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an ordinance may be partly void and partly valid, and the same rule has been applied to contracts limiting liability for night half rate telegraphic messages. Where a town made a stipulation in a lighting contract that its board of improvements would not give consent to any other gas or electric company to extend its mains or lay its pipes or conductors within the town

In re, 10 Idaho 288, 77 Pac. 621. Illinois: People, Green V. Cook County, 176 Ill. 576, 52 N. E. 334. Indiana: State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N. E. 469, 33 L. R. A. 313. Iowa: Brady v. Mattern, 125 Iowa 158, 100 N. W. 358. Louisiana: Watson V. McGrath, 111 La. 1097, 36 So. 204. Massachusetts: Wheelwright v. Boston, 188 Mass. 521, 74 N. E. 937; Commonwealth v. Anselvich, 186 Mass. 376, 71 N. E. 790. Michigan: Graham v. Fleming, 116 Mich. 571, 74 N. W. 729, 5 Det. Leg. N. 35. Missouri: Finck V. Schneider Granite Co., 187 Mo. 244, 86 S. W. 213; Birch v. Pittsburg, 180 Mo. 413, 79 S. W. 475; State v. Whitaker, 160 Mo. 59, 7 Am. Elec. Cas. 806, 60 S. W. 1068; State, Crow v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 45 L. R. A. 363, 52 S. W. 395. Montana: State v. Aetna Banking & Trust Co. (Mont. 1906), 87 Pac. 268. Nebraska: State, Adair, v. Drexel (Neb. 1905), 105 N. W. 174; Logan County v. Carnahan, 66 Neb. 694, 95 N. W. 812. New Hampshire: State V. Cohen (N. H. 1906), 63 Atl. 928. New Jersey: State v. Corrigan, 72 N. J. L. 64, 60 Atl. 515; States New York & New Jersey Telephone Co. v. Borough of Bound Brook, 66 N. J. L. 168, 48 Atl. 1022, 7 Am. Elec. Cas. 65, 66; Hickman v. State, 62 N. J. L. 499, 41 Atl. 942, affd. 44 Atl. 1099. New York: Parfitt V.

Ferguson, 159 N. Y. 111, 53 N. E. 707, affg. 38 N. Y. Supp. 466, 3 App. Div. 176; People, Eldred v. Palmer, 154 N. Y. 133, 47 N. E. 1084, affg. 21 App. Div. 101, 47 N. Y. Supp. 403. North Carolina: Lowery v. Board, etc., School Directors, etc., 140 N. C. 33, 52 S. E. 267; State v. McGinnis, 138 N. C. 724, 51 S. E. 50. Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Shaleen, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 1. South Carolina: State v. Burns, 73 S. C. 194, 52 S. E. 960. Tennessee: State v. Willett (Sup'r Ct. Tenn. 1906), 97 S. W. 299; Fite v. State, 114 Tenn. 646, 88 S. W. 941; Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 82 S. W. 171. Texas: St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. of Tex. v. Hall, 98 Tex. 480, 85 S. W. 786. Utah: Eureka v. Wilson, 15 Utah 67, 48 Pac. 150. Vermont: State V. Abraham, 78 Vt. 53, 61 Atl. 766. Virginia: Trimble V. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 818, 31 Chic. Leg. N. 366, 5 Va. Law Reg. 92. Washington: Seattle & L. W. Waterway Co. v. Seattle Dock Co., 35 Wash. 503, 77 Pac. 845, affd. 195 U. S. 624, 25 Sup. Ct. 789, 49 L. Ed. 350; Nathan v. Spokane County, 35 Wash. 26, 76 Pac. 521, 65 L. R. a. 336.

Electric Ry. Co. of Grand Rapids v. Common Council of Grand Rapids, 84 Mich. 257, 3 Am. Elec. Cas. 67, 71, 47 N. W. 557; Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 1 Am. Elec. Cas. 352, 358.

during the existence of the agreement, and a statute was enacted confirming and ratifying lighting contracts made by said board, it was held that this unconstitutional provision did not impair or affect the other provisions of the statute, as it was sufficiently independent and disconnected therefrom.7

§ 173a. Same subject. An ordinance may be valid in part although void under the State Constitution as to another part, as where it prohibits, under a penalty, the operations of poolrooms and the transmission to them or their operators or agents of telegraphic or telephonic information, but is broad enough to include French pools prohibited by the legislature under a greater penalty than that specified under the ordinance, and so void under a constitutional provision making an ordinance void which affixes less penalties than the statute for the same offense. It is also declared in a federal case that an ordinance conferring street easements in excess of the power of the municipality to grant is not necessarily void, as where ordinances conferring exclusive rights by a municipality having no power to grant such rights have been held valid so far as to convey a right, subject to the right of the city to grant like privileges to others. And the same rule would apply to

