reasonable time thereafter. 29 So the fact that a live wire had become detached from its fastenings and was hanging to the ground, and that a traveler was killed by contact therewith, was held to constitute, prima facie, a case of negligence on the part of the company, on whom the burden was cast to show that such live wire was in the street through no fault of its servants and agents.30 And where a policeman, in attempting to remove, with his mace, a wire which had fallen, and which he knew was conducting a dangerous current of electricity, was killed by an electric shock, received from such wire, it was held that he was not, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence, and a judgment awarding damages to the widow was sustained.31 So where a person was injured while attempting to remove, with a baseball bat, an electric light wire, which had broken and fallen upon his building, and was apparently endangering it, it was held that the company was liable for negligently permitting its wire to be broken and displaced, and to fall upon the plaintiff's buildings.32 And such recovery may be had, though the fallen wire was used in the police patrol system, and though the charter of the city provided that the city should be liable only in those cases where it had actual notice of the defect, where it appears that the line was constructed by the city and had broken on previous occasions. 33 So it has been determined that if the disturbed condition of a city telephone and fire alarm system indicates to the city officials that the fire alarm wire may be broken and down in the street, it is their duty to investigate the cause of the disturbance to ascertain if the wire constitutes a dangerous obstruction to the use of the street, it being declared that a notice of a disturbance of the system, caused by a fire alarm wire being broken and down, will be notice of the obstruction of the street.34 A municipality is not, however, liable for an 29 Lutolf v. United Elec. L. Co., 184 Mass. 53, 67 N. E. 1025, 8 Am. Elec. Cas. 506. 30 Haynes v. Raleigh Gas Co., 114 N. C. 203, 41 Am. St. Rep. 786, 5 Am. Elec. Cas. 265, 19 S. E. 344. 31 Dillon v. Allegheny Co. Light Co. (Penn. Sup. Ct., 1897), 6 Am. Elec. Cas. 242. 32 Leavenworth Coal Co. v. Ratchford, 5 Kan. App. 150, 48 Pac. 927. 33 Twist v. Rochester, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 307, 55 N. Y. Supp. 850, aff'd 165 N. Y. 619, 59 N. E. 1131. 34 City of Emporia v. Burns, 67 Kan. 523, 73 Pac. 95, 8 Am. Elec. Cas. 416. The court said: "It is injury resulting from contact with a broken wire where the breaking of such wire was caused by what is known as or called an "act of God," and the municipal authorities, upon notice of the break, exercised due and proper care to prevent injury.35 It has, however, been held that where a telephone company has no knowledge of the condition of one of its wires, which has become so rusted that it is liable to break and come into contact with a trolley wire, it is not negligence, as a matter of law, if it fails to remove such wire.36 § 451. Fallen or broken wires - Liability of city for.— Where the statutes impose upon a municipality the duty of maintaining its streets in such a condition as to be reasonably safe for travelers, or permitting recovery from the city for in apparent the city employee knew there was a likelihood that the wire was broken, and down in the street. Such was one of a very limited number of inferences to be drawn from the physical facts with which they were dealing, and they did not know but that it was the true one. If such were the condition of the wire, it was certain to be dangerous to travel. It was the duty of the city, therefore, to investigate, and an investigation would have disclosed the fact that the wire was actually broken, down in the street, and a serious menace to the safety of persons, walking and driving along such street. Under these circumstances the city must be held to have had all the information it should have acquired by the exercise of due diligence." Per Burch, J. See Herron v. City of Pittsburg, 204 Pa. St. 509, 54 Atl. 311, 8 Am. Elec. Cas. 482, holding that where police officials knew prior to the occurrence of an accident, of a break in the police call wire such knowledge imposed the duty upon the city officials of making an examination and that it was a question for the jury whether such duty was properly performed. 35 Colburn v. Mayor of Wilming ton, 4 Penn. (Del.) 443, 56 Atl. 605, 8 Am. Elec. Cas. 457. This was an action against the city of Wilmington to recover for horses killed by contact with a broken electric wire, which was highly charged and hanging down in the street. The court charged the jury in this case that if the wire was the property of the defendant and was broken by reason of sleet adhering to it, without any neglect or default on the part of the defendant, it would not be responsible for such break as it would be what is called an "act of God" and that if, at and immediately before the time of the accident, a police officer of the city gave due and timely warning to the driver of the plaintiff's wagon, the defendant would not be liable for injury sus tained by reason of the disregard of such warning, or other negligence on the part of the driver. 36 Hand v. Cent. Penn. Teleph. & S. Co. (Com. Pl.), 1 Lack L. News, 351. juries received from defects in the highway, if a traveler receives an injury from a broken or fallen wire, negligently permitted to remain upon the streets or so close to the surface as to be a source of danger, recovery may be had from the city for such injury.37 § 452. Cutting of wires-Fire department - Negligence of city in not removing.- Though it may be necessary for the fire department of a city, in order to extinguish a fire, to cut electrical wires suspended in front of a building or attached thereto, yet if the city negligently permits such wires to remain upon the streets for an unreasonable length of time, it will be liable to any traveler for any injury caused in consequence thereof. Or recovery may be had of the electrical company, if, after notice, it fails to remove its wires from the street. So where some of the water used by the fire department of a city, to extinguish a fire, fell upon crossbars, and froze, causing them, together with a large number of wires to fall to the ground, where they remained for a period of eight days, and a passer-by was injured, an action was brought against the city and a telephone company, and a verdict was recovered, on the ground of negligence in failing to remove the wires.3 38 § 453. Broken wires Thunder storms.