acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular fhade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different fhades of that colour, except that fingle one, be plac'd before him, defcending gradually from the deepest to the lightesft; 'tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that fhade is wanting, and will be fenfible, that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether 'tis poffible for him, from his own imagination, to fupply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, tho' it had never been convey'd to him by his fenfes ? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the fimple ideas are not always, in every instance, deriv'd from the correfpondent impreffions; tho' this inftance is fo fingular, that 'tis fcarce worth our obferving, and does not merit, that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.

HERE, therefore, is a propofition, which not only feems, in itself, fimple and intelligible; but, if a proper ufe were made of it, might render every difpute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has fo long taken poffeffion of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn such disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obfcure: The VOL. II.

B

mind

mind has but a flender hold of them: They are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas: And when we have often employ'd any term, tho' without a diftinct meaning, we are apt to imagine that it has a determinate idea, annex'd to it. On the contrary, all impreffions, that is, all fenfations, either outward or inward, are strong and fenfible: The limits betwixt them are more exactly determin'd: Nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain therefore any suspicion, that a philofophical term is employ'd without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent) we need but enquire, from what impreffion is that fuppos'd idea deriv'd? And if it be impoffible to affign any, this will ferve to confirm our fufpicion. By bringing ideas into fo clear a light, we may reasonably hope to remove all difpute, which may arife, concerning their nature and reality *.

'Tis probable, that no more was meant by those, who deny'd innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impreffions; tho' it must be confefs'd, that the terms which they employ'd were not chofen with such caution, nor fo exactly defin'd as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allow'd to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in oppofition to what is uncommen, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, cotemporary to our birth, the difpute feems to be frivolous; nor it it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word, idea, feems to be commonly taken in a very loofe fenfe,

fenfe, even by Mr. Locke himself, as standing for any of our perceptions, our fenfations and paffions, as well as thoughts. Now in this fenfe, I fhould defire to know, what can be meant by afferting, that self-love, or refentment of injuries, or the paffion betwixt the fexes is not innate ?

But admitting these terms, impreffions and ideas, in the fenfe above explain'd, and understanding by innate what is original or copy'd from no precedent perception, then may we affert, that all our impreffions are innate, and our ideas not innate.

To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that Mr, Locke was betray'd into this queftion by the schoolmen, who making use of undefin ́d terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in queftion. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run thro' all that great philosopher's reasonings on this subject,

i

[29]

ESSAY III.

Of the ASSOCIATION of IDEAS.

'T'

IS evident, that there is a principle of con nexion betwixt the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse, this is so obfervable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon this regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remark'd and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was ftill a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which fucceeded each other. Were the looseft and freeft conversation to be tranfcrib'd, there would immediately be obferv'd something, which connected it in all its tranfitions. Or where this is wanting, the perfon, who broke the thread of difcourfe, might B 3

ftill