by its terms and conditions, purport to vest in the purchasers a title in fee.

In view of the positive and unambiguous requirements of the laws of Maryland relating to the recording of titles when these several acts were passed by the legislature of that State, and the manifest purpose of the legislature that when these certificates were given the effect of deeds they should be subject to the same laws with reference to recording, I am strongly inclined to the opinion that, inasmuch as this certificate was not recorded until seven years after its issuance, it did not pass to Polock the legal title to lot 10. At any rate, it must be considered as a question of such doubt as to constitute a serious cloud upon the title. thereto of the present claimants.

The second question is whether or not the Chief Engineer of the Army has the power to execute a quitclaim deed in order to perfect the claimants' title.

On August 1, 1855, Attorney-General Cushing transmitted an opinion (7 Op. 355, 366) to the Secretary of the Interior, in which he reviewed very fully and carefully the various statutes relating to the transfer of lands in the District acquired by the United States from the original proprietors thereof; and he thus stated the final conclusion reached by him:

"Nevertheless, it seems to me, after careful analysis and consideration of all the elements of the question, that the Board of Commissioners, by force of the act of Congress of 1790, and the two acts of the State of Maryland, as construed by the acts of Congress of 1796 and 1798, the superintendent, under that of 1802, and the commissioner, under that of 1816, have had lawful authority to sell and convey the unreserved and legally saleable lots of the Government in the city of Washington, subject, however, in all things affecting the same, to the direction of the President of the United States."

From a careful consideration of this opinion, I see no reasonable grounds for doubting the correctness of the conclusion reached therein, and therefore assume that, under the act of April 20, 1816, which abolished the office of superintendent and substituted that of the commissioner

of public buildings, such commissioner did, from and after that date, have the power to execute deeds for lands belonging to the United States within said territory.

By section 2 of the act of March 2, 1867 (ch. 167, 14 Stat. 466), it was provided:

"That the office of commissioner of public buildings is hereby abolished; and the chief engineer of the army shall perform all the duties now required by law of said commissioner; and shall also have the superintendence of the Washington Aqueduct and all the public works and improvements of the government of the United States in the District of Columbia, unless otherwise provided by law."

By virtue of this act all authority previously exercised by the commissioner of public buildings was vested in the Chief Engineer of the Army, and he was necessarily authorized thereby to execute conveyances of lands within the District of Columbia belonging to the United States. This was so held by Attorney-General Garland, in an opinion which appears in volume 2, page 339, manuscript copies of title opinions, in the office of the attorney in charge of titles, Department of Justice.

The fact that the defect in the title here under consideration occurred while the original commissioners were vested with the authority to convey titles to these lands, and not since the power to convey was vested in the Chief Engineer of the Army, can not alter the principle, as the rights of the parties are the same in each instance.

In section 26 of the act of May 30, 1908 (ch. 228, 35 Stat. 543), after providing for the appointment of a commission to investigate and report on transfers by the United States of all titles to lands lying in the District of Columbia, it was provided:

"Pending the report of said commission, unless otherwise directed by Congress, all authorizations heretofore made for the sale of government land in the District of Columbia, in which conveyances have not been made, or contracts entered into, shall be held in abeyance."

Is the power of the Chief Engineer of the Army to execute a quitclaim deed to the claimants of lot 10 in con

firmation of the purchase evidenced by the certificate to Polock suspended by this provision?

While the certificate in question did not convey the legal estate, yet it passed an equitable interest in the land, and was equivalent to a contract of sale.

The act of 1793 provided that if the certificate should be recorded as required by the previous act relating to titles in the District of Columbia, it should pass the legal title, but it did not imply that in the absence of its being recorded it should become a nullity, and that the equitable title evidenced by the certificate should thereby be lost.

The purpose of the act was to enable the certificate to perform the function of a deed, and was not to destroy any virtue that previously existed in the certificate. Hence, it remains as a written evidence of a contract of sale made by the original commissioners; and, therefore, I am of the opinion that the execution of a quitclaim deed by the Chief Engineer of the Army, as requested by the claimants of a part of lot 10, is not prohibited by the provision above quoted of the act of 1908, and that such deed executed by him will be valid.

Respectfully,

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

J. A. FOWLER,
Acting Attorney-General.

PURCHASE OF STRUCTURAL MATERIAL FOR VESSELS FROM COMBINATION OR MONOPOLY-REASONABLE PRICE.

