article contracted for by the Government. It follows, therefore, that the words "work contemplated by the contract" must be construed in a manner which will enable the law to be practically observed and enforced, and the construction which naturally suggests itself is that the work contemplated is the work directly