existence at the time of the passage of an ordinance granting a franchise to it to construct its line in the streets yet it is decided that such ordinance is not on that account invalid as, when passed by the city council, it was a mere license or offer to grant a license to the company, and only became a binding contract between the city and the company when the latter accepted it. should have a full and complete organization and existence as an entity, before it can enter into any kind of a contract or transact any business, and that a corporation assuming to be created under the incorporation act of this State can have no right to transact business when the certificate of its complete organization has not been filed for record in the recorder's office, as directed by the statute. Gent v. Insurance Co., 107 Ill. 652; Loverin v. McLaughlin, 161 Ill. 417, 44 N. E. 99. The cases thus referred to do not sustain the contention that the ordinance of August 7, 1899, was void, because it was introduced into the common council before the complete organization of appellee under the statute. A privilege granted by a city to construct a public improvement in the streets is a mere license to the corporation until the corporation accepts the grant and constructs the public improvement thereunder in accordance with the terms and conditions of the same. When the grant is accepted by the corporation, after the passage of a legal ordinance granting it, and in pursuance of the terms of such ordinance, then there is a contract between the city and such corporation. Here the introduction of the ordinance in the common council was merely in the nature of an offer or proposition, and did not become a contract until the ordinance was subsequently passed and accepted. No action was taken by the city in reference to the ordinance when it was first introduced, but it was laid over under the rules until the next meeting. Before August 7, 1899, the city had not bound itself by any contract to the appellee. The ordinance was, from July 17, 1899, until its passage on August 7, 1899, merely under consideration by the city council. In the meantime on July 24, 1899, two weeks before the ordinance was finally passed, appellee became fully and completely organized by receiving its certificate of complete organization from the secretary of state and filing the same with the recorder of deeds of Will county, where its principal office was situated. It was not until after the appellee was thus completely organized that the matter came before the city council for its final action, and then the city council by unanimous vote passed the ordinance making the grant to appellee. The city suffered no harm or injury from the fact that appellee was not completely organized when the ordinance was originally presented to the council. It is sufficient that appellee was fully organized and had a right in law to transact business, at the time of the passage of the ordinance and of its acceptance," per Magruder, J. In such a case it is declared that the most that can be said as to the validity of the ordinance because the donee of the power was not in existence at the time would be that the proceeding by the city council was premature and irregular and that the irregularity might be waived by the parties, and could not be questioned by an abutting property owner not a party to the contract.8 89 § 400. Extension of tracks Statute. Under a Connecticut statute, it is provided that no street railway shall extend its tracks from one town to another so as to parallel a steam railroad, unless a judicial finding shall have been applied for and obtained, declaring that public necessity and convenience require it.90 Though a street railway company may, by an amendment to its charter, be authorized to construct such an extension, yet it is held that its right is subject to the above statute unless there clearly appears in the amendment an intention to except such extension from the operation of the general act.91 In New York it has been held that a valid proceeding for the extension of a route of a street railway company can not relate back so as to validate a prior resolution of the municipal authorities consenting to the construction of the track in the street included by the extension, which was before inoperative and ineffectual because of the invalidity of a prior extension proceeding upon which it was based.92 89 McWethy v. Aurora Elec. L. & P. Co., 202 Ill. 218, 67 N. E. 9, 8 Am. Elec. Cas. 220. See also Clarksburg Electric Light Co. v. City of Clarksburg, 47 W. Va. 739, 35 S. E. 994, 7 Am. Elec. Cas. 25, wherein the court said: "The defendant corporations raise the point against the plaintiff corporation that it had no charter existence on the day of the grant to it of the franchise in question, and that, not being in esse then, the grant did not vest, but was abortive, like the case of a grant of land to a grantee not in being. I do not think the point tenable. It was intended to operate only in the event of incorporation, and when it should take place, no de livery was necessary. Acceptance is all sufficient to put the ordinance into operation. Then it took ef fect; not till then," per Brannon, J. 90 Conn. Pub. Acts of 1893, p. 307. 91 Skelly v. Montville St. R. Co., 67 Conn. 261, 34 Atl. 1040. 92 McClean v. Westchester Electric R. Co. (Sup. Ct.), 25 Misc. (N. Y.) 383, 55 N. Y. Supp. 556. § 401. Two street railways in same street. It may be stated as a general proposition that where the control of the streets of a city is delegated by the legislature to the local authorities, they may authorize the construction of two street railways in the same street. This right, however, is subject to certain limitations. The streets are for the purposes of travel, and while a street railway is a mode of exercising that use, yet the rights of the traveling public, by means of other vehicles than the street cars, must be considered. And again, the abutting owner has rights in the street, which are to be regarded in devoting them to the more modern means of exercising the rights of Therefore, while a municipality having control of the streets may authorize the construction of two or more street railways therein, yet this right must be exercised with a proper regard for the rights of traveling public and of the abutting owners. 