Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 410, 19 L. ed. 972. Cloucester Ferry Co. v. Penn., 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. ed. 158. Postal Tel. Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871. Cognate to this proposition that a State connot directly tax a franchise held under the laws of a sister State is the question of the power of a State to tax franchises and rights held under the laws of the United States. It may be stated that, abstractly speaking, franchises granted by the Federal Government, in accordance with its constitutional powers, are not subject to State taxation. McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, (U. S.) 316. Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pel. 466, 7 L. ed. 447. California v. C. P. Ry. Co., 127 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 150. C. P. Ry. Co. v. California, 162 U. S. 91, 40 L. ed. 903. However, the States have found so many ways of doing by indirection what is forbidden to be done directly, that this rule has now almost become the exception. It must also be remembered that the agencies of the Federal Government are exempt from State taxation only so far as such taxation may interfere with or impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they serve the Government. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Att'y Gen., 125 U. S. 530 (3), 31 L. ed. 790. The special right held by the patentee to manufacture an arti cle patented under the laws of the United States is not subject to State taxation, but the article itself when manufactured is subject. to taxation. Webber v. Virginia, 13 Otto (103 U. S.), 344, 26 L. ed. 565. Edison Co. v. Assessors, 156 N. Y. 417, 42 L. R. A. 290. National banks are to be taxed only according to the rule prescribed by the United States statute. 2 The question as to the right of a State to tax the franchises and intangible property of a bridge company, owning a bridge spanning a navigable stream between two States has been to the Supreme Court of the United States in several different cases, and in each case it has been held that the fact that a bridge over such navigable stream is made a post road by an Act of Congress, which also regulates the height of the bridge, etc., does not interfere with the right of the State to impose taxes upon the bridge company, and that the value of the intangible property in such cases is properly estimated as a subject of taxation in the State which granted the franchise to the Company, by estimating the total value of the entire property in both States, and deducting therefrom the tangible property in the State named as well as all the property tangible and intangible in the other State, although certain privileges have been granted the corporation by the laws of the other State and by the Act of Congress. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Ky., 166 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 953. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626, 44 L. ed. 299. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592, 43 L. ed. 823. As to telegraph companies, the Act of Congress of July 24, 1866, provides that any telegraph company which accepts the provisions of the Act shall have the right to construct, maintain and operate lines of telegraph over any portion of the public domain of the United States, and over and along any of the military and post roads of the United States, and makes them governmental agencies. Under the term "post roads," as defined in $3964 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, all the railroads and nearly all the public roads in the country are included. A direct tax upon this very valuable and extensive franchise has been held void. San Francisco v. W. U. Tel Co., 96 Cal. 140, 17 L. R. A. 301. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067. But in a decision rendered in the Supreme Court of the United 16 g ba States about thirty days ago, in which the Western Union Telegraph Company sought to avoid a tax imposed by the State of Missouri, which, though not in terms, yet in effect, included its franchises, proportioned according to what is known as the unity of use theory of taxation of corporate property, the Court establishes the propositions: that the Company owed its existence as a corporation and its right to exercise the business of telegraphing to State laws; that the privilege of running its lines of wires over and along the public domain and military and post roads was granted by Congress, but that the statute was merely permissive and conferred no exemption from the ordinary burdens of taxation; that the State could not directly nor indirectly prevent or hinder the corporation from placing or operating their lines along the post roads, but that the corporation could be taxed, for the protection it receives from the State upon its real and personal property, as any other person would be, and, the method of taxation by which the whole property of a corporation. tangible and intangible, is considered as a unit or entirety and proportioned accordingly, having previously been declared lawful, the tax was upheld. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Mo., Advance sheets, Opinions U. S. See also Att'y Gen. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 141 U. S. 40, 35 L. ed. 628. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Seay, 132 U. S. 472, 33 L. ed. 409. Where a corporation holds a franchise from the State seeking to impose the tax, it may be taxed upon such franchise, notwithstanding it may also hold franchises from other States or the United States. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Ky., 166 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 953. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626, 44 L. ed. 299. While a State may not directly tax franchises granted by sister States or by the United States, yet there is no legal obstacle to their becoming an element in the fixing of the valuation of the property of a corporation for taxation under what has been called the "unity of use" theory of taxation. Several States now have statutes of this character. They generally provide substantially that such corporations as interstate railroad, express, sleeping car and telegraph companies, whose properties extend through more than one State, and whose movable effects are constantly shifting from one State to another, but whose property is joined together in a unity of use and of ownership, shall be considered in respect to their properties as one homogeneous entirety, and shall return for taxation to the State such proportion of their entire property, tangible and intangible, as the mileage of their lines in the State bears to the total mileage of all their lines, within and without the State. Thus in the State of Ohio an express company whose principal office was in New York, and whose capital stock had a market value of about $16,000,000.00 (which was considered as the entire value of all the corporate property, tangible and intangible), but which had in Ohio only approximately $70,000.00 worth of tangible property, was assessed taxes upon the amount of $533,000.00, on the basis that this was in accordance with the proportion existing between the mileage of the company's lines in Ohio and the total mileage of its lines, although of the sixteen million dollars capital stock, about twelve millions represented franchises and intangible assets. Thus Ohio was reaching franchises and other intangible assets in other States and subjecting them to her taxation, but after the question had been ably argued both upon hearing and rehearing, the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the tax, and this precedent has been followed and established in several subsequent cases. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 41 L. ed. 683. Same case on rehearing, 166 U. S. 185, 41 L. ed. 965. In this case the Court said: "Whatever property is worth for the purposes of income and sale, it is also worth for the purpose of taxation. "The situs of the intangible property of an express company engaged in interstate business is not, for the purpose of taxation, simply where its home office is, but such property is distributed wherever its tangible property is located and its work done." The doctrine of this case has been applied to railroad, bridge, telegraph, telephone, and sleeping-car companies, as well as to express companies. However, the Court in this leading case takes care to call attention to the fact that, in the absence of a statute full enough to include all these things, they will not be included. In other words, there must be drawn a distinction between what a State has the power to do in this respect and what it has done by her taxing statutes. Since no such theory of taxation appears to be contemplated by the provisions of the Georgia Act, it is probably safe to say that under this statute, only franchises held under the laws of this State can be included or considered in the assessment. Adams Ex. Co. v. Ohio, supra. Adams Ex. Co. v. Ky., 166 U. S. 171, 41 L. ed. 960. Am. Ex. Co. v. Ind. 165 U. S. 255, 41 L. ed. 707. Taylor v. Secor, 92 U. S. 575, 23 L. ed. 663. The valuation of franchises for taxation presents many difficult problems, and no general rule obtains throughout the States, in fact, there are almost as many different rules as there are States. From a Federal standpoint, any system which obtains the approval of the State Supreme Court, however arbitrary or capricious it may be, cannot be regarded as unconstitutional, unless it discriminates against rights held in other States, or is a tax on imports, exports, tonnage, interstate commerce, or Federal instrumentalities. Minot v. P. W. & B. Ry. Co., 18 Wall. (U. S.) 206, 21 L. ed. 888. The question of valuation is greatly simplified when a method is prescribed by statute. The Georgia law sets out no definite means of arriving at the value of franchises upon which the tax |