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7 Parfitt v. Ferguson, 159 N. Y. 111, 53 N. E. 707, affg. 3 N. Y. App. Div. 176, 38 N. Y. Supp. 466, which affd. 12 Misc. (N. Y.) 278, 33 N. Y. Supp. 1111. It was also held that said act (New York Laws 1891, c. 59) was not fairly within the scope of its title, An act to amend chapter 576 of the Laws of 1888, entitled 'An act establishing a board of improvement, and defining its powers and duties, and to provide for lighting the streets and other places in the town of New Utrecht, in the county of Kings, as amended by chapter 361 of the Laws of 1889." For general cases on these points, see State v. Street, 117 Ala. 203, 23 So. 807, partly valid if separable; People, Deneen v. Martin, 178 Ill. 611, 53 N. E. 309, 31 Chic. Leg.

News, 267, rule not applicable where parts mutually dependent; State, Crow v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S. W. 595, partly void, partly valid; State, Gray v. Dover, 62 N. J. L. 40, 40 Atl. 640, affd., 42 Atl. 674, when rule will be applied; State v. Godwin, 123 N. C. 697, 31 S. E. 221, not upheld when provisions inter-dependent; Trimble v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 818, 1 Va. Sup. Ct. 29, 5 Va. L. Reg. 92, 31 Chic. Leg. News, 366, may be partly void and partly valid; Robertson v. Preston (Va., 1899), 33 S. E. 618, certain provisions may be void.

8 City of Louisville v. Wehmhoff, 25 Ky. L. R. 1924, 79 S. W. 201, S. C. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 995, 76 S. W. 876.

an ordinance invalid in part only as applies to a statute; and if the grants are so distinctly separable that each can stand alone and there is no such interdependence that the validity of a part depends upon the validity of every other part the ordinance will be upheld to the extent of its validity."

§ 173b. When ordinance invalid - Distinction between invalidity and partial invalidity. If a franchise ordinance contains unreasonable restrictions unjustified by the authority conferred upon the city so that such ordinance is ultra vires the municipality then the whole of the ordinance, including its grant of privileges and franchises, must fall at the same time. The same reasoning applies in such case as to an unconstitutional act of the general legislature. The presumption is that the legislature intends an enactment to be effective in its entirety; such presumption is also against mutilation of a statute, and elimination will only be resorted to where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. But where an ordinance expressly declares that the covenant of restrictions is a part of the consideration and a condition of the enjoyment of the franchises and privileges granted thereby to a traction company, such part can not be eliminated without overthrowing the entire ordinance. 10

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§ 173c. Construction - Repeals.- Repeals by implication are not favored.11 So all interests under a statute or ordi

Morristown, City of, v. East Tennessee Telephone Co., 115 Fed. 304, 53 C. C. A. 165, 8 Am, Elec. Cas. 3, 9, per Lurton, C. J.

10 Mayor, etc., of Borough of Rutherford v. Hudson River Traction Co. (N. J. 1906), 63 Atl. 84, 87, per Pitney, J.

11 United States: United States v. Greathouse, 166 U. S. 601, 17 Sup. Ct. 701, 41 L. Ed. 1130; City of Wheaton v. Old Colony Trust Co., Fed. 648. Arkansas:

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641,

Benton v. Willis, 76 Ark. 443, 88 S. W. 1000. District Columbia: McCarthy v. McCarthy, 20 App. D. C. 195; United States v. Sampson, 19 App. D. C. 419. Illinois: Chicago W. & V. Coal Co. v. People, 114 Ill. App. 75, affd. 214 III. 421, 73 N. E. 770. Indiana: Shea v. Muncie, 148 Ind. 14, 46 N. E. 138. Kentucky: Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jarvis, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 986. Michigan: Hoffman v. H. M. Lond & Sons Lumber Co., 138 Mich. 10.

nance remain unimpaired by its reenactment which operates as a continuance of the original enactment and not as an implied repeal.12 The intent to repeal must be clearly apparent and courts will sustain the statute rather than its repeal if a reasonable ground for upholding it can be found, and this applies to a statute authorizing the use of streets by a telephone company which will not be held to have been repealed by a later city charter empowering the municipal authorities to prohibit or regulate use of the streets by telephone, telegraph or light companies. 13 Again, upon the principle that repeals by implication are not favored, a statute general in its terms will not repeal by implication a particular statute relating to some particular matter or locality unless the legislative inten tion so to do is clearly apparent. So where a statute gives entire control of its streets to a city, a later general enactment, authorizing telegraph companies to construct, maintain and operate telegraph, telephone and other necessary lines for the transmission of intelligence along and over public highways, streets, etc., will operate only as a permission to exercise in such city the franchises of a telegraph or a telephone company.