The provision of the naval appropriation act of March 4, 1911 (36 Stat. 1289), that no part of the money therein appropriated "shall be expended for the purchase of structural steel, ship plates, armor, armament or machinery" from any combination or monopoly, imposes upon the Secretary of the Navy the duty of determining the fact of monopoly or conspiracy and, in ascertaining this fact, he is free to resort to all sources of information at his command.

The presumption in the absence of any evidence to the contrary is here, as in all other cases, that the parties are innocent rather than guilty. The act does not, however, contemplate a previous judicial determination of combination or conspiracy before the prohibition of purchase applies.

The Secretary may require, as a condition of receiving any bid, an affidavit from the person, or a responsible representative of the firm or corporation proposing to deal with the Government, to the effect that such person, firm, or company was not engaged in such a combination, and might also, by appropriate stipulations in the contract, provide for its annullment if it were ascertained that it had been obtained by false representations in that respect.

By the provision of the act of March 4, 1911 (36 Stat. 1289), that "no purchase of structural steel, ship plates or machinery shall be made at a price in excess of a reasonable profit above the actual cost of manufacture" Congress committed the determination of what are reasonable prices to the sound discretion and best judgment of the Secretary of the Navy, subject to the obligation to keep the cost of construction as much as possible within the bounds of the maximum prescribed. The market price of any commodity under normal conditions is taken to be its reasonable value; and so in any case where purchase can be made in an open market under conditions of free competition it may be assumed that the prevailing price will not be "in excess of a reasonable profit above the actual cost of manufacture."

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 14, 1911.

SIR: Yours of the 7th instant, addressed to the AttorneyGeneral, has been referred to me for answer. I have given careful consideration to the matters involved, and in reply to your inquiries beg to say:

The first condition imposed by the provision of the act quoted by you (naval appropriation act of March 4, 1911, 36 Stat. 1289) is that no part of the money appropriated "shall be expended for the purchase of structural steel, ship plates, armor, armament or machinery from any persons, firms or corporations who have combined or conspired to monopolize the interstate or foreign commerce or trade of the United States, or the commerce or trade between the States and any Territory or the District of Columbia, in any of the articles aforesaid."

The combination or conspiracy defined has reference only to the monopolizing of trade in the articles specified. There is no particular form of inquiry suggested and no mode prescribed for ascertaining the fact which imposes a prohibition upon the purchase. The Secretary of the Navy is free, therefore, to inform himself from any and all sources and by any and all means at his command, in such way as seems to him most apt, for the purpose of ascer taining the essential fact, and, having exercised his dis

cretion in good faith, he has done his duty under the act. The presumption in the absence of any evidence to the contrary is here, as in all other cases, that the parties are innocent rather than guilty. I do not believe, however, that the act contemplates a previous judicial determination of combination or conspiracy before the prohibition of purchase applies. It bottoms the prohibition upon the fact of combination or conspiracy and not upon a previous adjudication of that fact; and the terms of the act plainly imply that there may be such a combination or conspiracy. In view of this the Secretary might well require, as a condition of receiving any bid, an affidavit from the person, or a responsible representative of the firm or corporation proposing to deal with the Government, to the effect that such person, firm, or company was not engaged in such a combination, and might also, by appropriate stipulations in the contract, provide for its annulment if it were ascertained that it had been obtained by false representations in that respect; but the matter is one for the Secretary to determine according to his best judgment.

The second condition imposed is that "no purchase of structural steel, ship plates or machinery shall be made at a price in excess of a reasonable profit above the actual cost of manufacture."

How the actual cost of manufacture is to be ascertained, and what is a reasonable profit above that cost, the act does not determine, but leaves to the discretion of the Secretary.

There is nothing in the act to guide the discretion of the Secretary except the maximum cost prescribed, which, in the case of battle ships, is fixed at $6,000,000.

It may be assumed that this maximum cost bears some relation to what Congress conceived to be the reasonable or proper cost of the ships. This consideration is emphasized by the fact that the limit of cost of the battle ship Florida is by the act increased $400,000 above the amount originally fixed.

The act having in view the increase of the naval establishment of the United States, it is to be presumed that the work was intended to be carried forward with reasonable