the fentiment of all philofophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here then is our natural ftate of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedy'd by experience? It only fhews us a number of uniform effects, refulting from certain objects, and teaches us, that thofe particular objects, at that particular time, were endow'd with such powers and forces. When a new object, endow'd with fimilar fenfible qualities is produc'd, we expect fimilar powers and forces, and lay our ac count with a like effect. From a body of like colour and confistence with bread, we look for like nourishment and fupport. But this furely is a step or progrefs of the mind, which wants to be explain'd. When a man fays, I have found, in all paft inftances, fuch fenfible qualities, coxjoin'd with fuch fecret powers: And when he fays, fimilar fenfible qualities will always be conjoin'd with fimilar fecret powers; he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are thefe propofitions in any refpect the fame. You fay that the one propofition is an inference from another. But you must confess, that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonftra. tive: Of what nature is it then? To say it is experimental is begging the question. For all inferences

rience fuppofe, as their foundation, that

future will resemble the past, and that fimilar powers will be conjoin'd with fimilar fenfible qualities. Cafpicion, that the courfe of nature

ab:

may

Szeire, that the understanding of the child is jei nu mis conclusion by any procefs of argument

zachten. I may july require you to produce argument: or have you any pretext to refuse fo SURAS I TEMA. You cannot say, that the arpenne s katruit and may poilibly escape your O zi par; face you confess, that it is obTHE CC of a mere infant. If you hefiza, parerere, a moment, or if, after reflection, you PRE ET USU and profound argument, you, a i namen. F're up the queftion, and confefs, that is not eating, which engages us to fuppofe the pad còndling the future, and to expect fimilar efech fem caels, which are, to appearance, fimilar. Ins is the proposition, which I intended to enforce

the present clay. If I be right, I pretend to have made no mighty difcovery. And if I be wrong, I mut acknowlege my felf to be indeed a very backward scholar; fince I cannot now difcover an argument, which, it feems, was perfectly familiar to me, long before I was out of my cradle.

ESSAY

[67]

ESSAY

V.

SCEPTICAL SOLUTION of thofe DOUBts.

PART I.

HE paffion for philofophy, like that for religion, feems liable to this inconvenience, that, tho' it aims at the correction of our manners and extirpation of our vices, it may only ferve, by imprudent management, to fofter a predominant inclina tion, and push the mind, with more determin'd refolution, towards that fide, which already draws too much, by the byafs and propensity of the natural temper. 'Tis certain, that, while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philofophic fage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may, at last, render our philosophy, like that of Epictetus and other Stoicks, only a more refin'd fyftem of felfishness, and reafon ourfelves out of all virtue, as well as focial enjoyment. While we ftady with attention the vanity of human life, and

turn

rent al our hughes en the empty and transitory MAIZE A NICHES and honours, we are, perhaps, all

waik hattering our natural indolence, which, best the bulls ze the world and drudgery of buPAYS-BAS Z NE of salon to give itself a full ne mopatra'e mdulgence. There is, however, NYA Nohr, which items little liable VEER and that because it ftrikes in

passion of the human mind, nor

(120° with ary natural affection propenare that as the ACADEMIC OF SCEPTICAL phio The academics talk always of doccts and

ne augment, of danger in hafty determi pacions, d2 connning to very narrow bounds the enquises of the understanding, and of renouncing all gooomlations which lie not within the limits of comaa hie and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be we contrary than such a philosophy to the spine adalence of the mind, its rash arrogance, its lefty pretenfions, and its fuperftitious credulity. Every pailion is mortify'd by it, except the love of trath; and that paffion never is, nor can be carry'd to too high a degree. 'Tis furprizing, therefore, that this philofophy, which, in almost every inftance, muft be lefs and innocent, fhould be the fubject of fo oundless reproach and obloquy. But, per e very circumstance which renders it fo inis what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred

and

and refentment. By flattering no irregular paffion, it gains few partizans: By oppofing fo many vices and follies, it raises to itself abundance of enemies, who ftigmatize it as libertine, prophane, and irreligious.

NOR need we fear, that this philofophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, fhould ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts fo far as to deftroy all action, as well as fpeculation. Nature will always. maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reafoning whatsoever. Tho' we should conclude, for inftance, as in the foregoing effay, that, in all reafonings from experience, there is a ftep taken by the mind, which is not fupported by any argument or process of the understanding; there is no danger, that these reasonings, on which almost all knowlege depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. If the mind be not engag'd, by argument to make this ftep, it must be induc'd by fome other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preferve its influence as long as human nature remains the fame. What that principle is, may well be worth the pains of enquiry.

SUPPOSE a perfon, tho' endow'd with the strongest faculties of reafon and reflection, to be brought on a fud.