Construction - More than one subject Title of act. Constitutional requirements that a statute, bill or law shall not embrace, or relate to more than one subject or object, which shall be embraced, or expressed, or clearly or briefly expressed in the title must be complied with.86 In construing

an ordinance under a statutory provision that it shall embrace but one subject, and the object intended to be effectuated is covered by one subject under its title, if it is necessary to deal with more than one feature of that subject, and the various provisions of the enactment are all germane to the subject expressed in the title the statutory requirement is complied with and satisfied and the ordinance is not repugnant to the statute.87 So the generality of the title of a State statute does not invalidate it, under a provision of the Constitution of the State that private and local laws shall only embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title, so long as the title is comprehensive enough to reasonably include within the general subject or the subordinate branches thereof, the several subjects which the statute seeks to effect, and does not cover legislation incongruous in itself and which by no fair intendment can be included as having any necessary and proper

Bell v. First Judicial District Court (Nev. 1905), 81 Pac. 875 (unconstitutional). New York: Cahill v. Hogan, 180 N. Y. 304, 73 N. E. 39, affg. 99 App. Div. 619, 90 N. Y. Supp. 1091 (unconstitutional); Rochester v. Bloss, 173 N. Y. 646, 66 N. E. 1105, affg. 77 App. Div. 28, 79 N. Y. Supp. 236 (unconstitutional); People v. Coler, 173 N. Y. 103, 65 N. E. 956, affg. 71 App. Dis. 584, 76 N. Y. Supp. 205. Oregon: Murphy v. City of Salem (Oreg. 1906), 87 Pac. 532; Spaulding Logging Co. v. Independence Imp. Co., 42 Oreg. 394, 71 Pac. 132 (void). Pennsylvania: See Franklin, City of, v. Hancock, 204 Pa. 110, 53 Atl. 644. South Carolina: Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co., 71 S. C. 457, 51 S. E. 485. South Dakota: Garrigan v. Kennedy (S. Dak. 1904), 101 N. W. 1081; Walling v. Lummis, 16 S. Dak. 349, 92 N. W. 1063. Tennessee: Red River Furnace Co. v. Tennessee Cent. R. Co., 113 Tenn.

697, 87 S. W. 1016. Texas: Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 494, 86 S. W. 11. Washington: State v. Packenham, 40 Wash. 403, 82 Pac. 597; State v. Case, 39 Wash. 177, 84 Pac. 554 (unconstitutional); State, Osborne Tremper & Co. v. Nicholas, 38 Wash. 309, 80 Pac. 462; Armour & Co. v. Western Const. Co., 36 Wash. 529, 78 Pac. 1106 (unconstitutional); Weed v. Goodwin, 36 Wash. 31, 78 Pac. 36; Seattle & L. W. Waterway Co. v. Seattle Dock Co., 35 Wash. 503, 77 Pac. 845, affd. 195 U. S. 624, 25 Sup. Ct. 789, 49 L. Ed. 350. Wis consin: Verges V. Milwaukee County, 116 Wis. 191, 93 N. W. 87. Such constitutional provision not applicable to municipal ordinances. Harris v. People, 218 Ill. 439, 75 N. E. 1012.

87 City of Louisville v. Wehmhoff, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 995, 76 S. W. 876, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1924, 79 S. W. 201.

connection.88 In a Missouri case it was urged that an act, entitled "an act requiring persons, associations and corporations, owning or operating street cars to provide for the wellbeing and protection of employees," and requiring, in the body of the statute, screens to protect motormen, was unconstitutionals in that the subject of the act was not clearly, or at all, expressed in the title, and this position was declared untenable. The court, per Gantt, J., said: "Sound policy and legislative convenience dictate a liberal construction of the title and the subject matter of statutes to maintain their validity. Infraction of this constitutional clause must be plain and obvious, to be recognized as fatal. This has been the uniform rule of construction of this provision of our Constitution. It is only necessary that the title shall indicate the subject of it in a general way without entering into details. All auxiliary provisions properly attaching to the main subject, and constituting with it one whole, may be embraced within the enactment.90 Measured by these and various other adjudications of this court, the title to this act was both definite and broad enough to include the provisions of this act, all of which were germane to the purpose expressed." 91 The Constitution of Kansas 92 providing that "no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title" is not violated by the title to an act entitled an act providing for the formation of telephone companies," as all rights extended to such an incorporated company to engage in the telephone business, as well as the right to incorporate, are contemplated by the word "formation." 94 Again, the title of an ordinance reciting that its object is to "grant certain rights and privileges to a certain telephone company," is suf

88 Blair v. City of Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 26 Sup. Ct. 427, 50 L. Ed. 801, revg. 132 Fed. 848.

89 Under art. 4, § 28 of Const. Mo.

90 Citing State V. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 335, 38 S. W. 317; State v. Marion Co. Ct., 128 Mo. 427, 30 S. W. 103, 31 S. W. 23; State v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271, 21 S. W. 1125.