- If an electrical company negligently permits one of its wires, which has become broken or has fallen, to remain upon the surface of a street, or in such a position that it becomes an obstruction to travel, or if it permits a broken or fallen wire to remain upon private property, even though such wire may not contain a dangerous current of electricity, yet if, by reason of a thunder storm, it becomes so heavily charged with electricity as to be a 37 Bourget v. City of Cambridge, 156 Mass. 391, 31 N. E. 390, 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 374; Graham v. City of Boston, 156 Mass. 75, 30 N. E. 170, 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 372; Twist v. Rochester, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 307, 55 N. Y. Supp. 850, aff'd 165 N. Y. 619, 59 N. E. 1131. See Herron v. City of Pittsburg, 204 Pa. St. 509, 54 Atl. 311, 8 Am. Elec. Cas. 482 wherein it is de clared that it is the duty of all parties using a highly dangerous agent to use care commensurate with the danger in order to prevent injury to persons or property exposed to its influence and that cities are not excepted from this rule. 38 Nichols v. City of Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 430, 23 N. W. 868, 1 Am. Elec. Cas. 762. 39 source of danger, and injury results therefrom, and if by means of such wire, lightning is conducted, so that injury to persons or property ensues, the wire will be considered as the proximate cause of the injury and not the electricity, since without the wire the electricity would probably have proved harmless. Although it may be the electrical fluid which is the main element in the production of the injuries or damage, yet where the displaced wire furnishes the means for communicating such dangerous force, such wire is the proximate cause of the injury.3 Thus, where a wire was permitted to remain suspended over a highway, in such position that travelers would unavoidably come in contact therewith, and on a dark night, during a thunder storm, the wire became heavily charged with electricity, and a traveler coming in contact therewith was injured, it was held that the wire was the proximate cause of the injury, and the company was liable.40 And where it appeared, from the evidence, that lightning striking the flagstaff of one building was communicated by a wire, which a telephone company had failed to remove, to another building, setting it on fire and destroying it, it was held that the company was guilty of want of ordinary care; that the wire was the proximate cause of the loss, and that the company was liable.11 § 454. Melting of fuse at power-house-Notice that wires are either broken or crossed. The melting of a fuse at the power-house of an electric light and power company is notice to the company that either a wire has been broken and grounded, or that a short circuit has been caused by the crossing of wires, and it is sufficient to put the company upon inquiry, and impose upon it the duty of refraining from sending a current through the wire until it has been ascertained that it is safe to do so." 42 39 Southwestern Teleg and Teleph. Co. v. Robinson, 50 Fed. 810, 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 346, 1 C. C. A. 684; Jackson v. Wisconsin Teleph. Co., 88 Wis. 243, 5 Am. Elec. Cas. 335, 60 N. W. 430. 40 Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Robinson, 50 Fed. 810, 4 Am. 41 Jackson v. Wisconsin Teleph. Co., 88 Wis. 243, 60 N. W. 430, 5 Am. Elec. Cas. 335. 42 Newark E. L. & Power Co. v. McGilvery, 62 N. J. L. 451, 41 Atl. 955, 5 Am. Neg. R. 187. § 455. Breaking of poles.- An electrical company is not an insurer of the absolute safety of its poles, but it is, however, bound to the exercise of reasonable care in the construction and maintenance of its line. It is not required to erect and maintain poles so strong that no storm can break them, but only to erect and maintain poles of sufficient strength and in such a manner as to withstand such violent storms as may reasonably be expected.43 So where a telephone pole was broken and fell during a storm of great and unusual severity and injured a building, it was decided that the company was not liable for such injury, it not appearing that the pole was insufficient under ordinary conditions. And the court declared in this connection: "It is unnecessary to cite authority upon the proposition that if the pole was, under ordinary conditions, suitable and sufficient for the purpose for which it was used, the fact that it was not strong enough to resist a storm of such unusual and unprecedented violence as that in which it was broken, would not show negligence on the part of defendant in using said pole, because the defendant was not required to foresee such an occurrence, or to construct its lines with reference to same. The mere fact that it was possible for the defendant to have procured poles of sufficient strength to withstand the storm, as shown by the fact that some of the poles erected by it were not broken by the storm, did not require it to use only poles of sufficient strength to withstand a storm of this character, and its failure to do so was not negligence." 44 § 456. Fall of insulators.- Insulators attached to electrical poles or crossarms should be so adjusted and maintained as to prevent, so far as possible, any chance of falling and causing injury to persons or property. So where a passer-by was injured by an insulator, which fell from a telephone pole, it was held that in the absence of explanatory circumstances a prima facie case of negligence was established upon the part of some one. In this case the defendants were the owners of a pole, 45 43 Ward v. Atlantic & Pac. Teleg. Co., 71 N. Y. 81, 1 Am. Elec. Cas, 259, 27 Am. Rep. 10. See § 605a herein. 44 Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Ingrando, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 400, 65 S. W. 1085, 8 Am. Elec. Cas. 447, per Pleasants, J. 45 Quill v. Empire State Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 92 Hun (N. Y.), 539, |