93 Thus, where two tracks had already been constructed in a street for the operation of cars by electricity, and it appeared that the laying of another track with the necessary poles would both impair the plaintiff's right of access and depreciate the value of his property, an injunction was granted restraining the laying of the third track, though authorized by the city council. The court, referring to the plaintiff's contentions 93 Ogden City Ry. Co. v. Ogden City, 7 Utah, 207, 26 Pac. 288, 3 Am. Elec. Cas. 321, 323; Dooly Block v. Salt Lake City Rap. Trans. Co., 9 Utah, 31, 33 Pac. 229, 8 Am. R. & Corp. Rep. 327, 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 189, 196; Oakland R. Co. v. Oakland, Brooklyn & Fruit Vale R. Co., 45 Cal. 365. Judge Dillon's remarks, in reference to the use of streets by horse railways, although not given in discussing this particular point, are, we think, pertinent in this connection. He says: author regards the appropriation, under legislative authority, of a reasonable portion of a street for a horse railway, constructed on the graduated surface of the street, and used under municipal regulation in the ordinary mode, to be such a "The use as falls within the purposes for which the streets are dedicated or acquired under the power of eminent domain. When thus authorized and so regulated by the public authorities as not to destroy the ordinary and usual street uses, this is a public use within the fair scope of the intention of the proprietor when he dedicates the street or is paid for property to be used as a street. Such proprietor must be taken to contemplate all improved and more convenient modes of use which are reasonably consistent with the use of the street by ordinary vehicles and in the usual modes." 2 Dill. on Mun. Corps. (4th ed.), § 722, p. 869. 94 Dooly Block v. Salt Lake City Rap. Trans. Co., 9 Utah, 31, 33 Pac. as to the power of the legislature over streets, said: "If this position be tenable, then, in the absence of special constitutional restrictions, the legislature may authorize municipalities to devote the entire width of a street to railroad uses, regardless of the property rights of abutting owners, without compensation for injury to their property. This theory does not appear to be sustained by the authorities. The legislature may delegate powers over streets to municipalities, but in doing so it must recognize the property rights of private individuals." 95 In another case in this same State it was said: "The permission to such companies cannot confer upon them an exclusive right. The rights so given exists in common with the right of travel on the streets in wagons and by other vehicles and on horseback and on foot in all legitimate ways. * * * The private rights of the owners and occupants of property abutting on the streets must also be protected, for the law is that such abutters have an easement in the street appurtenant to their property, of which they cannot be deprived without their consent or without just compensation in pursuance of the law of eminent domain; and the council has the power and it is its duty to say that no more than a reasonable portion of the street shall be occupied by street railways, and it has no right to consent that more shall be used.96 In New York a street railway is prohibited from extending or operating "its road or tracks in that portion of any street" already occupied by another street railway.97 The phrase "portion of any street" is construed as meaning not only the space occupied by the tracks, but the entire width of the street wherever occupied by such tracks.98 In Missouri the prohibition by statute99 of the construction in St. Louis of any street railway parallel to an exist ing street railway within three blocks of the proposed road, is held to have been rendered inoperative, both by the Constitution of the State and the powers conferred upon the city.1 And a street railway should be so constructed as not to inter 229, 8 Am. R. & Corp. Rep. 327, 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 189, 196. 95 Per Bartch, J. 96 Ogden City Ry. Co. v. Ogden City, 7 Utah, 207, 26 Pac. 288, 3 Am. Elec. Cas. 321. 97 Railroad Law of N. Y., § 102. 98 Forty-second St. & Grand St. Ferry R. Co. v. Thirty-fourth St. R. Co., 52 J. & S. 252, 102 N. Y. 691. 99 Mo. Act of Jan. 16, 1860. 1 State, Crow v. Lindell Ry. Co., 151 Mo. 162, 52 S. W. 248. fere unnecessarily with the operation of another company's lines.2 § 402. Stringing wires so as to monopolize streets. While an electrical company, when duly authorized to construct its line in the steets of a city, thereby acquires the right to erect poles and wires, where they are a necessary part of such line, yet it only acquires the right to erect such poles and wires as are necessary for the proper operation of its system. Where this result can be obtained by the use of one side of a street only, a company should not be allowed to string its wires on both sides, or to run them from one to the other, in an endeavor to obtain a monopoly of the street.3 When an elec § 403. Laying of turnouts and switches. trical company is granted the right to use the streets, it acquires as accessory to its franchise the right to use such apparatus as is necessary for the safe and effective operation of its line. So it is held that under an ordinance granting to a street railway company the right to construct and operate its road upon the center of a certain street, the company may lay a switch in addition to the main track, where such switch is necessary, to afford proper accommodation to the public. But where a corporation is by ordinance granted a franchise to construct, maintain and operate a single electric street railway, and to lay the necessary turnouts and switches, the privileges granted should not be unduly extended and the company cannot, under the power granted to lay turnouts and switches, construct what is in fact a double track over a part of the line.5 2 Fidelity Trust & Safety Trust Co. v. Mobile St. Ry. Co., 53 Fed. 687. 3 Consolidated E. L. Co. v. People's E. L. & Gas Co., 94 Ala. 372, 10 So. 440, 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 255. 4 Wyoming v. Wilkesbarre & W. S. R. Co. (C. P.), 8 Kulp (Penn.), 113. 5 Borough of Bridgewater V. Beaver Valley Traction Co. (Pa. 1906), 63 Atl. 796. In this case it was contended by the company that |