104 N. W. 424, 12 Det. Leg. N. 356; Michigan Teleph. Co. v. City of Benton Harbor, 121 Mich. 512, 80 N. W. 386, 7 Am. Elec. Cas. 9. Nebraska: Dawson County V. Clark, 58 Neb. 756, 79 N. W. 822. Oklahoma: Goodson V. United States, 7 Okla. 117, 54 Pac. 423. Pennsylvania: See Commonwealth v. Fry, 183 Pa. 32, 41 W. N. C. 270, 38 Atl. 417. Vermont: State v. Martin, 68 Vt. 93, 34 Atl. 40. Wisconsin: Hay v. City of Baraboo, 127 Wis. 1, 105 N. W. 654.

12 Kittanning Borough v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 26 Pa. Sup. Ct. 346. See also the following cases: Georgia: Horn v. State, 114 Ga. 509, 40 S. E. 297. Indiana: Blumenthal v. Tibbits, 60 Ind. 70, 73, 66 N. E. 159. Michigan: Goodrich v. Hackley-Phelps-Brunell Co.,

141 Mich. 343, 104 N. W. 669, 12 Det. Leg. N. 458. Nebraska: Sternberg v. State, Keller, 50 Neb. 127, 69 N. W. 849, affg. 48 Neb. 299, 69 N. W. 849. New Jersey: Henry v. Simanton, 64 N. J. Eq. 572, 54 Atl. 153. New York: People v. Wells, 94 App. Div. 271, 87 N. Y. Supp. 1107. North Carolina: Wood v. Bellamy, 120 N. C. 212, 27 S. E. 118. Compare Murphy v. Utter, 186 U. S. 95, 22 Sup. Ct. 776, 46 L. Ed. 1070.

The fact that the substance of part of a section is re-enacted and the remainder not re-enacted evidences an intention to repeal all not re-enacted. Lawyer v. Carpenter (Ark. 1906), 97 S. W. 662, 663.

13 Michigan Telephone Co. v. City of Benton Harbor, 121 Mich. 512, 80 N. W. 386, 7 Am. Elec. Cas. 9.

In such a case where it does not clearly appear that the legis lature intended by the later statute to resume its power of control over the city's streets, given the city by the earlier enactment, it will not be so construed.14 The repeal of a statute authorizing every street railway to be operated by such animal, electric or other power as the municipal authorities may have granted will not destroy its effect to ratify contracts in existence when it was passed.15 And where a telephone company has erected its plant under the general as well as special laws and has maintained and continued to extend the same, or has made substantial improvements upon the strength of the authority granted to it the rights acquired in so doing cannot be impaired or interfered with by subsequent legislation, and the right to extend the system within the city cannot be revoked by the city by a resolution not passed in the exercise of the police power. 16 A general repealing clause in an act is a legislative expression carrying with it a repealing effect only where under law the effect would be the same without such repealing clause.17

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§ 174. Construction Prior and subsequent statutes eral and special laws-Repeal Decisions.- If a prior law is referred to and adopted in a statute, the law as it exists is included and not a subsequent modification thereof, 18 and a telegraph companies act intended to repeal or supersede similar

14 City of Memphis v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co., 145 Fed. 602, revg. in part, 139 Fed. 707.

15 Blair v. City of Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 26 Sup. Ct. 427, 50 L. Ed. 801, revg. 132 Fed. 848.

16 Duluth, City of, V. Duluth Teleph. Co., 84 Minn. 486, 87 N. W. 1128, 8 Am. Elec. Cas. 136; Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 81 Minn. 140, 83 N. W. 527, 86 N. W. 69, 53 L. R. A. 175, 7 Am. Elec. Cas. 168, 179.

17 City of Wichita v. Missouri & K. Teleph. Co., 70 Kan. 441, 78 Pac. 886, holding that no part of the general Telegraph Act (Gen. Stat.

1868, art. 8, c. 23), was repealed by the charter act of cities of the first class (Laws 1881, c. 37, p. 79); and also that Laws of 1885, c. 104, p. 151; Gen. Stat. 1901, §§ 1251, 1252, conferring upon telephone companies all the rights given to telegraph companies by Gen. Stat. 1868, art. 8, c. 23, is not in contravention of the requirements of the Constitution, art. 2, § 16, that no law shall be revived or amended, unless the new act contain the entire act revived, or the section or sections amended.

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18 Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Southern R. Co., 89 Fed. 190.

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