93

91 State v. Whitaker, 160 Mo. 59, 60 S. W. 1068, 7 Am. Elec. Cas. 806, 813.

92 Art. 2, § 16.

93 Laws 1885, c. 104, p. 151; Gen. Stat. 1901, §§ 1251, 1252.

94 City of Wichita v. Missouri & K. Teleph. Co., 70 Kan. 441, 78 Pac. 886.

ficient to carry a grant of a right to use the streets and alleys of the city for its lines.95 But where it is required that the subject of an ordinance be clearly expressed in its title, and the titles of ordinances, covering street railway extensions, do not express an intent to deal with the subject of the life of the original grant, an extension of such franchise will not, it is held, be raised by implication."

96

$172. Construction of statute More than one subject— Decisions. Where a statute encourages and authorizes the construction of telegraph lines; confers privileges, powers and penalties upon the owners thereof; provides a penalty for divulging the contents of a private message by any person connected with the telegraph company, and throughout the entire act, after its first section, there are provisions different from and not germane to those authorizing and encouraging the construction of telegraph lines, such statute violates a constitutional provision which prohibits legislative acts from containing more than one subject-matter.97 But a statute which includes telegraph and telephone companies and which prescribes their duties, and penalties for its violation, is not unconstitutional as embracing two subjects. 98 The Michigan Act of 1863,99 under which electric railways were organized, was held not unconstitutional as embracing more than one subject not expressed in its title.1 Where an act is entitled "An act to prohibit extortion and discrimination in the transmission of telegraphic despatches," it is not unconstitutional as containing more than one subject, because it contains a section which makes telegraph companies "liable for the nondelivery of despatches intrusted to its care and for all mistakes in transmitting messages made by any person in its employ and for all damages resulting from a failure to perform any other duty

95 State v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 127 Iowa 194, 103 N. W. 120. 96 Cleveland Electric Ry. Co. v. City of Cleveland (C. C. Ohio, 1905), 137 Fed. 112.

97 Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Cooledge, 86 Ga. 104, 3 Am. Elec. Cas. 618, 12 S. E. 264, Ga. Acts 1888-9, p. 175 (Act November 12, 1889).

98 Central Un. Teleg. Co. v. Fehring, 146 Ind. 189, 45 N. E. 64, 6 Am. Elec. Cas. 694; Const. Ind.. § 19, art. 4; Acts Ind. 1885, p. 151, § 2 (Rev. Stat. 1894, § 5529).

99 Chap. 94, How. Mich. Stat. 1 Detroit City Ry. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634, 48 N. W. 1007.

required by law, and any such telegraph company shall not be exempted from any such liability by reason of any clause, condition or agreement contained in its printed blanks." 2 Again, an act entitled "An act to provide for the incorporation and regulation of motor-power companies for operating passenger railways," which also provides that they may lease the property of passenger railways which they desire to operate, is not unconstitutional, because the subject of leases is not within the title, since the "incorporation" includes obtaining possession of such railways. So in a recent New York case the power to consolidate, conferred by the Amendatory Act of 1892 upon corporations formed under the Laws of 1863, is germane to the subject expressed in the title to the earlier act and is not unconstitutional.1

3

§ 173. Construction Statute Ordinance or ContractPartly valid. It is an oft-asserted rule that part of a statute may be unconstitutional and another separable part valid, so

2 Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Lowrey, 32 Neb. 732, 3 Am. Elec. Cas. 717, 49 N. W. 707; Const. Neb., § 11, art. 3, § 12; c. 89a, Comp. Stat. Neb.

See Potter v. Collis, 19 N. Y. App. Div. 392, 46 N. Y. Supp. 471, where act of 1874, relating to the Eighth Ave. Ry. Co., which has not used electricity until within a comparatively short time, was held not unconstitutional as referring to more than one subject; N. Y. Const., art. 3, § 16; N. Y. Laws 1874, c. 478; case aff'd 156 N. Y. 16,

3 Pinkerton v. Pennsylvania Traction Co., 193 Penn. St. 229, 44 Atl. 284, Act March 22, 1887 (P. L. 9).

4 Bohmer v. Haffen, 35 N. Y. App. Div. 381, 54 N. Y. Supp. 1030; case aff'd 161 N. Y. 390, and affirms 50 N. Y. Supp. 857, 22 Misc. Rep. 565; N. Y. Laws 1863, c. 361, entitled "An act to authorize the construction of a railway and tracks," in certain towns.

See the following cases: Alabama: Untreiner v. State (Ala. 1906), 41 So. 170; Norvell v. State, 143 Ala. 561, 566, 39 So. 357; Kentz v. Mobile, 120 Ala. 623, 24 So. 952. Arkansas: Waterman v. Hawkins (Ark. 1905), 86 S. W. 844. California: Gerino Ex parte, 143 Cal. 412, 77 Pac. 166, 66 L. R. A. 249. Connecticut: State V. Dow, 78 Conn. 53, 60 Atl. 1063. Florida: State v. Bryan (Fla. 1905), 39 So. 929. Georgia: Bass v. Lawrence, 124 Ga. 75, 52 S. E. 96. Idaho: Abel,