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THO' there be no such thing as Chance in the
world; our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understand. ing, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.
There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of chances on any fide; and according as this superiority encreases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionable encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that fide, in which we discover the superi
ority. ority. If a dye were mark'd with one figure or number of spots on four fides, and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would be more probable, that the former should turn up than the latter; tho' if it had a thousand fides mark'd in the same manner, and only one opposite side, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure. This process of the thought or seasoning may seem trivial and obvious; but to those, who consider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for very curious speculation.
* Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probahle. In this view, we must say, that 'tis only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow, But to conform our language more to common use, we hould divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. ' By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition,
It seems evident, that when the mind looks for. ward to discover the event, which may result from the throw of such a dye, it considers the turning up of each particular fide as alike probable ; and this is the very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended in it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of fides concur in the one event than the oiher, the mind is carry'd more fre. quently to that event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various posibilities or chances, on which the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of feveral views in one particular event begets im. mediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives that event the ad. vantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a
: smaller number of views, and recurs lefs frequently
to the mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fi&tions of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps, in some measure, be account. ed for. The concurrence of these several views or glimpfes imprints its idea more strongly on the ima. gination ; gives it superior force and vigour ; renders its influence on the passions and affections more senfible ; and in a word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion.
The case is the same with the probability of causes as with that of chance. There are some causes, which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect ; and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their opera. tion. Fire has always burnt, and water fuffocated every human creature : The production of motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has hi. therto admitted of no exception. But there are other causes which have been found more irregular and uncertain ; nor has rhubarb prov'd always a purge, or opium a soporific to every one, who has taken these medicines. 'Tis true; when any cause fails of producing its usual effect, philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but fuppofe, that some fecret causes, in the particular structure of parts, have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, how. ever, and conclusions concerning the event are the fame as if this principle had no place. Being determind by cuftom to transfer the past to the future, in all our inferences; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the event with the greatest affur. ance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition. But where different effects have been found to follow from causes, which are to appearance exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future, and enter into our con. fideration, when we determine the probability of the event. Tho' we give the preference to that which has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we must not overlook the other effects, but mult give each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent. 'Tis more probable, in every place of Eitrope, that there will be frost sometime in January, than that the weather will continue open throughout that whole month; tho’this probability varies according to the different climates, and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it seems evident, that when we transfer the past to the future, in order to determine the effect, which will refult from any cause, we transfer all the different events, in the fame proportion as they have appear'd in the past, and conceive one to have existed a hundred times,
for for instance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget that sentiment which we call belief, and give it the preference above its antagonist, which is not supported by an equal number of experiments, and occurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future. Let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of philofophy, and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part, I shall think it sufficient, if the present hints excite the curiosity of philosophers, and make them sensible how extremely defective all common theories are, in treating of such ca. rious and such sublime subjects.